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Opinions regarding capital account openness have been undergoing changes. On the one
hand, financial liberalization and integration are viewed as sources of economic growth
and prosperity due to a better allocation of capital to productive uses. In addition, free
capital mobility and access to foreign capital are considered to be important facilitators
of investment as well as cross-border risk sharing. On the other hand, during the global
financial crisis, free capital mobility was blamed for exchange rate overvaluation, overbor-
rowing, fueling of credit booms, asset price bubbles, and sudden stops. Policymakers in
emerging market economies claim that the risk of macroeconomic and financial instability
increases due to large and volatile global capital flows. Chapters 1 and 2 of this disser-
tation analyze policies, such as capital flow management measures, monetary policy, and
foreign exchange (FX) interventions, that are implemented by policymakers in emerging
market economies with the aim of smoothing economic and financial fluctuations. Chap-
ter 3 assesses the determinants of capital market integration in Europe, motivated by the
benefits that cross-border capital flows can bring to economies.
The first chapter presents a novel dataset on the easing and tightening of capital
controls on inflows and outflows for 24 emerging market economies for the 1997-2014 period
at a quarterly frequency. The indexes on capital controls and an index on macroprudential
policies (Cerutti et al., 2017b) are then used to estimate policy reaction functions that
examine the motivation for a time-varying adjustment of these policy measures. According
to both the theoretical literature and policymakers, such as the International Monetary
Fund, macroprudential policies and controls on net capital inflows should be used in a
countercyclical manner in order to smooth business and financial fluctuations. Indeed, the
empirical findings of this chapter show that adjustment of macroprudential policies and
capital controls on inflows can be largely explained by changing global financial conditions;
that is, the policies are used to limit exposure to international capital flows. However, the
pattern of loosening and tightening of macroprudential policies and capital controls varies
across instruments and categories of assets as well as exhibits some heterogeneity across
countries with different income levels, external indebtedness, and exchange rate regimes.
XVI
SUMMARY
The second chapter analyzes, using a sample of 15 emerging market economies, whether
countries with a large foreign exchange debt in the non-financial private sector tend to react
more strongly to exchange rate changes using both FX interventions and monetary policy.
As empirical observations suggest, countries with de jure floating exchange rate regimes
are often reluctant to allow their currencies to float freely in practice. One reason why
countries may wish to limit exchange rate volatility is potential negative balance sheet
effects due to currency mismatches on the balance sheets of firms and households. This
chapter supports the idea that an important source of “fear of floating” is balance sheet
currency mismatches. This effect is asymmetric; that is, countries stem depreciation, but
not appreciation pressure.
The third chapter assesses the potential for legal harmonization and convergence in
institutional quality to affect financial structures in Europe. The chapter is motivated
by the Action Plan for a European Capital Markets Union, which aims to deepen and
integrate financial markets in the European Union (EU) through standardization and
harmonization of financial regulations. Based on self-collected data on the implementation
of the EU-Directives, the analysis suggests that legal harmonization promotes portfolio
equity holdings, while discrepancies in institutional quality, such as insolvency procedures,
investor protection, and tax systems, matter primarily for cross-border debt positions. In
addition, the relationship between external investments and harmonization of regulations




Die Meinungen u¨ber Kapitalmarkto¨ffnung haben sich immer wieder gea¨ndert. Auf der
einen Seite werden die Liberalisierung und Integration von Finanzma¨rkten als begu¨nsti-
gender Faktor fu¨r Wirtschaftswachstum und Wohlstand angesehen, da sie zu einer pro-
duktiveren Allokation von Kapital beitragen. Außerdem werden freier Kapitalverkehr und
Zugang zu Auslandskapital als wichtige Faktoren fu¨r Investitionen und grenzu¨berschrei-
tende Risikoteilung gesehen. Auf der anderen Seite wurden dem freien Kapitalverkehr
Verantwortung fu¨r U¨berbewertungen von Wa¨hrungen, U¨berschuldung, zu hohe Kredit-
bereitschaft, Vermo¨genspreisblasen und plo¨tzliche Unterbrechungen von Finanzstro¨men
zugewiesen. Politische Entscheidungstra¨ger in Schwellenla¨ndern haben zudem behauptet,
dass das Risiko makroo¨konomischer und finanzieller Instabilita¨t mit großen und volatilen
internationalen Kapitalflu¨ssen ansteigt. Kapitel 1 und 2 dieser Doktorarbeit widmen sich
der Analyse von Maßnahmen, die von Entscheidungstra¨gern in Schwellenla¨ndern imple-
mentiert werden, um wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Schwankungen zu reduzieren, wie zum
Beispiel das Management von Kapitalflu¨ssen, Geldpolitik und Wechselkursinterventionen.
Kapitel 3 untersucht die Einflussfaktoren der Kapitalmarktintegration in Europa motiviert
durch die Vorteile, die grenzu¨berschreitender Kapitalverkehr fu¨r die beteiligten La¨nder mit
sich bringen kann.
Das erste Kapitel beschreibt einen neuartigen Datensatz von Lockerungen und Straf-
fungen der Kontrollen von Kapitalzuflu¨ssen und Kapitalabflu¨ssen fu¨r 24 Schwellenla¨nder
u¨ber den Zeitraum 1997-2014 bei viertelja¨hrlicher Frequenz. Die konstruierten Indizes fu¨r
Kapitalverkehrskontrollen und ein Index fu¨r makroprudenzielle Maßnahmen (Cerutti et al.,
2017b) werden anschließend dafu¨r verwendet, Funktionen zu scha¨tzen, mit denen die Mo-
tivation fu¨r zeitlich variierende Anpassungen dieser Maßnahmen untersucht werden kann.
Die theoretische wissenschaftliche Literatur und A¨ußerungen von internationalen Entschei-
dungstra¨gern, wie zum Beispiel dem Internationalen Wa¨hrungsfond, legen nahe, dass die
antizyklische Verwendung von makroprudenziellen Maßnahmen und Kapitalkontrollen fu¨r
Netto-Kapitalzuflu¨sse fu¨r Volkswirtschaften vorteilhaft sind, da sie konjunkturelle und
finanzielle Zyklen gla¨tten ko¨nnen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Anpassungen von makro-
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prudenziellen Maßnahmen und Kapitalkontrollen fu¨r Kapitalzuflu¨sse zum Großteil mit
wechselnden globalen finanziellen Bedingungen erkla¨rt werden ko¨nnen. Das bedeutet, dass
die Maßnahmen dafu¨r verwendet werden, die Exposition gegenu¨ber dem internationalen
Kapitalverkehr zu reduzieren. Das Muster der Lockerung und Straffung von makropruden-
ziellen Maßnahmen und Kapitalverkehrskontrollen variiert hinsichtlich der betrachteten
Maßnahmen und Vermo¨gensarten und weist einige Heterogenita¨t zwischen La¨ndern mit
unterschiedlichen Einkommensniveaus, Auslandsverschuldungsquoten und Wechselkursre-
gimen auf.
Das zweite Kapitel untersucht anhand einer Stichprobe von 15 Schwellenla¨ndern, ob
La¨nder mit einer hohen Auslandsverschuldung im nicht finanziellen Privatsektor tenden-
ziell sta¨rker mit Wechselkursinterventionen und Geldpolitik auf Wechselkursa¨nderungen
reagieren. Empirische Beobachtungen legen nahe, dass Schwellenla¨nder mit einem de jure
freien Wechselkursregime oft zo¨gerlich sind, ihre Wa¨hrungen in der Praxis tatsa¨chlich frei
schwanken zu lassen. Ein Grund dafu¨r, dass La¨nder versuchen, die Volatilita¨t ihrer Wech-
selkurse zu reduzieren, sind mo¨gliche negative Effekte wegen der Wa¨hrungsdifferenzen
in den Bilanzen von Unternehmen und privaten Haushalten. Das Kapitel unterstu¨tzt die
Idee, dass Wa¨hrungsdifferenzen in Bilanzen ein wichtiger Grund fu¨r die sogenannte“fear of
floating” sind. Der Effekt ist asymmetrisch in der Hinsicht, dass La¨nder Abwertungsdruck
aushalten, nicht jedoch Druck zur Aufwertung ihrer Wa¨hrung.
Das dritte Kapitel widmet sich den Auswirkungen rechtlicher Harmonisierung und der
Konvergenz der institutionellen Qualita¨t auf die Finanzmarktstrukturen in Europa. Das
Kapitel ist durch den Aktionsplan fu¨r eine Europa¨ische Kapitalmarktunion motiviert, der
durch Standardisierung und Harmonisierung von Finanzmarktregeln eine Vertiefung und
Integration der Finanzma¨rkte in der EU anstrebt. Auf Basis eines selbststa¨ndig erstellten
Datensatzes zur Implementierung von EU-Richtlinien zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass rechtli-
che Harmonisierung grenzu¨berschreitende Investitionen in Aktien befo¨rdert. Unterschiede
in der institutionellen Qualita¨t, zum Beispiel hinsichtlich Insolvenzverfahren, Schutz von
Investoren und Steuersysteme, sind in erster Linie fu¨r die Integration der Anleihema¨rk-
te von Bedeutung. Die Beziehung zwischen Auslandsinvestitionen und Harmonisierung
der Regulierung variiert zudem deutlich u¨ber die verschiedenen Sektoren. Die Ergebnisse
werden am sta¨rksten von den Investitionen institutioneller Investoren gepra¨gt.
XIX
Introduction and Overview
The debate on whether free cross-border movement of capital is beneficial for the economy
and how to deal with volatile capital flows resumed since the global financial crisis of
2007-2009. Capital inflows (Figure 0.1) to both advanced and developing economies were
steadily growing prior to 2007 and then significantly dropped, coinciding with the global
financial crisis that affected a large number of countries simultaneously. While capital flows
can be beneficial for economic growth and development, they can also bring potential risks
for economic and financial stability, with short-term debt flows being especially disruptive.
At the same time, capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and equity
are considered to be rather stabilizing (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2011). The ability of countries
to handle the risks and extract the benefits of capital flows crucially depends on the quality
of their policies and institutions (Fratzscher and Imbs, 2009). Sound macroeconomic
policies and efficient regulations of the financial sector as well as a developed banking
sector and financial markets are important prerequisites for successful capital account
liberalization (Kose et al., 2006, 2011).
Figure 0.1: Capital inflows, 1980-2015. Note: The Figure displays capital inflows (FDI, portfolio
debt and equity, and credit) to advanced economies and the rest of the world for the 1980-2015 period.
Advanced economies include 22 OECD economies. Source: The updated and extended version of the
dataset of net private and public capital flows constructed by Alfaro et al. (2014), based on the IMF IFS.
1
Introduction and Overview
The widespread view pioneered by Solow (1956) is that open and well-functioning
financial markets are important facilitators of economic growth and better standards of
living. Liberalization of the capital account allows countries with an abundance of capital
to transfer it to countries with scarce capital. As a result of lower costs of borrowing
and better access to foreign capital, investments and economic growth tend to increase.
In addition, economic growth is spurred via efficiency gains that come with improvement
of technologies and organizational structures (Henry, 2007). Further, developed financial
markets allow for better cross-border risk sharing and consumption smoothing, especially
via equity markets (Kose et al., 2009; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2011; Bremus and Buch, 2018).
At the same time, the literature points out that capital markets are prone to herding
behavior and panics due to incomplete information, moral hazards, and adverse selection
(Stiglitz, 2000) and capital does not always flow to countries with the fastest productivity
growth (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013). Moreover, volatile capital inflows and outflows
can be disruptive for an economy and may result in sudden stops and reversals of capi-
tal (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008). Policymakers in emerging market economies (EMEs)
claim that the risk of macroeconomic and financial instability increases due to large and
volatile global capital flows that are often speculative. Around the global financial crisis,
free capital mobility was blamed for exchange rate overvaluation, overborrowing, fueling
of credit booms, asset price bubbles, and sudden stops, in both emerging markets and
advanced economies (IMF, 2011).
Due to the disruptive nature of speculative capital flows, many countries try to limit
capital inflows and prevent huge capital outflows by introducing capital controls (e.g.,
Brazil 2008-2010, Colombia 2007-2008). IMF (2011) suggests that restrictions on net
capital inflows and macroprudential regulations should be tightened during booms and
relaxed during busts in business and financial activities; that is, these policies should be
used countercyclically. As the theoretical literature shows, used this way, capital controls
can promote financial stability (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Benigno et al., 2016) and
improve macroeconomic adjustment (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2016).
The first chapter, Capital controls and macroprudential policies: Are they counter-
cyclical?, provides empirical evidence on the factors that motivate policymakers in emerg-
ing market economies to adjust macroprudential policies and capital controls. More specif-
ically, I investigate whether controls on net capital inflows and macroprudential policies
have been adjusted in a countercyclical manner throughout global and local business as well
as financial cycles. To this end, I construct a new index on the adjustment – tightening and
easing – of capital controls on inflows and outflows for five types of assets (portfolio debt,
portfolio equity, FDI, credit, and derivatives) in 24 emerging economies for the 1997-2014
period at a quarterly frequency. The constructed indexes and the macroprudential policy
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index by Cerutti et al. (2017b) are then related to global and local cyclical components of
gross domestic product (GDP), credit to private non-financial corporations, real effective
exchange rates, and financial conditions indicators. For that, I apply policy reaction func-
tions to capital flow management (CFM) policies, assuming that a policymaker chooses
between tightening, easing, and not changing CFM measures after observing all available
information on global as well as local economic and financial developments. The findings
suggest that adjustment of macroprudential policies and capital controls on inflows can
be largely explained by changing global financial conditions. In addition, I show that the
pattern of loosening and tightening of macroprudential policies and capital controls varies
across instruments and categories of assets as well as exhibits some heterogeneity across
countries with different income levels, external indebtedness, and exchange rate regimes.
Chapter 1 contributes to the literature, first, by constructing a novel dataset on the
tightening and easing of capital controls on outflows and inflows. The most widely used
measures of capital controls, such as the ones by Chinn and Ito (2006) and Fernandez
et al. (2015a), did not provide information on changes in the existing restrictions. At
the same time, the indexes constructed for this chapter capture time-varying adjustments
of the restrictions and provide a detailed information on the tightening and easing of
the restrictions on different types of assets. Second, the chapter analyzes whether local
or global economic and financial developments motivate policymakers to adjust capital
controls and macroprudential policies, while previous empirical studies (Fratzscher, 2012;
Aizenman and Pasricha, 2013; Pasricha, 2017) looked solely at local cycles. The results of
this chapter, however, suggest that policies in EMEs are sensitive to global cycles due to
the dependence of economies on capital inflows.
Another concern regarding economic and financial stability in emerging market economies
lies in the choice of exchange rate regime. As compared to pegs, floating exchange rate
regimes are considered to be more efficient in absorbing shocks and can serve as stabiliz-
ers of the economy (Eichengreen, 2016). Nevertheless, countries that often claim to be
floating are in fact not (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Many emerging market economies try
to limit exchange rate volatility due to a lack of credibility of the central banks’ policies,
high pass-through from exchange rates to prices, or negative balance sheet effects from
exchange rate movements. Capital flows can affect exchange rates in two ways. First, cap-
ital inflows are associated with an appreciation of exchange rates and a subsequent loss
of competitiveness of domestic firms. Second, capital outflows might lead to depreciation
of exchange rates, which may affect balance sheets of borrowers that obtain financing in
foreign currencies. Therefore, to smooth exchange rate movements, policymakers often
use capital flow management measures, monetary policy, or FX interventions.
The second chapter, Floating with a load of FX debt?, is a joint work with Uffe
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Mikkelsen. It assesses whether countries with high FX debt in the non-financial private
sector tend to react more strongly to exchange rate pressure using monetary policy and
FX interventions. As the empirical observations by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggest,
many emerging market economies use interest rates and FX interventions, among others,
to stabilize exchange rates. One of the possible explanations for the “fear of floating” are
negative balance sheet effects of exchange rate volatility when debt is denominated in a
foreign currency. This chapter tests this hypothesis in a panel setup, using monthly data
for 15 emerging market economies for the 2002-2015 period. We estimate two separate
equations for FX interventions and policy rates and analyze whether the correlation be-
tween policy instruments and exchange rate changes is amplified by the stock of FX debt
that non-financial private sector holds. The results suggest that indeed the level of FX
debt affects the sensitivity of the instruments – FX interventions and policy rates – to
exchange rate changes. This finding supports the idea that an important source of the
“fear of floating”are balance sheet currency mismatches. This effect is asymmetric; that is,
countries stem depreciation, but not appreciation pressure. Moreover, FX debt financed
through the domestic banking system is more important for the “fear of floating” than FX
debt obtained directly from external sources.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by examining the influence of private sector FX
exposures on central banks’ policies and accounting directly for externally and domestically
financed FX borrowing, while previous studies considered only liability dollarization of
the domestic banking system (Honig, 2005; Harms and Hoffmann, 2011). That allows
the provision of focused policy recommendations on the importance of reducing specific
types of debt. In addition, the chapter distinguishes between the effect of exchange rate
depreciation and appreciation, revealing that currency depreciation may threaten financial
stability due to balance sheet effects.
Finally, being motivated by the benefits that developed financial markets and free cap-
ital mobility may bring, I look at the Action Plan for the European Capital Markets Union
(CMU) that was launched in 2015. The EU capital market is rather underdeveloped as
compared to those of other advanced economies, such as the USA or Japan (Langfield
and Pagano, 2016). Moreover, the financial markets in the EU remain national and cross-
border financial integration is rather limited (European Commission, 2015). The Action
Plan aims to promote capital market integration in Europe and further deepen debt and
equity markets. By investigating potential determinants of cross-border debt and eq-
uity investment, the literature provides ample evidence that information frictions between
countries due to differences in language and legal origins, along with deep-rooted prefer-
ences and habits, can explain a significant part of cross-border equity and debt holdings
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012; Giofre, 2013a; Roque and
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Cortez, 2014; Giofre, 2017).
The third chapter, Legal harmonization, institutional quality, and countries’ external
positions: A sectoral analysis, is a joint work with Franziska Bremus. It analyzes legal
and institutional determinants of countries’ external debt and equity positions for a large
sample of advanced economies, with a focus on EU countries. More specifically, it assesses
whether harmonization of financial regulations (as suggested by the Action Plan) can sup-
port capital market integration. In addition, it investigates how cross-country differences in
the quality of institutional variables, such as insolvency recovery rates, strength of investor
protection, coverage of credit registries, and efficiency of tax and contract laws, are related
to cross-border portfolio debt and equity investment. The results suggest that, first, legal
harmonization promotes portfolio equity holdings. Second, discrepancies in institutional
quality matter primarily for cross-border debt positions. Third, the relationship between
external investments and harmonization of regulations varies significantly across sectors:
the non-bank financial corporations, which account for a large share of portfolio positions,
react more to institutional harmonization than banks and the non-financial private sector.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by constructing a bilateral index on legislative
harmonization of financial regulations in the EU and analyzing its effect on capital mar-
ket integration. The index of legislative harmonization by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010)
is extended by collecting the dates of the transposition of the EU-Directives in the area
of financial regulations by the new member states as well as by including information on
the new EU-Directives that were introduced post-crisis. In addition, the chapter stud-
ies the potential of legislative harmonization and convergence in institutional quality to
promote capital market integration, while previous literature analyzed effects on banking
integration (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010; Houston et al., 2012). Finally, it analyzes the
determinants of international investment positions at the sectoral level, while most of the
previous gravity studies were based on aggregate data (Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012).
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Chapter 1
Capital Controls and Macroprudential
Policies: Are they Countercyclical?
1.1 Introduction
The ability of capital flow management (CFM) measures, macroprudential policies (MP)
and capital controls (CC), to smooth economic and financial fluctuations by putting “sand
in the wheels” of international borrowing (by Tobin, 1978) is widely debated by academics
and policymakers (IMF, 2011). The theoretical literature suggests that restrictions on net
capital inflows and macroprudential regulations should be tightened during booms and
relaxed during busts; this way CFM measures promote financial stability (Jeanne and
Korinek, 2010; Benigno et al., 2016) and improve macroeconomic adjustment (Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe, 2016). Additionally, Korinek and Sandri (2016) show that it is desirable
to employ both types of instruments as macroprudential regulations reduce indebtedness
of leveraged borrowers, while capital controls induce more precautionary behavior for the
economy as a whole.
Indeed, during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, many emerging market economies
(EMEs) reintroduced capital controls on inflows (e.g., Brazil 2008-10, Colombia 2007-08)
using them as a countercyclical tool. At the same time, some countries with capital controls
in place, like China and India, have been gradually liberalizing their capital accounts with
no regard to business or financial developments. Additionally, many countries started us-
ing macroprudential policies not only as domestic prudential regulations, but also as tools
for managing capital flows. In this paper, I investigate whether controls on net capital
inflows and macroprudential policies have indeed been adjusted in a countercyclical man-
ner throughout business and financial cycles, as suggested by the theoretical literature
and as advised by the international organizations. In addition, I examine whether use
6
Chapter 1. Capital Controls and Macroprudential Policies: Are they Countercyclical?
of capital flow management measures is driven by global or local economic and financial
developments.
To this end, I construct a novel dataset on the tightening and easing of capital controls
on outflows and inflows for 5 types of assets (portfolio equity, portfolio bonds, FDI, credit,
and derivatives) in 24 emerging market economies for the 1997-2014 period at a quarterly
frequency. The existing datasets on capital controls mostly gauge the existence of policies
at aggregated (Chinn and Ito, 2006) or disaggregated (Fernandez et al., 2015a) levels. They
describe whether capital controls are in place or not for a given country in a certain year.
Yet, they do not capture time-varying adjustments of the restrictions. Other datasets, such
as Pasricha (2012), Ahmed et al. (2015), Chantapacdepong and Shim (2015), and Garcia
(2017), account for subsequent changes of capital controls by incorporating tightening and
easing of the policies. The dataset constructed for this paper contributes to the efforts
to measure changes in capital controls and improves on country, time, and asset type
coverage. As the subsequent analysis suggests, more granular data on capital controls
with a disaggregation by asset type and direction of the policy is needed as policymakers
may have different motivation for tightening and easing of the policies for various types of
assets. Additionally, I construct an index of capital controls on outflows, while the existing
literature, with the exception of Pasricha (2012) and Garcia (2017), only concentrates on
capital controls on inflows.
The constructed capital controls indexes and the macroprudential policy indexes by
Cerutti et al. (2017b) are related to global and local cyclical components of GDP, credit
to private non-financial corporations (NFC), real effective exchange rates (REER), and
financial conditions indicator (FCI). To this end, I apply policy reaction functions that are
common in monetary policy literature to CFM policies. I estimate logit and multinomial
logit models, assuming for the latter that a policymaker chooses between tightening, easing,
and not changing CFM measures after observing all available information on global as well
as local economic and financial developments. The main results of this paper suggest that
capital controls on inflows and macroprudential policies are used countercyclically with
respect to global financial variables. Adjustment of these policies can be largely explained
by changing global financial conditions. For example, when financial conditions tighten,
the probability of easing macroprudential policies and capital controls on inflows increases
to 60% and 20%, respectively. At the same time, capital controls on outflows behave
somewhat procyclically throughout local business and financial cycles.
Further, the behavior of CFM measures varies across prudential instruments and cap-
ital restrictions on different categories of assets. Local and foreign reserve requirements
(RR) as well as loan-to-value (LTV) ratios behave countercyclically, while adjustment of
the other instruments is not related to the cycles. Additionally, the results obtained for
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capital controls on inflows are mostly driven by restrictions on credit flows. Yet, adjust-
ment of the restrictions on the other capital inflows is related to changing global financial
conditions. Finally, countries apply different instruments, macroprudential policies versus
capital controls on net capital inflows, and strategies, countercyclical versus acyclical use
of CFM policies, depending on their income level, external indebtedness, and exchange
rate regime. Overall, the results support findings of the theoretical literature on cyclical-
ity of CFM measures, with an important distinction between global and local cycles. The
paper suggests that global developments, and especially global financial conditions, are
important in shaping the use of capital flow management measures.
The findings of this paper are related to studies on cyclicality of CFM measures. For
capital controls, there is no consensus in the literature on whether they are imposed and
adjusted countercyclically or not. While Fernandez et al. (2015b) find that capital con-
trols are largely acyclical, Fratzscher (2012), Aizenman and Pasricha (2013), and Pasricha
(2017) show that capital controls are adjusted based on concerns about an overheating
of the domestic economy as well as FX policy objectives. My study contributes to the
existing literature by relating capital controls to both global and local cycles, thus showing
that these policies might be affected by developments abroad. Additionally, the analysis
is performed for capital controls on inflows and outflows disaggregated by categories of
assets, while the existing studies analyzed aggregated indexes. A more granular approach
accounts for heterogeneous preferences of policymakers in adjusting capital controls on
more volatile debt, equity, and credit flows as compared to rather stable FDI flows.
For macroprudential policies, Cerutti et al. (2017b) and Federico et al. (2014) find that
reserve requirements are used in a countercyclical manner with respect to domestic cycles
defined by GDP gap and credit growth. My paper adds to the literature by analyzing
behavior of macroprudential policies throughout global business and financial cycles sug-
gesting that macroprudential policies might be used by policymakers to regulate capital
flows. Further, I analyze a larger number of macroprudential instruments, thus providing
some additional insights on importance of and motivation for different types of regulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides literature re-
view and derives hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes data on capital controls and macropru-
dential policies as well as provides definitions for financial and business cycles. Section 1.4
performs unconditional correlation analysis between CFM indexes and the main financial
and macroeconomic variables as well as studies behavior of CFM measures around the
global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Section 1.5 describes econometric methodology and
discusses the main empirical findings on the (counter-)cyclical adjustment of capital con-
trols and macroprudential policies. In addition, this Section presents robustness tests of
the results and extensions of the model. Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Literature review and hypotheses
This paper aims to assess whether central banks and other regulators systematically ad-
just, tighten or ease, macroprudential policies and capital controls on net capital inflows
in a countercyclical manner. Therefore, it is directly related to the following strands of
literature: (1) datasets on existence and adjustment of capital controls and macropruden-
tial policies; and (2) (counter-)cyclical adjustment of capital flow management measures
throughout financial and business cycles.
Databases on capital controls and macroprudential policies. First, there is a
growing number of datasets on the level of, and change in, capital account restrictions.
Cross-country time series of capital controls are usually drawn from the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER) and are sometimes supplemented by country-specific information from news
and press releases. These datasets are mostly used to analyze effectiveness of the policies.
The first type of dataset measures the existence of capital controls aggregated across dif-
ferent asset classes, as in Chinn and Ito (2006), or at a disaggregated level, as in Schindler
(2009) and Fernandez et al. (2015a). The dataset by Fernandez et al. (2015a) presents
information on capital restrictions on inflows and outflows for 10 categories of assets for
100 countries between 1995 and 2014 at an annual frequency. It codes capital controls as
one if there are some restrictions in place and zero, otherwise. These measures, however,
do not capture time-varying changes in the intensity of restrictions. For example, Brazil
changed IOF, the tax on portfolio inflows, four times during the 2008-2010 period. This
change in intensity is not reflected in the datasets discussed above and it is simply coded
as a presence of the capital control.
The second type of datasets accounts for subsequent adjustment of capital controls by
incorporating tightening and easing of the policies. These datasets are presented in papers
by Pasricha et al. (2017), Garcia (2017), Forbes et al. (2015), Chantapacdepong and Shim
(2015), and Ahmed and Zlate (2014). The datasets usually cover either a short time span
or a small number of countries. The datasets that are the closest to this paper are those
by Pasricha et al. (2017) and Ahmed et al. (2015). Pasricha et al. (2017) calculates the
number of easing and tightening steps for capital controls on inflows and outflows for 17
emerging market economies between 2001 and 2011 at a daily frequency, disaggregating
them by an assets type and classifying them into quantitative, monitoring, and price-based
measures. Then a cumulative index is constructed by weighting changes in policies by the
share of country’s total international assets or liabilities that the measure is designed to
influence. Ahmed et al. (2015) calculates the number of steps that countries undergo to put
new restrictions in place, tighten or ease them, or remove them altogether. The indexes
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measure capital controls on inflows for four types of assets (portfolio equity, portfolio bond,
FDI, and credit) for 19 countries between 2002 and 2012 at a quarterly frequency.
Second, there are a few global datasets on macroprudential policies. In particular, Lim
et al. (2011) present a dataset of 10 types of macroprudential measures for 42 economies
over the 2000-2010 period. Further, the Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments Survey
by the IMF covers 125 countries and provides a comprehensive overview of the timing and
use of different macroprudential policies across 125 countries. The information is provided
by country authorities and it is cross-checked by IMF country desk economists. Using
this survey, the dataset by Cerutti et al. (2017a) documents the use of macroprudential
policies for 119 countries over the 2000-2013 period, covering 12 instruments. My paper
relies on the dataset by Cerutti et al. (2017b) that focuses on changes in intensity in the
use of 5 types of prudential tools (capital buffers, interbank exposure limits, concentration
limits, LTV limits, and reserve requirements) for 64 countries over the 2000-2014 period
at a quarterly frequency.
Cyclicality of CFM measures. Based on the theoretical literature, capital controls
on net capital inflows and macroprudential policies that are imposed in a countercyclical
manner can promote financial stability (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Benigno et al., 2016;
Korinek and Sandri, 2016) and improve macroeconomic adjustment (Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe, 2016). Therefore, policymakers should tighten capital controls on inflows and re-
lax them on outflows during expansions, and vice versa during contractions. Similarly,
prudential regulations should be strengthened during periods of high growth and loosened
during recessions.
Empirically, a number of papers relate capital flow management measures to local fi-
nancial and business cycles. Fernandez et al. (2015b) find that capital controls are remark-
ably acyclical; that is, there is no movement in capital controls during booms and busts
in aggregate activity. More formally, Fratzscher (2012) shows that the (re-)introduction
and persistence of capital controls was motivated by FX policy objectives and concerns
about an overheating of the domestic economy. Using data on changes in capital controls,
Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) claim that capital controls on outflows were adjusted due
to overheating and foreign exchange valuation concerns arising from net capital inflows
pressure as well as for financial and macroeconomic stabilization reasons. Additionally,
Pasricha (2017) finds that policymakers respond to mercantilists concerns, that is promo-
tion of exports by manipulating the terms of trade or preventing foreign control of strategic
industries, by using both instruments – inflow tightening and outflow easing. At the same
time, only inflow tightening is used in response to macroprudential concerns.
For macroprudential policies, Cerutti et al. (2017b) find that LTV ratios and reserve
requirements are used in a countercyclical fashion with regard to local credit, policy rates,
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and house prices by many countries, while the other macroprudential instruments are
aimed at achieving structural objectives. Federico et al. (2014) claim that around two-
thirds of developing countries have used reserve requirements as a macroeconomic stabi-
lization tool substituting monetary policy that is usually procyclical.
Hypotheses. Relying on theoretical and empirical literature, this study tests the
hypotheses presented below. Hypothesis 1: Policymakers adjust macroprudential policies
and capital controls on net capital inflows in a countercyclical manner throughout global as
well as local business and financial cycles (as measured by GDP and credit to private NFC
gaps, respectively). When there is a surge in local or global economic and/or financial
activities, policymakers tighten macroprudential policies and capital controls on inflows
in order to constrain international and domestic borrowing and, thus, limit overheating
of the economy. The opposite happens in times of busts as easing of the policies should
attract additional capital from abroad and, in turn, facilitate investment and consumption.
Further, capital controls on outflows are tightened during recessions so that capital does
not fly away from the country, and vice versa during boosts. This way, macroprudential
policies and restrictions on net capital inflows are used as stabilization tools, or “leaning
against the wind.”
Hypothesis 2: Capital controls and macroprudential policies are adjusted due to fear of
appreciation (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) and changing financial conditions. With capital
inflows comes an upward pressure on the exchange value of the currency, which makes
domestic firms less competitive in global markets. As discussed by Magud et al. (2011), a
desire to stem such an appreciation results in tightening of capital controls on inflows or
easing of capital controls on outflows. Additionally, when financial conditions are wors-
ening (in this study, measured as an increase in financial conditions indicator), obtaining
internal and external financing for firms and households becomes difficult due to bank-
ing distress and/or downturn in securities or foreign exchange markets (Cardarelli et al.,
2011). Therefore, policymakers might be willing to ease CFM measures in order to facili-
tate lending and borrowing (Fratzscher, 2012).
Hypothesis 3: CFM measures are changed throughout local cycles, global cycles, or both.
While there is no clear guidance on this Hypothesis from the theoretical perspective, all of
the empirical studies discussed above relate CFM policies to local cyclical variables. On
the one hand, financial and economic stability is the main priority for policymakers and,
therefore, they should be guided by local economic and financial developments. On the
other hand, policymakers might be willing to closely follow global economic and financial
variables due to the presence of a global financial cycle in capital flows, asset prices, and
credit growth (Rey, 2015). This is particularly the case for the EMEs as their markets are
more sensitive to the global cycle due to their dependence on capital inflows.
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1.3 Data and summary statistics
The cyclicality of capital controls1 and macroprudential policies is assessed in a sample of
24 emerging market economies as presented in Appendix 1.B. The sample period spans
from 1997 to 2014 for capital controls (based on the availability of extended AREAER
reports) and from 2000 to 2014 for macroprudential policies. The use of quarterly as com-
pared to annual data is beneficial as, in practice, policies are often adopted and adjusted at
a high frequency in order to counteract movements in exchange rates or moderate highly
volatile financial indicators. Therefore, annual data might provide a muted picture. At
the same time, use of high frequency data is complicated as most macroeconomic variables
are not available at a monthly or daily frequency.
Data on capital controls and macroprudential policies. Capital flow man-
agement measures include capital controls and macroprudential policies. While capital
controls are defined as restrictions on cross-border financial activities that discriminate
based on the residency of transactors, macroprudential policies are aimed to regulate the
domestic banking sector and do not directly target capital flows.
In this paper, I use information on easing and tightening of 5 types of macropruden-
tial policy instruments obtained from Cerutti et al. (2017b); for capital controls, a novel
dataset on adjustment of capital controls on inflows and outflows for 5 types of assets
is constructed. Both datasets include information on the number of tightening and eas-
ing steps undertaken by regulators as well as CFM policies direction (or CFM index ).
First, I calculate the number of easing and tightening measures for each type of asset or
macroprudential instrument implemented by each country in each quarter. “Easing” steps
indicate mitigation or removal of the existing barriers and are recorded with a negative
sign. “Tightening” steps mean augmentation of the existing or imposition of new regula-
tions and are coded with a positive sign. The cumulative index is computed as a sum of the
number of steps for 5 categories of assets for capital controls or 5 types of instruments for
macroprudential policies. Second, I identify the direction of the policy in a given quarter
that is summarized as follows:
CFM indexi,t =









Although the intensity of restrictions is captured imperfectly by this type of coding,
1Detailed information on construction of the dataset is presented in Appendix 1.A. The data is avail-
able upon request.
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the indexes can indicate the direction of a policy change in a given country over time.
At the same time, the indexes do not contain information on the initial level of capital
account openness and, therefore, are more suitable for panel studies in which the initial
level of openness is captured by country fixed effects. Further, the indexes do not allow
for assessing the difference in restrictiveness of the regulations across countries as policy
instruments may be qualitatively and quantitatively different.
Data on macroprudential policies measure adjustment of 5 types of macroprudential
instruments: capital buffers (general and sector-specific), interbank exposure limits, con-
centration limits, LTV ratio limits, as well as domestic and foreign currency reserve re-
quirements. General capital requirements are based on regulatory changes introduced by
Basel Accord and sector-specific capital buffers capture regulations that are aimed at cur-
tailing growth in bank claims to specific sectors of the economy. Concentration limits
prohibit large exposures to a single borrower or a group of borrowers, while interbank
exposure limits bound exposures to the other banks. LTV ratio limits restrict the max-
imum amount that an individual or a firm can borrow against their collateral. For the
observed period, macroprudential policies were mostly tightened, with 305 tightening and
162 easing episodes (Table 1.2). LTV ratios and reserve requirements on foreign and local
currency have the highest number of loosening and tightening episodes. At the same time,
other instruments are not changed often. For example, capital requirements and interbank
exposure limits were only tightened over the observed period.
Data on capital controls presents information on tightening and easing of restrictions on
capital outflows and inflows for 5 types of assets; that are, portfolio equity, portfolio debt,
FDI, credit, and derivatives. Changes in policies are entered as of the implementation
date. The resulting dataset includes 631 easing and 239 tightening episodes as shown
in Table 1.3. As opposed to macroprudential policies, capital accounts for residents and
non-residents were mostly liberalized for the observed period. As expected, rather volatile
credit, debt, and equity flows have the highest number of easing and tightening episodes for
both capital inflows and outflows. At the same time, changes in capital account restrictions
on more stable FDI flows are not frequent. This observation is in line with a “pecking
order” suggesting that capital controls are usually imposed on the assets that contribute
to financial instability the most (Ostry et al., 2010).
Based on the example of China, the cumulative indexes on capital controls on inflows
and outflows presented in this paper are compared to the capital account openness index by
Chinn and Ito (2006) and the overall inflow and outflow restriction indexes by Fernandez
et al. (2015a). As Figure 1.1 (a, b) suggests, the index by Chinn and Ito (2006) is flat
indicating no changes in capital account openness. The indexes on capital controls on
inflows and outflows by Fernandez et al. (2015a) exhibit almost no variation and have a
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value close to one, suggesting that China had a closed capital account with almost no
adjustment in restrictions during the observed period of time. My index, in contrast,
captures the evolution of capital controls policies documenting an increased openness of
China to inflows and outflows of capital. The index is comparable to a similar intensive
measure of capital account restrictiveness by Garcia (2017), as shown in Figure 1.1 (c, d).
The differences between two indexes, probably, arise due to the fact that the latter index
includes information on both capital transactions and exchange arrangements, while my
index only captures changes in restrictions of capital account.
The main statistics for CFM measures are reported in Table 1.4. The standard de-
viations for both capital controls and macroprudential policies are rather high indicating
active adjustment of the policies. Next, while the theory predicts that, in order to dis-
courage net capital inflows, policymakers should increase capital controls on inflows and
ease them on outflows, the observed correlation between changes in capital controls on
inflows and outflows is positive. It reveals lack of a systematic use of capital controls to
limit procyclicality of net capital inflows. At the same time, correlations between changes
in macroprudential policies and capital controls are close to zero, thus indicating a lack of
coordination between the two types of policies.
Further, changes in capital controls and macroprudential policies exhibit some variation
across time and countries. As shown in Figure 1.2, changes of capital flow management
measures vary widely across the sample period. Easing of capital controls on inflows was
largely implemented in 1997-2004 and around the global financial crisis. The number of
easing episodes dropped significantly post-crisis. At the same time, tightening episodes of
capital controls on inflows were mostly introduced pre- and post-crisis. Capital controls
on outflows were liberalized during the whole period with a slight decline in the number
of easing episodes after 2009. Therefore, EMEs were largely liberalizing their capital
accounts pre-crisis and during the crisis even though they were undertaking measures to
restrict certain types of capital inflows. For the case of macroprudential policies, loosening
episodes coincide with the global financial crisis, while the wave of tightening episodes
occurs thereafter. Additionally, there were important differences between countries in
terms of the frequency in using CFM measures (Figure 1.3) as well as in their reliance on
tightening or easing of the restrictions.
Definition of business and financial cycles. To assess the cyclicality in imposition
of capital controls and macroprudential policies, I distinguish between business and finan-
cial cycles. Business and financial cycles exhibit some degree of synchronization, with
the duration and amplitude of booms and busts in economic activity being affected by
the strength and intensity of financial cycles (Claessens et al., 2012). In this paper, the
business cycle is defined as fluctuations in economic activity that an economy, or its real
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sector, experiences over the period of time. It is measured as a deviation of gross domes-
tic product from its trend, or output gap. While there is no consensus definition of the
financial cycle, broadly defined, it is characterized by fluctuations of financial variables
including both quantities and prices (BIS, 2014). In this paper, I use the deviation of
credit to private NFC from its trend, or credit gap, as a definition of the financial cycle.
Additionally, I employ real effective exchange rates (REER) as in Magud et al. (2011)
and financial conditions indicators (FCI)2,3 to assess adjustment of CFM measures at a
frequency that is higher than the frequency of business and financial cycles. Further, I
distinguish between two types of cycles (Kose et al., 2003), global cycles4 and local (or
country-specific) cycles. All variables are at a quarterly frequency. Detailed definitions of
the variables and data sources are presented in Appendix 1.C.
In this paper, I assume that global markets are not affected by economic and finan-
cial developments in local economies, while domestic economies follow global trends (Rey,
2015).5 To “clean” local variables from innovations that come from global developments, I
derive an orthogonal component for each local variable by regressing them on global vari-
ables and taking the residuals. Further, to eliminate country-specific trends and seasonal
effects, I use HP-filtering with λ = 1, 600 for quarterly data.6 Throughout the paper, I
refer to the deviation of a variable from its trend as its cyclical component.
2The FCIs are estimated based on a TVP-FAVAR model by Koop and Korobilis (2014). The vector
of financial variables includes corporate spreads, term spreads, interbank spreads, sovereign spreads, the
change in long-term interest rates, equity and house price returns, equity return volatility, the change in
the market share of the financial sector, and credit growth.
3Similar results are produced when I use CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) which is a measure of the stock
market’s expectation of volatility implied by S&P500 Index options. The major advantage of FCI is that
it approximates financial stance of credit, equity, debt, and housing markets, while VIX only captures
stock market volatility. In addition, FCIs are available for 43 advanced and emerging economies, while
VIX is a measure of the global risk.
4In this study, I use world GDP, world credit to private non-financial corporations (includes all BIS-
reporting countries), REER of emerging market economies, and FCI in the US as global variables.
5It is common in the literature to assume that the global cycle is mostly driven by the developments
in the US (Rey, 2015), while contributions of the other individual countries are marginal. However, due to
the increasing trade and financial intergeneration of the EMEs, the role of the EMEs in shaping the global
economy is growing (IMF, 2016). Further, the EMEs now account for more than 75% of global growth
in output and consumption, almost double the share in 2000 (IMF, 2017a). Therefore, the assumption
of independence of the global market from the developments at local markets might be changing in the
future.
6Deseasonalization of the variables and removal of a (log-)quadratic trend as well as estimations in
growth rates produce similar results. Further, HP-filtering with λ = 400, 000, as suggested by BIS (2014),
does not alter the results.
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1.4 Cyclicality of capital flow management measures:
Preliminary analysis
This Section studies whether indexes on capital controls and macroprudential policies are
correlated with the variables defining global as well as local financial and business cycles,
as defined in Section 1.3.
Unconditional correlations. To analyze the cyclicality of CFM measures, country-
by-country unconditional correlations of CFM indexes with local and global cyclical com-
ponents of GDP, credit to private NFC, REER, and FCIs are calculated. For capital
controls on inflows, Figure 1.4 shows that most countries display insignificant correlations
and the sign of the correlations can be positive or negative with a roughly equal probabil-
ity. Similarly, capital controls on outflows (Figure 1.5) behave acyclically with regard to
local and global variables. Exceptionally, there are negative correlations of capital controls
on outflows with local REER and GDP gaps and positive correlations with local financial
conditions, though the correlations are mostly not statistically significant. Therefore, the
results suggest that capital controls on inflows and outflows are largely acyclical.
For macroprudential policies, correlations with all local variables, global credit, and
EMEs REER gaps are mostly statistically insignificant and are equally likely to take pos-
itive or negative values, as shown in Figure 1.6. Remarkably, most of the correlations
between macroprudential policies and a global output gap are positive and statistically
significant for nine countries. Further, worsening of global financial conditions is associ-
ated with the easing of macroprudential regulations for the majority of countries in the
sample. Thus, macroprudential policies show some countercyclical behavior throughout
global business and financial cycles.
Additionally, I check correlations for both a one quarter and a one year lags and leads
of CFM indexes with cyclical components of the explanatory variables (corresponding
Figures are not reported and are available upon request) as policies either can take some
time to be adjusted or are changed based on the expectations of future macroeconomic and
financial developments at home and abroad. For this exercise, a similar pattern emerges
for correlations with slow-moving variables, such as GDP and credit gaps. At the same
time, correlations become statistically insignificant or even change signs for fast-moving
variables, such as REER and FCIs.
Capital flow management measures around the global financial crisis. Fur-
ther, I study behavior of CFM indexes around the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.
As highlighted by Fernandez et al. (2015b), regulators are often not responsive to small
and short-term movements in financial and economic variables. Therefore, unconditional
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correlations might not be fully able to capture countercyclical behavior of CFM measures,
as fluctuations in economic and financial activities are largely dominated by the small
deviations of global and local variables from trend. At the same time, regulators might
be willing to use capital controls and/or macroprudential policies once they face large and
long-lived fluctuations, like those observed during the global financial crisis.
Figure 1.7 displays behavior of major economic and financial indicators as well as
indexes on capital controls and macroprudential policies during the 2007-2009 period. Both
local and global GDP, credit to NFC, and REER picked in 2008 and dropped dramatically
thereafter. Additionally, financial markets contracted at the second and third quarters of
2008 that is displayed as a peak in financial conditions indicators. At the same time, capital
controls on inflows and outflows showed almost no cyclical movement during the crisis. If
at all, both of them were slightly eased at the first quarter of 2008. In addition, capital
controls on outflows were liberalized before 2008. In contrast, easing of macroprudential
policies coincided with worsening of global financial conditions and preceded troughs in the
global and local business and financial activities. Thus, macroprudential policies displayed
a clear countercyclical behavior around the period of the Great Contraction.
1.5 Capital flow management measures
and fundamentals: Econometric analysis
In this Section, I test empirically whether countries adjust – ease and tighten – macro-
prudential policies and capital controls throughout business and financial cycles as well as
due to changes in REER and financial conditions. I assume that decisions on adjustment
of macroprudential policies and capital controls are taken independently, as central banks
are mostly responsible for macroprudential policies, while national governments (in limited
cases, central banks) decide on imposition of capital controls (IMF, 2018).
1.5.1 Methodology
The empirical approach for this paper is borrowed from monetary policy literature that es-
timates policy reaction functions, such as a Taylor rule. I apply this strategy to estimate
policy reaction functions for capital controls and macroprudential policies. As the first
step, I assume that a policymaker in country i chooses between tightening and easing of
CFM measures after observing all available information Ωi,t = (Local cyclei,t, Global cyclet,
CFM previ,t) at time t. To estimate the policymaker’s choice, I use the following logit
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model:
Prob(CFM indexi,t = 1|Ωi,t) =
Λ(α + β × Local cyclei,t + γ ×Global cyclet + θ × CFM previ,t)
(1.2)
where Λ() is a logistic function;
CFM indexi,t =
1, if policy is tightened0, if policy is eased. (1.3){
Local cyclei,t, Global cyclet
}
are defined by cyclical components of slow-moving vari-
ables, such as GDP and credit to private NFC, and fast-moving variables, such as REER
and FCIs, as specified in Section 1.3;
CFM previ,t indicates policy direction in the previous year (Pasricha, 2017). It takes
the value of 1 if the previous policy action was tightening, the value of -1 if the policy
action was easing, and 0, otherwise. This variable captures cycles in policy assuming that
the probability of tightening (easing) increases if the previous policy action was tightening
(easing).7
As additional control variables, I use monetary and fiscal policy stances that take the
value of 1 if the policy was tightened, -1 if the policy was eased, and 0 if there was no change
in the policy (Pasricha, 2017). Fiscal policy stance is approximated by fiscal balance and
monetary policy stance is defined as a change in a policy rate. Tightening of a fiscal or
monetary policy results in an upward pressure on interest rates, thus making investment
in the country more attractive and increasing capital inflows. Therefore, policymakers
might be willing to respond by tightening CFM measures. Further, I include political risk
rating from PRS Group assuming that countries with unstable political environment and
weak institutions might have different motivations for implementing CFM policies.
As the second step, I estimate a multinomial logit model assuming that a policymaker
chooses between K = 3 options, that are easing, tightening, and not changing the policy.
The following model is used:
Prob(CFM indexi,t = k|Ωi,t) =
Λ(αki + β
k × Local cyclei,t + γk ×Global cyclet + θk × CFM previ,t)
(1.4)
The probability that the policymaker at country i chooses policy option k at time t is
7Policy directions at the previous quarter and at the previous three years produce similar results.
18
Chapter 1. Capital Controls and Macroprudential Policies: Are they Countercyclical?
given by:









The equation (1.4) has country-specific coefficients αi that measure time-invariant char-
acteristics of a country that might affect its decision on adjustment of CFM measures.
Therefore, regression coefficients are driven by the variation over time within each coun-
try. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood assuming independence of irrelevant
alternatives (based on Hausman-McFadden test).8
It is worth mentioning that coefficients on local business and financial variables can
suffer from a reverse causality problem; that is, capital controls and macroprudential
policies that are successfully implemented can moderate local business and financial cycles
(Forbes et al. (2015), Klein (2012), Ostry et al. (2010), among others). Therefore, the
coefficients on local variables might be biased downwards. As in the existing literature
(Klein, 2012; Cerutti et al., 2017a), I assume that the effect from policies takes place with
a lag and the direction of a cycle is not changed as a result of the policy implementation.
Still, the coefficients on the variables defining local cycles should be interpreted with
caution.
1.5.2 Empirical results
In this Subsection, I discuss empirical results that assess motivation for adjustment of
macroprudential policies as well as capital controls on inflows and outflows based on the
logit and multinomial logit models presented in Subsection 1.5.1.
Logit model. The results for the baseline logit models that explain adjustment of
CFM measures throughout global as well as local business and financial cycles are pre-
sented in Tables 1.5 - 1.7. Due to concerns about a high correlation between the explana-
tory variables, I estimate the regressions with global and local GDP, credit to NFC, REER,
and FCI gaps separately in columns (1) - (8) and then all together including additional
controls in columns (9) - (11) of the respective Tables.
As shown in Table 1.5, capital controls on inflows are imposed in cycles. If the policy
was tightened in a previous year, the probability that the next action will be tightening
increases. Further, coefficients on local variables are not statistically significant, indicating
a low or zero correlation of local economic and financial developments with index on
capital controls on inflows. Unlike the existing literature (Pasricha, 2017; Fratzscher,
2012), changes in real effective exchange rates and GDP are not associated with changes
8The nested logit model that assumes that a policymaker, first, chooses whether to adjust a CFM
policy or not and, second, selects between tightening and easing of the policy produces similar results.
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in capital controls on inflows. At the same time, worsening of global financial conditions
and/or a drop in credit to the NFC increase the probability of easing of the policies.
For capital controls on outflows (Table 1.6), tightening of capital restrictions in the last
year increases the probability of tightening them in the current year due to the persistence
of the policies. Global financial and economic variables have a low power in explaining
imposition of the capital restrictions. At the same time, the probability of tightening
capital controls on outflows increases in times of financial busts or when exchange rates
depreciate, thus preventing domestic agents from pushing capital abroad (Aizenman and
Pasricha, 2013). To the contrary, financial booms in a domestic economy increase the
probability of easing capital restrictions, thus, allowing the economy or its financial sector
to cool down. Statistical significance of the coefficients on local variables is, however,
sensitive to the model specification.
Further, Table 1.7 reports the estimates for tightening and easing of macroprudential
policies. Countries that tightened macroprudential policies over the previous year tend to
tighten them in the current period indicating that CFM policy changes come in cycles.
Contrary to Cerutti et al. (2017b), local variables have little or no power in explaining
adjustment of macroprudential policies. At the same time, macroprudential policies are
adjusted in a countercyclical manner throughout global financial cycles measured by credit
to private NFC and FCIs. As a financial boom abroad is usually accompanied by surge
in capital flows, tightening of macroprudential policies seems to be used to put “sand
in the wheels” of international borrowing. Additionally, in times of worsening of global
financial conditions, macroprudential instruments might be relaxed in order to support a
vulnerable domestic financial sector and attract additional financial flows from the rest of
the world. It is worth mentioning that other control variables, like monetary policy stance,
fiscal policy stance, and political risk have no statistical power in explaining adjustment
of macroprudential policies.
The overall results show that use of capital controls on outflows is somewhat procycli-
cal throughout local business and financial cycles, though statistical significance of the
coefficients is sensitive to the model specification. At the same time, macroprudential
policies and capital controls on inflows are adjusted countercyclically throughout global
financial cycle (defined as credit gap) and changing global financial conditions. The latter
finding suggests that policymakers at the EMEs are closely following global developments
and domestic policies are largely shaped by the global financial cycle.
Multinomial logit model. The results for a multinomial logit model that assumes
that a policymaker chooses between not changing, tightening, and easing of CFM measures
after observing global as well as local business and financial variables are presented in
Table 1.8. Each column of the Table presents coefficients for choosing one option over
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the baseline option (for example, choosing tightening over not changing, easing over not
changing, or tightening over easing of a CFM measure).
As for the logit model described above, macroprudential policies and capital controls
on inflows are adjusted countercyclically throughout global financial cycles, while domestic
variables play a minor role and are not statistically significant. Exceptionally, the probabil-
ity of easing capital controls on inflows increases when local real exchange rates depreciate
as in Pasricha (2017). At the same time, the probability of tightening over not changing
the policy stays unaffected along fluctuations of REER. This finding might be explained
by foreign currency debt accumulation at the EMEs and a subsequent fear of depreciation
rather than appreciation (Levy-Yeyati and Rey, 2006). In addition, adjustment of capital
controls on outflows is motivated by changing local REER, GDP, and financial conditions
as in a simple logit model.
To give a more in depth explanation for the results, the average predicted probabilities







Probi,K,t × βK) (1.6)
where i is a country and k =
{
No change, T ightening, Easing
}
. The predicted probability
of choosing easing, tightening, or not changing the policy by country i are computed at
different values of the continuous predictor variables, holding all other variables at their
current values. Then probabilities are averaged across countries.
Figure 1.8 shows average predicted probabilities of changes in CFM measures at differ-
ent values of global variables. While the probabilities of tightening and easing of capital
controls on outflows are close to zero and remain almost unchanged throughout global busi-
ness and financial cycles, capital controls on inflows behave somewhat countercyclically
(that is, the probability of tightening them in times of a global financial boom increases to
about 10%). Additionally, the probability of tightening macroprudential policies increases
in times of booms in global business and financial activities. For example, the probability
of tightening is around 30% at the peaks of global business and financial cycles. The
probability of easing macroprudential policies changes with changing global economic and
financial conditions; that is, at the peak of the global FCI, i.e. financial conditions are the
worst, and at the trough in global GDP the probability of easing macroprudential policies
increases to more than 60% and 20%, respectively.
Next, Figure 1.9 displays average predicted probabilities of adjustment of CFM mea-
sures throughout local business and financial cycles. While the probabilities of policy
changes remain almost unchanged for different values of local GDP, credit to private
NFC, and REER, some changes in the use of capital controls and macroprudential policies
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along different local financial conditions are observed. The probability of easing capital
controls on outflows increases from zero to almost 20% and the probability of tightening
to 15% at the time of good and bad local financial conditions, respectively. The small
probabilities for tightening and easing of capital controls on outflows are not surprising as
change of these policies is a rare event and it is observed only in about 10% of the sample.
Additionally, the probability of easing macroprudential policies and capital controls on
inflows rises to about 20% in times of unfavorable local financial conditions, while the
probability of their tightening remains almost constant throughout the cycle.
1.5.3 Robustness checks and extensions
In this Subsection, I provide robustness checks (the corresponding regression results are
not reported and are available upon request) as well as some extensions of the analysis.
Robustness of the results. For robustness of the results, I check whether the main
conclusions hold when I use one-quarter and one-year lags as well as four-quarters cu-
mulative explanatory variables. The intuition is that a policymaker makes a decision on
adjustment of CFM measures based on financial and business variables observed in the
past. The regression results, however, become weaker in terms of statistical significance
when I use one-quarter lags or four-quarters cumulative explanatory variables and statis-
tically insignificant or with a different sign for one-year lagged explanatory variables. It
suggests that, for the given sample of countries, policymakers base their decisions on the
current state of the economy and financial markets. The results, however, are not driven
by a single country or a single explanatory variable and they become stronger in terms
of a statistical significance when I estimate the regressions on a reduced sample of coun-
tries that actively adjusted CFM measures as defined in the Appendix 1.B. In addition,
the results are mostly driven by the period around and after the global financial crisis,
when the paradigm shift occurred and policymakers started using capital flow management
measures as stabilization tools more frequently.
Disaggregation by asset category and macroprudential instrument. As an
extension of the main results, I analyze the cyclicality of capital controls for each cate-
gory of assets and of macroprudential policies for each prudential instrument (Table 1.9).
For capital controls on inflows and outflows, I estimate the regressions using changes in
controls on non-FDI, credit, equity, and debt flows as dependent variables. The results
are mostly driven by restrictions on credit inflows that are introduced countercyclically.
Additionally, worsening financial conditions coincide with easing of capital controls on all
types of inflows. These findings support the idea that EMEs are heavily dependent on
global capital inflows. Therefore, in times of a global financial bust, capital restrictions
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are alleviated in order to attract additional financing from abroad, mostly in the form of
credits. For capital controls on outflows, the coefficients for all asset types have the right
sign, but are not statistically significant. It might be due to a small number of observations
in each category of assets.
For macroprudential policies, I run regressions using adjustment of financial institution-
targeted instruments (all instruments, excluding LTV ratios as in Cerutti et al. (2017b)),
LTV ratios, and reserve requirements on local and foreign currency-denominated accounts
as dependent variables. I do not run separate regressions for capital buffers, concentra-
tion limits, and interbank exposure limits due to a small number of tightening and easing
episodes.9 The results obtained for a cumulative index are mostly driven by local reserve
requirements that are introduced countercyclically throughout global business and finan-
cial cycles. Additionally, the probability of easing foreign reserve requirements and LTV
ratios increases in times of worsening global financial conditions. All in all, these results
indicate the importance of analyzing capital controls and macroprudential policies sepa-
rately for each type of asset and instrument as opposed to the cumulative indexes used in
the existing literature.
Intensity of capital flow management measures. When changes in financial or
economic fundamentals are small, policymakers might opt for not changing or moderate
changes in CFM measures. At the same time, when significant swings in economic or
financial variables are observed, policymakers may intensify the use of CFM policies. As
the main measure of capital controls and macroprudential policies used in this paper
indicates the direction of a policy – tightening or easing – it does not allow for capturing the
intensity with which policies are used. To partially account for this drawback, Table 1.10
presents the results for an ordered logit model, as in Pasricha (2017), that uses the number
of easing and tightening steps made by each country in each quarter as a dependent
variable. It is worth mentioning, however, that intensity is not captured precisely by this
type of measurement, as the country that undertakes many small tightening or easing
steps will be classified as the one that uses CFM policies more intensively as compared
to the country that undertakes one significant change in a CFM measure. Overall, the
results are in line with the previous models suggesting that adjustment of macroprudential
policies and capital controls on inflows is motivated by global developments, while capital
controls on outflows are imposed somewhat procyclically throughout local business and
9In addition, I disaggregate macroprudential instruments into capital tools (interbank exposure limits
and capital buffers), assets-side tools (LTV ratios and concentration limits), and liquidity-related tools (re-
serve requirements on local and foreign currency-denominated accounts) as in IMF-FSB-BIS (2016). The
results (not reported) suggest that liquidity-related tools are adjusted in a countercyclical way through-
out global business and financial cycles. However, there is no clear countercyclical pattern in changes of
asset-side and capital tools.
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financial cycles. Additionally, both capital controls on inflows and outflows are statistically
significantly correlated with fluctuations in local REER.
Disaggregation by income level, external indebtedness, exchange-rate regime,
and other characteristics. As countries are heterogeneous along a number of dimen-
sions, I investigate whether incentives to change CFM measures vary across countries with
different income level, external indebtedness, exchange rates (ER) regime, quality of in-
stitutions, and amount of FX reserves (Table 1.11). First, I examine how CFM measures
are adjusted by countries with different income levels. For that, I divide countries into
high-, medium-, and low-income based on the World Bank (WB) income group classifica-
tion.10 High-income economies are usually much less volatile as compared to medium- and
low-income countries. As noted by Fernandez et al. (2015b), volatile economies should
benefit more from imposition of countercyclical CFM measures. The results suggest that
high-income countries use capital controls on inflows in a countercyclical manner, while
medium- and low-income economies seem to rely more on macroprudential policies and
capital controls on outflows. These observations are, however, not fully attributed to the
difference in quality of institutions that is defined as a regulatory quality based on the
WB Worldwide Governance Indicators.11
Second, I check whether the cyclicality of changes in CFM measures varies with coun-
try’s external indebtedness that is defined as a net foreign assets-to-GDP ratio from Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). I distinguish between countries with high, medium, and low
external debt.12 Countries with high external debt are usually more volatile and are
characterized by more pronounced booms and busts. Therefore, highly-indebted coun-
tries should be more likely to apply CFM measures to mild business and financial cycles
(Fernandez et al., 2015b). Indeed, countries with medium and high debt seem to adjust
macroprudential polices and capital controls on net inflows in a countercyclical way, while
adjustment of CFM measures by countries with a low external debt is acyclical.
Next, I divide countries based on their exchange rate arrangements, as defined by
Ilzetzki et al. (2017). I distinguish between countries with fixed (classified as fixed or
crawling peg) and floating (classified as floating or managed floating) ER regimes. As the
theory states, countercyclical use of CFM measures is more beneficial under fixed exchange
10Low-income countries: India, Indonesia, and the Philippines; medium-income countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Thailand, South Africa,
and Turkey; high-income countries: Chile, Czech Republic, Israel, Korea, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Russia, and Poland.
11A country is considered to have low quality of institutions if estimates of regulatory quality from the
WB Worldwide Governance Indicators are below zero, and good quality of institutions if the estimates
are above zero.
12A country is considered to be highly-indebted if it belongs to a lower quartile and low-indebted if it
is in an upper quartile of the external indebtedness distribution.
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rate regimes because these policies can potentially reduce the amplitude of expansions
and contractions in aggregate demand (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2016). Yet, the results
suggest that countries with different ER regimes do not show a clear-cut difference in
adjustment of CFM policies at different points of cycles, as measured by credit and GDP
gaps. At the same time, indexes on macroprudential policies are statistically significantly
correlated with global and local financial conditions indicators for economies with a fixed
ER regime. Further, under a floating exchange rate regime adjustment of capital controls
on outflows and macroprudential polices is associated with changes in local REER.
Finally, I distinguish between countries with different amount of FX reserves-to-GDP
ratios, as defined by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).13 As noted by Aizenman et al.
(2013), the “trilemma” variables in EMEs have converged towards intermediate levels. It
was possible due to a significant accumulation of international reserves that were used as
a buffer. I observe that countries that have not accumulated substantial amount of FX
reserves were adjusting macroprudential policies and capital controls on net inflows in a
countercyclical manner. At the same time, countries with high FX reserves-to-GDP ratios
changed CFM measures only along changing global and local financial conditions.
1.6 Conclusion and outlook
A growing theoretical literature and international policymakers argue that macropruden-
tial policies and capital controls on net capital inflows should “put sand in the wheels”
of international borrowing by being tightened during booms and relaxed during busts in
economic and/or financial activities. In this paper, I show that macroprudential policies
and capital controls on inflows are adjusted in a countercyclical manner throughout the
global financial cycle, and especially changing global financial conditions. At the same
time, capital controls on outflows respond somewhat procyclically to local developments.
In this paper, I present a novel dataset on easing and tightening of capital controls
on inflows and outflows for 5 types of assets for 24 emerging economies for the 1997-2014
period at a quarterly frequency. Using this dataset together with a dataset on changes in
macroprudential policies by Cerutti et al. (2017b), I analyze patterns of a co-movement
of CFM measures with different macroeconomic and financial variables using correlation
analysis, inference around the global financial crisis, and regression analysis. I distinguish
between global as well as local business and financial cycles that are proxied by slow-
moving variables, such as GDP and credit to private NFC, and fast-moving variables,
13I distinguish between countries with high, medium, and low FX reserves. A country has high FX
reserves-to-GDP if it belongs to an upper quartile and low FX reserves-to-GDP if it is in a lower quartile
of the distribution of FX reserves-to-GDP ratios.
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such as real effective exchange rates and financial conditions indicators.
The main findings of this paper indicate that policymakers in EMEs use capital con-
trols on outflows in a somewhat procyclical fashion throughout local cycles, but statistical
significance of the coefficients is sensitive to the model specification. At the same time,
macroprudential policies and capital controls on inflows are adjusted in a countercyclical
manner throughout global financial cycles. These findings suggest that Hypotheses 1-3 are
supported depending on the type of policy instruments being used. More specifically, wors-
ening of global financial conditions and/or slowing down of a global credit growth increases
the probability of easing restrictions on capital inflows and macroprudential policies, thus
allowing to attract additional financing from abroad and facilitating consumption and in-
vestment. The opposite happens in times of a global financial boom as policymakers might
want to limit international borrowing and, thus, prevent overheating of the economy. For
capital controls on outflows, global financial and economic variables have a low power in
explaining their adjustment. At the same time, restrictions on capital outflows are ad-
justed somewhat procyclically throughout local business and financial cycles as well as
along changes in local REER. For example, the probability of tightening capital controls
on outflows increases in times of economic or financial busts, thus preventing domestic
agents from pushing capital abroad.
The findings differ across the macroprudential instruments: local and foreign reserve
requirements as well as LTV ratios behave countercyclically, while the other instruments
are imposed with more structural objectives (address long-term aspects of the economy as
opposed to short-term recession-fighting measures) in mind. Capital controls on credit in-
flows exhibit a clear countercyclical behavior, while restrictions on the other capital inflows
are only correlated with global financial conditions. In addition, there is some heterogene-
ity in adjustment of CFM measures by countries with different characteristics. Countries
disaggregated based on their income level, external indebtedness, and ER regimes differ in
application of instruments, macroprudential policies versus capital controls, and strategies,
countercyclical versus acyclical use of CFM policies.
As the view with respect to the use of capital controls and macroprudential policies
as “the second best tool” was accepted only around the global financial crisis, it will
be interesting to update the index constructed for this paper to determine whether the
observed pattern on (counter-)cyclicality of CFM measures changes over time. Further,
the index can be useful for assessing effectiveness of CFM measures (Ostry et al., 2010;
Klein, 2012; Forbes et al., 2015) around the global financial crisis and thereafter. A more
granular analysis on the stabilizing effect of CFM measures can be performed as the index
provides information on tightening and easing of policies as well as distinguishes between
restrictions on different types of assets and macroprudential instruments.
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Appendix
1.A Description of a dataset on capital controls
The dataset provides information on tightening and easing of capital controls on inflows
and outflows for 5 types of assets for the 1997-2014 period at a quarterly frequency. The
primary source of information for the dataset is the AREAER by the International Mon-
etary Fund for the 1997-2014 period. I focus on the end of the section for each country
that reports changes in capital flow management policies that occurred over the year. Ad-
ditionally, I supplement the AREAER with the information from the papers by Ahmed
et al. (2015), Chantapacdepong and Shim (2015), and Pasricha et al. (2017).
For this dataset, “Easing” indicates mitigation or removal of the existing barriers and
it is entered with a negative sign. “Tightening” means augmentation of the existing or
imposition of new regulations and it is coded with a positive sign. To construct the data,
first, I calculate the number of steps (actions) made by regulators for each category of
assets in each quarter. Second, I identify the direction of the policy: if the total number of
steps is a negative number, the policy is eased; and if it is positive, the policy is tightened.
The index is coded as 0 if either no changes of policies occur or the number of tightening
and easing actions is equal.
The dataset provides information on adjustment of capital controls on inflows and
outflows for 5 types of assets that correspond to the types of transactions at the balance
of payment (BoP) disaggregated as follows:
• “Debt” includes information on capital controls on portfolio investment in debt in-
struments; that is, money market instruments and bonds (Debt securities in the
BoP);
• “Equity”provides information on capital controls of individual companies (“equities”)
or of mutual funds or other investment trusts (“collective investments”) (Equity
securities in the BoP);
• “Derivatives” include information on controls on derivatives and other instruments
(Financial derivatives in the BoP);
• “Credits” inform on capital controls on financial credits, commercial credits, and
guarantees and sureties (Other investment in the BoP);
• “FDI” refers to the controls on investments that involve active participation in the
management of the acquired entities (Direct investment in the BoP).
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Further, I distinguish between capital controls on inflows and outflows following Fer-
nandez et al. (2015a). For three types of assets, that are debt, equity, and derivatives, cap-
ital controls on inflows include controls on the purchase of assets locally by non-residents
and the sale or issue of assets abroad by residents. Capital controls on outflows refer to
controls on the purchase of assets abroad by residents and the sale or issue of assets locally
by non-residents. For credit operations and direct investment, there are capital controls
on inflows and outflows without further disaggregation.
Examples of the measures that are considered to be capital controls are:
• Change in limits on the amount of loans in FX or the allowed amount of cross-border
flows;
• Change in tax rates or non-remunerated reserve requirements;
• Change in minimum stay requirements;
• Change in a permitted maturity of an asset;
• Permission or prohibition to purchase/sale/issue some instruments freely within spe-
cific group of countries, under certain conditions, or in a specific currency;
• Easing or tightening of a transaction for a specific agent (banks or mutual funds);
and
• Change of conditions on the use of proceeds.
Measures that are NOT considered to be capital controls:
• Changes in macroprudential regulations that do not discriminate on residency;
• Limits on capital flows that target a specific country, a specific industry (with an
exception of a financial sector and pension funds), and/or are imposed on government
transactions (defense, security, etc.). If a control refers to more than one sector where
private entrepreneurship is common, then it is categorized as a control;
• Capital controls related to sanctions for political reasons;
• Changes in rules related to foreign purchases of land;
• Authorization, approval, permission, and clearance are considered to be capital con-
trols, while reporting, registration, notification, and declaration are not reported as
capital controls (Fernandez et al., 2015a); and
• Capital controls imposed on FDI flows that concern only natural persons.
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1.B List of countries
Baseline sample (24 emerging market economies):
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, In-
donesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
Reduced sample:
Argentina (from 2004), Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Russia (from 2002), and
Turkey (from 2004).
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1.C Data sources
Table 1.1: Definitions of variables and data sources
Variable Description Source
Dependent variables:
Index on capital con-
trols on inflows and
capital controls on
outflows
Index indicating the direction of a policy
change. It takes the value +1 if the policy









Capital controls on in-
flows (steps) and out-
flows (steps)
The number of tightening (+) and easing (-)









GDP Nominal GDP, bln. USD Haver Analytics
Credit Credit to non-financial private sector from all




Real effective exchange rate, CPI based,




The indicator approximates financial stance
of credit, equity, debt, and housing markets





An indicator variable that takes the value +1
if a CFM policy was tightened in the previous





An indicator variable that takes the value +1
if monetary policy was tightened, -1 if it was
eased, and 0 otherwise. Monetary policy is




Fiscal policy stance An indicator variable that takes the value
+1 if fiscal policy was tightened, -1 if it was
eased, and 0 otherwise. Fiscal policy is de-
fined as a fiscal balance, bln. USD
Haver Analytics
Political risk taking Risk index assessing the political stability of
a country (high points = low risk)
PRS Group
N ote: The cyclical components of all explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed
in Section 1.3. Credit: for Bulgaria, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, I use claims
on private sector by other deposit taking corporations from the IMF IFS. Financial conditions indicator:
for Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, I use financial stability indicators from Cardarelli et al. (2011).
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1.D Figures
Figure 1.1: Comparison of indexes on capital controls on inflows (a, c) and capital controls
on outflows (b, d) with the other indexes on capital account restrictions for the case of
China. Note: Indexes on capital controls on inflows and outflows (black solid lines) are the cumulative
number of easing and tightening steps undertaken by regulators as of the first quarter of 1997.
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Figure 1.2: Capital flow management measures across time. N ote: Each bar indicates the
number of tightening and easing steps made by all countries in the sample in a given year.
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Figure 1.3: Capital flow management measures across countries. N ote: Each bar indicates the
number of tightening and easing steps made by a country over the 1997-2014 period for capital controls
and 2000-2014 period for macroprudential policies.
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Figure 1.4: Country-by-country correlations between index on capital controls on inflows
and (a) GDP gap; (b) credit gap; (c) REER gap; and (d) FCI gap. N ote: Correlations are
computed using CFM indexes and cyclical components of the corresponding time series. Black, dark grey,
and light grey bars indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Missing bars
indicate covariances equal to zero.
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Figure 1.5: Country-by-country correlations between index on capital controls on outflows
and (a) GDP gap; (b) credit gap; (c) REER gap; and (d) FCI gap. N ote: Correlations are
computed using CFM indexes and cyclical components of the corresponding time series. Black, dark grey,
and light grey bars indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Missing bars
indicate covariances equal to zero.
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Figure 1.6: Country-by-country correlations between index on macroprudential policies
and (a) GDP gap; (b) credit gap; (c) REER gap; and (d) FCI gap. N ote: Correlations are
computed using CFM indexes and cyclical components of the corresponding time series. Black, dark grey,
and light grey bars indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Missing bars
indicate covariances equal to zero.
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Figure 1.7: CFM measures during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. N ote: The Figure
displays a co-movement between global and local economic and financial variables (dashed lines, black)
and indexes on CFM measures (solid lines) over the period 2007-2009. The local economic and financial
variables as well as indexes on CFM measures are averaged across countries.
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Figure 1.8: Average predicted probabilities of tightening (right column), easing (middle
column), and not changing (left column) CFM measures throughout global business and
financial cycles. N ote: X-axis displays gaps in global variables and y-axis displays probabilities of
tightening, easing, and not changing the policies.
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Figure 1.9: Average predicted probabilities of tightening (right column), easing (middle
column), and not changing (left column) CFM measures throughout local business and
financial cycles. N ote: X-axis displays gaps in local variables and y-axis displays probabilities of
tightening, easing, and not changing the policies.
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1.E Tables14
Table 1.2: Macroprudential policies (MP): easing vs. tightening steps
Tightening Easing
Sector-specific capital buffers 42 12
Capital requirements 39 0
Concentration limit 14 2
Interbank exposure limit 9 0
LTV capital ratio 34 10
RR foreign 65 42
RR local 102 96
Total 305 162
N ote: This Table shows the number of tightening and easing steps for different macroprudential
instruments made by all countries in the sample for the 2000-2014 period.
Table 1.3: Capital controls (CC): easing vs. tightening steps
CC on outflows CC on inflows
Tightening Easing Tightening Easing
Equity 14 79 23 59
Debt 14 71 33 50
Credits 23 65 85 110
FDI 3 47 8 37
Derivatives 10 50 26 63
Total 64 312 175 319
N ote: This Table shows the number of tightening and easing steps for different categories of assets made
by all countries in the sample for the 1997-2014 period.
Table 1.4: Main statistics: CFM measures
Statistics Obs. Mean SD Min Max ρi,CCI ρi,MP
MP index 1,440 0.075 0.458 −1 1 0.140 1.000
CCI index 1,752 −0.049 0.368 −1 1 1.000 0.140
CCO index 1,752 −0.066 0.327 −1 1 0.348 0.027
MP steps 1,440 0.099 0.744 −6 10 0.192 1.000
CCI steps 1,752 −0.082 0.868 −10 10 1.000 0.192
CCO steps 1,752 −0.142 0.789 −9 4 0.384 0.027
N ote: The sample covers the 1997-2014 period for capital controls and 2000-2014 period for
macroprudential policies. CCI = capital controls on inflows, CCO = capital controls on outflows.

























Table 1.5: Regression results – Capital controls on inflows
Dependent variable:
Index on capital controls on inflows: 1 - tightening, 0 - easing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Local GDP gap −0.001 −0.002 −0.080∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.043) (0.048)
Global GDP gap 0.064 −0.127 −0.186∗
(0.044) (0.100) (0.105)
Local credit gap −0.011 −0.004 −0.009 0.017
(0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032)
Global credit gap 0.088∗ 0.203∗ 0.235∗∗
(0.051) (0.107) (0.116)
Local REER gap 0.030 0.030 0.106∗∗ 0.103∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.052) (0.057)
EMEs REER gap −0.004 −0.007 0.049
(0.042) (0.058) (0.068)
Local risk gap −0.128 −0.196 −0.196 −0.375
(0.264) (0.281) (0.360) (0.433)
Global risk gap −0.616∗∗ −0.791∗∗∗ −0.842∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.299) (0.310)
CCI (prev. year) 0.729∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.344 0.484∗∗ 0.448∗
(0.206) (0.210) (0.219) (0.221) (0.207) (0.207) (0.209) (0.216) (0.239) (0.247) (0.256)
Monetary policy 0.310 0.334∗ 0.322
(0.194) (0.197) (0.207)
Fiscal policy 0.437∗∗ 0.458∗∗ 0.368∗
(0.181) (0.182) (0.190)
Pol. risk −0.008 −0.030 −0.011
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Constant −0.674∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗ −0.709∗∗∗ −0.791∗∗∗ −0.659∗∗∗ −0.660∗∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗∗ −0.205 1.093 −0.084
(0.153) (0.157) (0.159) (0.169) (0.152) (0.152) (0.155) (0.161) (1.668) (1.664) (1.745)
McFadden R2 0.149 0.156 0.232 0.242 0.156 0.156 0.193 0.222 0.338 0.342 0.375
Observations 217 217 194 194 217 217 202 202 174 186 174
Log Likelihood −129.1 −128.0 −116.5 −115.0 −128.0 −128.0 −122.4 −118.0 −100.4 −99.9 −94.9
Akaike Inf. Crit. 264.2 264.1 238.9 238.0 262.1 264.1 250.8 244.1 218.8 217.8 215.7
Note: This Table presents estimation results for a logit model based on the equation 1.2. The sample covers 1997-2014 period. Reported coefficients are log of odds ratios. All
continuous explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed in Section 1.3. Standard errors are in parentheses.

























Table 1.6: Regression results – Capital controls on outflows
Dependent variable:
Index on capital controls on outflows: 1 - tightening, 0 - easing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Local GDP gap −0.059∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.034 −0.065
(0.025) (0.027) (0.051) (0.058)
Global GDP gap −0.105∗ −0.204∗ −0.256∗∗
(0.061) (0.108) (0.127)
Local credit gap −0.023 −0.036 0.043 0.050
(0.031) (0.033) (0.046) (0.053)
Global credit gap −0.102 0.048 0.106
(0.069) (0.116) (0.134)
Local REER gap −0.061∗ −0.059∗ −0.035 −0.018
(0.033) (0.034) (0.052) (0.057)
EMEs REER gap −0.043 −0.049 −0.009
(0.050) (0.055) (0.064)
Local risk gap 0.668∗ 0.674∗∗ 0.255 −0.204
(0.342) (0.343) (0.501) (0.560)
Global risk gap −0.079 −0.436 −0.461
(0.256) (0.332) (0.364)
CCO (prev. year) 1.153∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.185∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗
(0.298) (0.312) (0.299) (0.306) (0.295) (0.296) (0.297) (0.300) (0.331) (0.325) (0.353)
Monetary policy 0.415∗ 0.444∗ 0.470∗
(0.248) (0.238) (0.262)
Fiscal policy 0.050 0.086 0.073
(0.231) (0.232) (0.237)
Pol. risk 0.011 −0.014 0.008
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Constant −1.192∗∗∗ −1.191∗∗∗ −1.152∗∗∗ −1.159∗∗∗ −1.119∗∗∗ −1.123∗∗∗ −1.054∗∗∗ −1.059∗∗∗ −1.883 −0.267 −1.685
(0.205) (0.207) (0.203) (0.205) (0.199) (0.200) (0.201) (0.202) (1.804) (1.753) (1.858)
McFadden R2 0.197 0.212 0.221 0.233 0.183 0.187 0.201 0.202 0.282 0.280 0.313
Observations 179 179 166 166 179 179 167 167 151 161 151
Log Likelihood −79.5 −78.0 −77.1 −75.9 −80.8 −80.5 −79.1 −79.0 −71.0 −71.3 −68.0
Akaike Inf. Crit. 165.0 164.0 160.2 159.9 167.7 168.9 164.1 166.0 160.0 160.5 161.9
Note: This Table presents estimation results for a logit model based on the equation 1.2. The sample covers 1997-2014 period. Reported coefficients are log of odds ratios.
All continuous explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed in Section 1.3. Standard errors are in parentheses.

























Table 1.7: Regression results – Macroprudential policies
Dependent variable:
Index on macroprudential policies: 1 - tightening, 0 - easing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Local GDP gap 0.000 0.005 −0.024 −0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.038)
Global GDP gap 0.166∗∗∗ −0.059 −0.072
(0.039) (0.073) (0.080)
Local credit gap 0.007 0.020 0.005 0.014
(0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.032)
Global credit gap 0.120∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.049) (0.083) (0.095)
Local REER gap 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.015
(0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.034)
EMEs REER gap −0.004 −0.011 0.018
(0.039) (0.041) (0.052)
Local risk gap −0.179 −0.187 −0.191 −0.085
(0.177) (0.202) (0.201) (0.261)
Global risk gap −0.890∗∗∗ −0.994∗∗∗ −1.016∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.181) (0.187)
MP (prev. year) 0.752∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.176) (0.162) (0.167) (0.162) (0.166) (0.167) (0.188) (0.172) (0.207) (0.216)
Monetary policy 0.115 0.165 0.091
(0.147) (0.166) (0.173)
Fiscal policy 0.022 −0.043 −0.068
(0.141) (0.158) (0.163)
Pol. risk −0.012 −0.014 −0.011
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Constant 0.606∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 1.464 1.694 1.517
(0.131) (0.142) (0.131) (0.135) (0.131) (0.132) (0.136) (0.153) (1.370) (1.480) (1.579)
McFadden R2 0.093 0.146 0.093 0.110 0.094 0.094 0.139 0.292 0.145 0.270 0.313
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 287 287 287 302 287
Log Likelihood −177.5 −167.1 −177.4 −174.1 −177.4 −177.3 −168.5 −138.6 −167.3 −142.9 −134.4
Akaike Inf. Crit. 361.0 342.3 360.9 356.2 360.7 362.7 343.0 285.1 352.7 303.8 294.8
Note: This Table presents estimation results for a logit model based on the equation 1.2. The sample covers 2000-2014 period. Reported coefficients are log of
odds ratios. All continuous explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed in Section 1.3. Standard errors are in parentheses.

























Table 1.8: Regression results – Multinomial logit model
Dependent variable: Index on CFM policy: 1 - tightening, -1 - easing, and 0 - no change.
MP policy CC on inflows CC on outflows
1 vs.0 -1 vs.0 1 vs.-1 1 vs.0 -1 vs.0 1 vs.-1 1 vs.0 -1 vs.0 1 vs.-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Local GDP gap −0.015 −0.018 0.003 −0.017 −0.024∗∗ 0.006 −0.042∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.050∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
Global GDP gap 0.042∗ −0.134∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ −0.003 0.086∗∗ −0.059 0.011 −0.070
(0.023) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) (0.042) (0.049) (0.025) (0.054)
Observations 1344 1344 1344 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632
Log Likelihood -787.4 -787.4 -787.4 - -681.5 -681.5 -681.5 -574.6 -574.6 -574.6
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,682.8 1,682.8 1,682.8 1,470.9 1,470.9 1,470.9 1,257.2 1,257.2 1,257.2
Local credit gap −0.002 −0.021 0.019 0.005 0.011 −0.006 −0.038 −0.005 −0.033
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026) (0.013) (0.028)
Global credit gap 0.053∗∗ −0.062 0.115∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.037 0.096∗ −0.069 0.012 −0.081
(0.026) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.031) (0.050) (0.059) (0.030) (0.064)
Observations 1344 1344 1344 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536
Log Likelihood -796.7 -796.7 -796.7 -612.2 -612.2 -612.2 -533.9 -533.9 -533.9
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,701.4 1,701.4 1,701.4 1,332.3 1,332.3 1,332.3 1,175.9 1,175.9 1,175.9
Local REER gap −0.016 −0.024 0.008 0.003 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.035∗ −0.035∗∗ 0.020 −0.055∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022)
EMEs REER gap −0.003 −0.014 0.011 −0.027 −0.021 −0.006 −0.051 0.007 −0.058
(0.023) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.025) (0.042) (0.048) (0.025) (0.053)
Observations 1344 1344 1344 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632
Log Likelihood -799.8 -799.8 -799.8 -683.2 -683.2 -683.2 -576.8 -576.8 -576.8
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,707.7 1,707.7 1,707.7 1,474.4 1,474.4 1,474.4 1,261.6 1,261.6 1,261.6
Local risk gap 0.053 0.212 −0.159 −0.020 0.186 −0.206 0.449∗ −0.340∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.164) (0.214) (0.244) (0.159) (0.281) (0.248) (0.180) (0.300)
Global risk gap −0.261∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ −1.001∗∗∗ −0.351∗ 0.188∗∗ −0.539∗∗ −0.071 0.054 −0.125
(0.129) (0.088) (0.145) (0.204) (0.087) (0.217) (0.211) (0.099) (0.229)
Observations 1279 1279 1279 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531
Log Likelihood -710.7 -710.7 -710.7 -631.6 -631.6 -631.6 -536.0 -536.0 -536.0
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,529.4 1,529.4 1,529.4 1,371.3 1,371.3 1,371.3 1,180.0 1,180.0 1,180.0
Note: This Table presents estimation results for a multinomial logit model based on the equation 1.4. The sample covers 2000-2014 period for
macroprudential policies and 1997-2014 period for capital controls. Reported coefficients are log of odds ratios. Coefficients for country dum-
mies and CFM policies at the previous year are omitted. All continuous explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed in
Section 1.3. Standard errors are in parentheses.

























Table 1.9: Regression results – Disaggregation by asset type and macroprudential instrument
Dependent variable: Index on CFM policy: 1 - tightening, 0 - easing
MP policy CC on inflows CC on outflows
Fin. inst.-target RR local RR foreign LTV ratio Non-FDI Equity Debt Credit Non-FDI Equity Debt Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Local GDP gap 0.0004 0.003 −0.006 0.042 −0.016 −0.023 −0.011 −0.032∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.058 −0.044 −0.054
(0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.059) (0.017) (0.054) (0.034) (0.019) (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.035)
Global GDP gap 0.165∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.032 0.138 0.069 −0.036 0.017 0.143∗∗ −0.134∗∗ −0.036 −0.072 −0.088
(0.039) (0.044) (0.063) (0.132) (0.044) (0.116) (0.091) (0.055) (0.064) (0.095) (0.090) (0.098)
Observations 269 179 89 32 197 50 56 128 162 72 66 67
Log Likelihood −148.2 −104.1 −51.1 −18.6 −118.8 −25.9 −32.0 −79.5 −75.0 −31.3 −30.4 −30.7
Akaike Inf. Crit. 304.5 216.3 110.3 45.2 245.5 59.9 72.1 167.1 158.0 70.6 68.9 69.3
Local credit gap 0.011 0.001 −0.048 0.198∗∗ 0.004 −0.033 0.039 −0.031 −0.025 −0.056 −0.044 −0.020
(0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.101) (0.025) (0.054) (0.053) (0.028) (0.033) (0.053) (0.046) (0.048)
Global credit gap 0.111∗∗ 0.108∗ −0.066 0.416 0.105∗∗ 0.022 0.083 0.126∗∗ −0.109 0.078 −0.043 −0.171
(0.049) (0.059) (0.081) (0.298) (0.053) (0.112) (0.111) (0.062) (0.072) (0.087) (0.097) (0.120)
Observations 269 179 89 32 178 47 52 115 150 66 61 60
Log Likelihood −155.4 −106.8 −49.8 −16.7 −106.4 −25.3 −29.0 −71.8 −72.9 −29.3 −29.6 −26.8
Akaike Inf. Crit. 318.7 221.5 107.6 41.4 220.8 58.6 65.9 151.5 153.8 66.7 67.2 61.6
Local REER gap 0.009 0.006 0.016 −0.016 0.021 −0.043 0.211∗∗ −0.001 −0.060∗ −0.021 −0.039 −0.071
(0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.063) (0.027) (0.076) (0.087) (0.029) (0.034) (0.049) (0.032) (0.050)
EMEs REER gap −0.010 −0.008 −0.048 0.174 0.005 −0.176∗ −0.086 0.053 −0.042 −0.066 0.024 −0.048
(0.041) (0.045) (0.088) (0.152) (0.044) (0.106) (0.098) (0.056) (0.050) (0.074) (0.072) (0.068)
Observations 269 179 89 32 197 50 56 128 162 72 66 67
Log Likelihood −158.0 −108.7 −51.1 −18.6 −120.1 −24.5 −27.7 −83.6 −78.0 −32.0 −31.6 −31.3
Akaike Inf. Crit. 324.0 225.5 110.2 45.2 248.2 56.9 63.4 175.1 164.0 72.1 71.2 70.7
Local risk gap −0.221 −0.213 −0.018 −1.216 −0.124 −0.749 −0.505 0.022 0.615∗ 0.198 0.230 0.794
(0.210) (0.251) (0.360) (1.628) (0.280) (0.717) (0.663) (0.308) (0.337) (0.454) (0.475) (0.514)
Global risk gap −0.862∗∗∗ −0.918∗∗∗ −1.096∗∗∗ −2.032∗ −0.546∗∗ −1.840∗∗ −1.236∗ −0.411∗ −0.079 0.265 −0.112 −0.251
(0.159) (0.215) (0.353) (1.165) (0.242) (0.882) (0.698) (0.225) (0.255) (0.301) (0.390) (0.424)
Observations 257 168 82 30 182 44 50 117 153 67 62 61
Log Likelihood −124.5 −84.6 −38.3 −12.0 −110.2 −20.6 −26.7 −76.2 −76.6 −29.7 −31.4 −30.0
Akaike Inf. Crit. 257.0 177.3 84.6 32.1 228.5 49.1 61.5 160.5 161.3 67.4 70.8 68.1
Note: This Table presents estimation results for a logit model based on the equation 1.2. The sample covers 2000-2014 period for macroprudential policies and 1997-2014 period for capi-
tal controls. Fin. inst.-target = all instruments, excluding LTV ratios, Non-FDI = all instruments, excluding capital controls on FDI flows. Reported coefficients are log of odds ratios.
Coefficients for a constant term and CFM policies at the previous year are omitted. All continuous explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed in Section 1.3.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.10: Regression results – Intensity of CFM measures
Dependent variable:
Number of tightening (+) or easing (-) steps





Local GDP gap −0.000 0.008 −0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Global GDP gap 0.071∗∗∗ 0.034∗ −0.028
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
Observations 1,344 1,632 1,632
Log Likelihood -1109.7 -992.8 -843.7
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,245.4 2,067.6 1,765.4
Local credit gap 0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Global credit gap 0.059∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.027
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 1,344 1,536 1,536
Log Likelihood -1093.9 -895.3 -784.1
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,259.8 1,872.7 1,646.2
Local REER gap 0.004 0.027∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
EMEs REER gap 0.008 0.002 −0.018
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
Observations 1,344 1,632 1,632
Log Likelihood -1097.8 -991.2 -844.3
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,267.6 2,064.4 1,766.7
Local risk gap −0.088 −0.107 0.329∗∗
(0.107) (0.116) (0.130)
Global risk gap −0.575∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.055
(0.065) (0.076) (0.086)
Observations 1,279 1,531 1,531
Log Likelihood -1011.5 -914.9 -790.0
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,095.1 1,911.7 1,658.1
N ote: This Table presents estimation results for an ordered logit model. The sample covers
2000-2014 period for macroprudential policies and 1997-2014 period for capital controls.
Reported coefficients are log of odds ratios. Coefficients for country dummies and CFM
policies at the previous year are omitted. All continuous explanatory variables are computed


























Table 1.11: Regression results – The role of country-specific characteristics
Dependent variable:
Index on CFM policy: 1 - tightening, 0 - easing
Local Global Local Global Local Global Local Global
GDP gap GDP gap credit gap credit gap REER gap REER gap risk gap risk gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Macroprudential policies:
Low & medium income 0.000 0.204 ∗∗∗ 0.012 0.113∗∗ 0.001 0.011 −0.368 −1.009∗∗∗
High income 0.078 0.022 0.068 0.123 0.075 −0.060 0.150 −0.677∗∗
High & medium debt 0.004 0.224∗∗∗ 0.018 0.138∗∗ 0.018 0.010 −0.011 −0.935∗∗∗
Low debt 0.001 0.035 0.030 0.044 −0.048 −0.082 −0.996∗∗ −0.908 ∗∗
Fixed ER −0.031 0.164∗∗∗ −0.009 0.143∗ −0.065∗ −0.038 −1.021 ∗∗∗ −0.751 ∗∗∗
Floating ER 0.046 0.153∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.093 0.066∗∗ −0.027 −0.135 −0.166
Low quality inst. 0.020 0.179∗∗∗ 0.034 0.197∗∗ 0.007 0.031 −0.499 −1.050 ∗∗∗
Good quality inst. −0.011 0.162∗∗∗ 0.015 0.093 0.015 −0.028 0.100 −0.786∗∗∗
Low & medium reserves 0.016 0.260 ∗∗∗ 0.030 0.200∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.013 0.091 −0.891∗∗∗
High reserves −0.092∗∗ −0.008 −0.014 −0.035 −0.098∗ 0.017 −0.866∗∗ −0.877∗∗∗
Capital controls on inflows:
Low & medium income 0.004 0.024 −0.007 0.058 0.034 −0.026 −0.009 −0.479∗
High income −0.032 0.356 ∗∗ −0.010 0.226 ∗ 0.019 0.069 −0.779 −1.187∗
High & medium debt 0.006 0.076 −0.007 0.121∗ 0.032 −0.008 −0.177 −0.530∗
Low debt −0.026 0.053 0.002 0.052 0.015 −0.024 −-0.289 −0.719
Fixed ER 0.052 0.100 −0.021 0.099 0.147∗∗ 0.036 −1.000∗ −0.962∗
Floating ER 0.013 0.082 0.023 0.106 0.032 0.013 −0.303 −0.610∗
Low quality inst. −0.003 0.036 −0.032 0.037 0.035 −0.023 0.021 −0.840 ∗
Good quality inst. 0.010 0.088 0.023 0.137∗ 0.025 0.014 −0.415 −0.547∗
Low & medium reserves −0.011 0.098∗ −0.023 0.145∗∗ 0.027 −0.014 −0.008 −0.270
High reserves 0.056 0.050 0.025 −0.014 0.085 0.071 −0.481 −1.642∗∗∗
Capital controls on outflows:
Low & medium income −0.054∗ −0.162∗∗ −0.037 −0.176∗∗ −0.063∗ −0.054 0.957∗∗ 0.064
High income −0.099 0.299 −0.218 0.294 −0.075 −0.032 −0.390 −1.921∗
High & medium debt −0.052∗ −0.064 −0.027 −0.098 −0.125∗∗ −0.015 0.568 −0.219
Low debt −0.087 −0.177 ∗ −0.081 −0.145 0.071 −0.123 1.215 −0.029
Fixed ER −0.018 −0.011 −0.012 0.016 0.058 −0.068 −0.128 −0.037
Floating ER −0.085 −0.152∗ −0.006 −0.118 −0.141∗∗ −0.041 0.932 0.020
Low quality inst. −0.054∗ −0.114 −0.100∗ −0.202 −0.034 −0.085 1.170∗∗ −0.301
Good quality inst. −0.055 −0.125 0.048 −0.070 −0.132∗∗ −0.019 0.328 0.059
Low & medium reserves −0.061∗∗ −0.026 −0.046 −0.077 −0.053∗ −0.035 0.433 −0.161
High reserves −0.056 −0.393∗∗ 0.009 −0.264 −0.162 −0.070 1.472∗ 0.260
Note: This Table presents estimation results for a logit model based on the equation 1.2. The sample covers 2000-2014 period for macroprudential
policies and 1997-2014 period for capital controls. Logit models are estimated for each subsample as defined in Subsection 1.5.3. Reported coefficients
are log of odds ratios. Coefficients for constant term and CFM policies at the previous year as well as standard regression statistics are omitted.
Standard errors are not reported. All continuous explanatory variables are computed using the HP-filter as discussed in Section 1.3.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 2
Floating with a Load of FX Debt?1
2.1 Introduction
Many emerging market economies (EMEs) are reluctant to let their currencies float. Even
when de jure they announce themselves as having a floating exchange rate (ER) regime,
de facto they are not allowing their exchange rates to move freely. One explanation of why
countries may fear letting their exchange rates float is a negative influence of exchange
rate volatility on balance sheets of corporates and households. When they borrow in
foreign currency, while receiving income in local currency, exchange rate depreciation may
lead to a sharp rise in debt-service costs, bankruptcies, and disruption of investment and
consumption demand. Corporate and household sector distress can further spill over to the
financial sector generating deeper financial instability, particularly if the foreign currency
exposures were financed by the domestic banking system. The issue of a large foreign
currency debt accumulation is especially important for emerging market economies as
they are usually less able to borrow abroad in their domestic currency as compared to
advanced economies (Eichengreen et al., 2003). The problem is amplified by lack or high
costs of hedging, especially for households and small and medium size firms. In addition,
moral hazard could amplify the problem as households, companies, and banks that expect
to be bailed out – directly by governments or indirectly by central bank policies aimed
to curb depreciation pressures – do not internalize their risks and may borrow more in
foreign currency.
There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature focusing on whether and how coun-
tries react to exchange rate pressure. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) analyze the behavior
1This chapter was previously published as: Kliatskova, T. and Mikkelsen, U. (2015). Floating with
a Load of FX Debt? IMF Working Paper 15/284. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781513543307.
001.
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of exchange rates, foreign exchange (FX) reserves, and interest rates across different ex-
change rate arrangements and find that countries that claim they are floating are often
not. Many emerging market economies seem to use interest rates and FX market inter-
ventions to stabilize exchange rates, mostly, due to lack of credibility of central banks’
policies, high pass-through from exchange rates to prices, or negative balance sheet effects
from exchange rate movements. The last channel is the focus of this paper.
In our paper, we assess whether countries with high FX debt of non-financial firms
and households tend to react more strongly to exchange rate pressure assuming that the
decision to borrow in FX is exogenous. We rely on a set of 15 emerging market economies
using monthly data for the 2002-2015 period. We look at two instruments that can be used
to manage exchange rates – adjustment of policy rates and FX interventions using central
bank’s FX reserves – and analyze whether the level of FX debt affects the sensitivity of
these instruments to exchange rate changes.
Our findings suggest that countries with large FX debt in the non-financial private
sector tend to react more strongly to exchange rate pressure using both FX interventions
and monetary policy rates. The results are driven mainly by reactions to depreciation
of exchange rates and we find that FX debt in the non-financial private sector from do-
mestic sources is a more important driver of central bank policies than the debt obtained
directly from abroad. The importance of FX debt in inhibiting central banks from al-
lowing exchange rates to move freely implies that monetary policy could be overburdened
by multiple goals. Policies should focus on limiting FX lending by the domestic banking
system to ensure that monetary policy can work effectively.
Our paper is most closely related to studies on the use of different policy instruments
to stem exchange rate volatility. The existing theoretical and empirical literature shows
that monetary policy (Garcia et al., 2009; Filosa, 2001) and FX interventions (Benes et al.,
2015; Blanchard et al., 2015; Adler and Tovar, 2011) are the most widely used tools for
stabilization of exchange rates. The other strand of literature claims that countries that
borrow internationally in FX are those that tend to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes
(Hausmann et al., 2001; Harms and Hoffmann, 2011; Honig, 2005), i.e. fear of floating
arises due to liability dollarization. In our paper, we combine two strands of literature and
look at how policies – policy rates and FX interventions – react to exchange rate changes
allowing the variation of responses to differ with the amount of the non-financial private
sector FX debt. Throughout the paper, we treat FX debt as exogenous and do not directly
account for potential endogeneity of FX debt. However, we discuss why we believe the
results should be robust to a potential endogeneity of FX debt.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of dimensions. First, we
focus on the influence of private sector FX exposures and account directly for externally
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and domestically financed FX borrowing, whereas most papers look either at banks’ lia-
bility dollarization or the total FX debt of the country. This allows us to reach specific
conclusions on which forms of FX debt matter more for the use of FX interventions and
monetary policy rates, thus drawing relevant policy conclusions from our findings. Sec-
ond, we distinguish between the effects of appreciation and depreciation of exchange rates,
revealing that currency depreciation may threaten financial stability due to balance sheet
effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we provide literature
review, Section 2.3 presents the data and stylized facts about FX exposures as well as
discusses empirical methodology, Section 2.4 presents our main results and performs a
number of robustness checks and extensions, and Section 2.5 concludes and provides an
outlook for further research.
2.2 Literature review
Liability dollarization is considered to be one of the factors that cause central banks to
care about exchange rate stability. Cespedes et al. (2004) show that balance sheet effects
magnify the effects of foreign disturbances through increase in country risk premium.
They claim that flexible exchange rates are better absorbers of real foreign shocks than
fixed rates are, even conditioning on large balance sheet effects. Empirically, however,
Hausmann et al. (2001), Harms and Hoffmann (2011), and Honig (2005), among others,
show that liability dollarization plays a central role in producing “fear of floating.” The
first two papers use the choice of exchange rate regime as a dependent variable and Honig
(2005) explores the influence of the ability to borrow internationally in local currency on
exchange rate volatility relative to the volatility of policy instruments.
To stabilize exchange rates, central banks can use monetary policy rates and FX in-
terventions as well as less conventional instruments such as capital controls or exchange
rate-linked instruments. Benes et al. (2015) gives theoretical justifications for including
sterilized interventions as an additional central bank instrument alongside the Taylor rule
and find that there can be advantages for combining inflation targeting with some degree
of exchange rate management. Ghosh et al. (2016) examine the case for using two in-
struments and show that the use of FX interventions as the second instrument improves
welfare under both discretionary monetary policy and inflation targeting regime. Empiri-
cally, Mohanty and Klau (2004), Filosa (2001), Garcia et al. (2009), among others, show
that central banks strongly respond to exchange rate movements using policy rates. Gar-
cia et al. (2009) argue that, for financially-vulnerable emerging market economies, some
exchange rate smoothing is beneficial, largely reflecting perverse effects of demand shocks
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on exchange rate movements. Adler et al. (2015), Blanchard et al. (2015), and Adler and
Tovar (2011) suggest that (sterilized) FX interventions are effective in affecting exchange
rates. The effectiveness depends on the depth of the financial market (Adler et al., 2015)
and it decreases rapidly with the degree of capital account openness (Adler and Tovar,
2011).
In addition, literature focuses on how choice of the ER regime and central bank’s
policies may influence agents’ borrowing behavior. Arteta (2002) suggests that floating
exchange rate regimes exacerbate currency mismatches in domestic financial intermedi-
ation as those regimes seem to encourage deposit dollarization more strongly than they
encourage matching via credit dollarization. On the contrary, Kamil (2012), using firm
level data, finds that after countries switch from pegged to floating exchange rate regimes,
firms decrease their levels of foreign currency exposures by reducing the share of debt
contracted in foreign currency and matching more systematically their foreign currency
liabilities with assets denominated in foreign currency and export revenues. Two-way
causality is addressed by Chang and Velasco (2006) and Hamon and Hausmann (2005).
In Chang and Velasco (2006) residents choose in which currency to borrow and the central
bank, in turn, chooses exchange rate regime. “Fear of floating” emerges endogenously and
in association with a currency mismatch in assets and liabilities. At the same time, the
choice of currency of borrowing depends on the residents’ expectations regarding the cen-
tral bank’s policy. Both fixed and floating exchange rate regimes can be an equilibrium,
while the latter is Pareto-efficient. Empirically, Berkmen and Cavallo (2010) confirm that
countries with high liability dollarization (external, public, or financial) tend to be more
actively involved in exchange rate stabilization operations. However, their results suggest
that there is no evidence that floating, by itself, promotes de-dollarization.
2.3 Empirical analysis
2.3.1 Data and summary statistics
While balance sheet currency mismatches may appear in all sectors, in this paper, we focus
on the non-financial private sector (households and non-financial companies). The corpo-
rate debt of non-financial firms across major emerging market economies had an upward
trend in recent years due to favorable global financial conditions (IMF, 2015). On the one
hand, greater leverage can boost investment and economic growth. On the other hand, a
possibility of a rise in monetary policy rates in key advanced economies and subsequent
depreciation of local currencies of emerging market economies may increase debt-service
costs and impose currency risks on leveraged firms, especially if their debt is denominated
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in a foreign currency. At the same time, banks in floating exchange rate regimes are
likely to either keep a balance between their FX assets and liabilities or, at least, hedge
on-balance sheet open positions through off-balance sheet operations. Government FX
exposure, while being important for the public sector risk, is assumed not to be taken
into account by the monetary authority as this can less easily be justified within a typical
central bank’s mandate of maintaining price and financial stability.
We consider two sources of FX exposure of the non-financial private sector (Figure 2.1).
The first is borrowing directly from abroad, which we obtain from Quarterly External Debt
Statistics. The second is FX lending from the financial sector – funded mainly through
banks’ borrowing abroad (in FX) as intermediaries of capital inflows or from accepting
local FX deposits (deposit dollarization). We obtain this data from the IMF Monetary
and Financial Statistics.
Our sample includes 15 emerging market countries with floating exchange rates.2 We
use monthly data for the 2002-2015 period (subject to data availability). A full description
of the variables and data sources are presented in the Appendices 2.A-2.B.
We use the change in the net foreign assets (NFA) position of the central bank in
percent of GDP as a proxy for FX interventions. As a robustness check, we clean this
measure for valuation effects. In addition, we use other proxies such as the change in
official reserves minus gold in percent of GDP and the change in NFA relative to M2. For
the policy rate, we use the interbank rates, where possible, and short-term government
bond yields in the remaining cases.3 The summary statistics are presented in Table 2.2.
The average FX debt of the countries in our sample increased during the global fi-
nancial crisis to almost 25% of GDP on average from less than 20% before the crisis as
shown in Figure 2.2. The domestic part of FX debt was increasing up to year 2009 and
remained constant thereafter. In 2003, FX exposures from the domestic banking system
only accounted for about a quarter of total FX exposures; since 2009, domestic and ex-
ternal FX debt has been roughly of the same size. Countries have not managed to bring
down the overall FX exposures of the non-financial private sector and, in many countries,
the exposures are large enough that exchange rate volatility (in particular, depreciations)
can have significant implications for corporate and household balance sheets. As shown in
Figure 2.3, the size of FX debt varies widely across countries from less than 5% of GDP
to over 50% of GDP. In addition, composition of the FX debt varies across countries.
2We include countries that are classified as “emerging market and developing countries” in the April
2015 World Economic Outlook. In addition, the choice of countries into the final sample is restricted to
those for which data for both domestic and external debt of the non-financial private sector is available.
3We also use the actual official monetary policy rates of the countries as dependent variables. However,
for countries where the monetary policy framework is not based on only one policy rate to affect market
rates (e.g. Turkey), but instead is based on several policy rates, we use market rates as a better indication
of the monetary policy stance.
52
Chapter 2. Floating with a Load of FX Debt?
For some, the FX debt is almost exclusively a result of borrowing directly from abroad,
whereas for many of the countries with large FX exposures, most of it is financed from
domestic sources. Finally, the data shows that external FX debt exhibits less cross-country
variation than domestic FX debt.
We split the sample based on the FX debt, where we define FX exposures as being high
when the total FX debt for a given country at a specific time is more than 20% of GDP.4
FX interventions are generally larger when FX exposures in the non-financial private
sector are high, as shown in Figure 2.4. Moreover, FX interventions are more negatively
correlated with changes in exchange rates when FX debt is high with correlation being
equal to -0.33 against a correlation of -0.16 for a low-FX-debt sample. The correlation is
driven by selling FX in the market when the currency depreciates rather than by buying
FX during appreciation episodes.
For policy rates, Figure 2.5 shows that in countries with low FX debt, policy rate
changes are smaller than in countries with high FX debt. In addition, the correlation of
changes in policy rates and exchange rates is larger (correlation is equal to 0.14) and statis-
tically significant for high-FX-debt countries as compared to a non-significant correlation
of 0.04 for a low-FX-debt sample.
If countries with high FX exposures are more reluctant to allow the exchange rates to
float freely, this would manifest itself in reserves and policy rates that are more volatile (as
countries use these instruments more actively to try to stabilize exchange rates). Calvo
and Reinhart (2002) show for a large sample of countries that many of them exhibit fear
of floating. They find that their volatility in reserves and interest rates is generally higher
and the exchange rate volatility is lower than for the most free floating exchange rate
regimes (such as the US, Japan, and Australia).
Letting xc denote some critical threshold, we estimate the probability that an absolute
value of a variable x (changes in NFA or policy rates) falls within some specified bounds5,
conditioning on the amount of FX debt. In our notation, we should observe:
Prob(abs(x) > xc|FX Debt = High) > Prob(abs(x) > xc|FX Debt = Low) (2.1)
Indeed, countries with high FX exposure show higher volatility in NFA and policy
rates as shown in Table 2.3. However, exchange rate changes are not lower in these
countries. This could indicate that countries with high FX debt face larger exchange
rate pressure. Therefore, despite their attempts to limit exchange rate volatility, they
4The 20% threshold is chosen because roughly half of the observations fall in each group. The results
are robust to the choice of the threshold.
5We use thresholds of 2.5% for exchange rates, 0.5 percentage points for policy rates, and 0.5% of
GDP for changes in NFA. The results are generally robust for other choices of thresholds.
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experience exchange rate movements as large as countries that intervene less. When
calculating an intervention index, the results are confirmed; countries with high FX debt
show a higher degree of exchange rate management.
2.3.2 Methodology
We assume that central banks at emerging market economies use policy rates and for-
eign exchange reserves as instruments for managing exchange rates.6 We suppose that
these instruments work independently of each other. Therefore, we estimate two sepa-
rate equations with foreign exchange interventions (FXI) and policy rates as dependent
variables and analyze whether the correlation between policy instruments and exchange
rate changes is amplified by the stock of foreign exchange debt (FXD) in the non-financial
private sector. We estimate the following equation for FXI:
FXIi,t = αi + γ1∆ERi,t + γ2∆ERi,t × FXDi,t−1 + βcontrolsi,t + εi,t (2.2)
∂FXIi,t
∂∆ERi,t
= γ1 + γ2FXDi,t−1 (2.3)
where the first term on the right hand side is a country-specific fixed effect, the second is a
percent change of a country j’s exchange rate relative to US dollar (USD), and the third is
the exchange rate change interacted with a lagged FX debt-to-GDP. Following a financial-
stability model by Obstfeld et al. (2008), control variables include trade openness to GDP,
lagged current account balance to GDP, change in money stock (M2) to GDP, lagged
exchange rate change, lagged reserves relative to imports and M2, as well as a change
and a lagged level of FXD. The interaction term allows the coefficient on the exchange
rate change to vary with the level of FX debt and the expected negative sign of γ2 would
indicate that, for countries with high FX debt, higher exchange rate pressure is related to
bigger changes in NFA. The sign on the exchange rate change (γ1) is ambiguous as this
can be interpreted as the reaction to exchange rate movements of a country with a zero
FX debt.
The second equation is an extended Taylor rule equation following Taylor (2001) and
Mohanty and Klau (2004), which is expanded to include an interaction between exchange
rate changes and FX debt of the non-financial private sector:
ii,t = αi + θ1∆ERi,t−1 + θ2∆ERi,t−1 × FXDi,t−1 + βcontrolsi,t + εi,t (2.4)
6Central banks may use other instruments to manage exchange rates such as capital controls, changes
in FX reserve requirements, exchange rate-linked instruments, or other policies that affect FX markets.
In this paper, however, we restrict the analysis to FX interventions and monetary policy rates.
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∂ii,t
∂∆ERi,t−1
= θ1 + θ2FXDi,t−1 (2.5)
where ij,t is the nominal policy rate of country j at time t. As in a standard Taylor rule,
the central bank is expected to react to inflation, pi, and the output gap, (yˆ), with the
lagged policy rate included as explanatory variable to allow for persistence in adjusting
policy rates. We assume that countries have different policy rules with regard to inflation,
output gap, and lagged policy rates by allowing these coefficients to be country-specific.7,8
We include lags of exchange rate changes and the interaction term to take into account
that central banks’ policy rate reaction to exchange rate changes may happen with a lag.
The parameter of interest is θ3. As before, if it is significant – and now with an expected
positive sign – it indicates that higher FX debt leads to a stronger association between
exchange rate changes and policy rates, that is higher (lower) policy rates are related to
depreciating (appreciating) exchange rates.
Instrumental variables. Both equations suffer from an endogeneity problem as FX
interventions and changes in policy rates affect exchange rates behavior. If countries
intervene to stabilize exchange rates, exchange rate changes will be smaller and changes
in FX interventions and policy rates will be larger. Thus, a coefficient for the exchange
rate changes interacted with FX debt is biased towards a larger reaction to exchange
rate changes. Using country-specific fixed effects in the regressions partially alleviates
endogeneity concerns as time-invariant unobserved country factors that may affect both
policy variables and changes in exchange rates are controlled for.
Further, to address the endogeneity issue, we use instruments for changes of exchange
rate. A good instrument is the one that is correlated with exchange rate changes, but
not with FX interventions and policy rates. We use a change in the Emerging Markets
Bond Index (EMBI) spread and VIX separately and in combination as instrumental vari-
ables.9 As the effect of the global factors on individual countries exchange rates varies
across countries, we interact these global variables with country-specific dummies (Di).
7We do not include the inflation target and natural real interest rate in the reaction function. However,
these terms are captured by a constant term (which in the fixed effect regression differs across countries)
as long as they do not change over the sample period. Including the inflation target and natural real
interest rate that varies over time is challenging as 1) measuring the natural real interest rate over time
for countries is highly uncertain and 2) not all countries in the sample target inflation.
8As a robustness check, we do not allow inflation, output gap, and lagged policy rates to be country-
specific. The results still hold.
9VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility index. It is a measure of the implied
volatility of S&P500 Index options. EMBI is the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond index that measures
the total return performance of international government bonds issued by emerging market economies.
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Therefore, the set of instruments is given by10, 11:
D1 ×∆V IXt, ..., D15 ×∆V IXt, (FXDj,t−1 ×∆V IXt);
D1 ×∆EMBIt, ..., D15 ×∆EMBIt, (FXDj,t−1 ×∆EMBIt)
(2.6)
VIX is associated with capital flows (Rey, 2015) and EMBI approximates the ability
of debt repayment; both of them are used as proxies for risk aversion and uncertainty.
Changes in VIX and EMBI show a high degree of co-movement with changes in bilateral
exchange rates (correlations of the exchange rate changes with the change in VIX and the
EMBI spread are 0.35 and 0.48 respectively), showing that a rise in VIX and EMBI tends
to exert depreciation pressure on the bilateral exchange rates. As shown in Figure 2.6,
both indexes capture exchange rate changes well especially during periods of financial
distress (highlighted in red). Additionally, the first stage regressions (the corresponding
regression results are not reported and are available upon request) show that coefficients
on the instruments are jointly different from zero for both equations.
At the same time, we consider changes in VIX and the EMBI spread to be exogenous
events, which are not directly affected by FX interventions and monetary policy decisions
of the individual countries in our sample. Further, we assume that FX interventions and
monetary policy rates are affected by VIX and the EMBI spread only through changes in
exchange rates. The last assumption is rather strong as in times of uncertainty policy rates
and changes in NFA may occur for reasons other than management of exchange rates.
2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Baseline results
Table 2.4 presents the estimation results for a simple fixed effects and a 2SLS with fixed
effects regressions with FX interventions as a dependent variable.12 All control variables for
our regressions have the expected signs and are statistically significant with the exception
of coefficients on FX debt-to-GDP and trade openness to GDP. In line with Adler et al.
(2015) and Obstfeld et al. (2008), we show that increase in financial liabilities that could
potentially be converted into foreign currency (M2), growth of FX debt, and higher current
10Our baseline results are reported using changes of VIX as the only instrument for changes of exchange
rate. In Section 2.4.2, we replicate the results using changes of EMBI and a combination of changes of
EMBI and VIX as instruments.
11Changes in VIX are used as instrumental variables for changes in exchange rates in Equations 2.2
and 2.4. FXDj,t−1 × ∆V IXt is used as an instrument for an interaction term FXDj,t−1 × ∆ERi,t in
Equation 2.2.
12Throughout this Chapter, we interpret the results based on 2SLS regressions.
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account balance to GDP are associated with higher NFA. The coefficient for a percent
change in the nominal exchange rate is -0.02, but it is not statistically significant. The
coefficient on the interaction term is highly significant and with the right sign. The
coefficient of -0.16 implies that, for a 10% depreciation pressure, FX interventions increase
by 0.16% of GDP for every additional 10% of FX debt-to-GDP. Using the latest available
data on FX debt of the non-financial private sector for each country, Figure 2.7 illustrates
the level of FX interventions associated with a 10% depreciation (based on the regression
estimates).
For the monetary policy rate equation, standard control variables, such as output
gap, lagged policy rate, and inflation are statistically significant and have the right signs
(Table 2.5). The results indicate that in the absence of FX debt, the policy rate reaction to
exchange rate movements is limited. This is in line with a traditional Taylor rule approach
where monetary policy reacts to inflation and the output gap. However, when exchange
rate changes are interacted with FX debt, the coefficient becomes statistically significant.
The coefficient of 0.08 implies that, for a country with a 10% of FX debt-to-GDP, a
10% depreciation is associated with an increase in policy rate by 0.08 percentage point in
the following month. The reason why the coefficient is significant with a one-month lag
– instead of contemporaneously – is likely due to the fact that decisions on changes in
policy rates as opposed to decisions to do FX interventions are taken in planned policy
meetings that occur with a lower frequency. Moreover, since policy rate inertia is high
(the coefficient for a lagged policy rate is 0.73-0.99) a longer lasting depreciation will be
related to a further increase in policy rates. For the countries in our sample, Figure 2.8
shows a total increase in policy rates over the first month and a quarter (cumulative)
that is associated with a 10% deprecation. For the cumulative response of policy rates,
we assume that the other variables such as inflation and output gap stay constant. As
expected, the effect is larger for countries with high levels of FX debt.
External vs. domestic FX borrowing. We separate our analysis into domestically
and externally funded FX borrowing. Central banks are likely to be more concerned about
FX exposures in the non-financial private sector if they are financed through lending by
the domestic banking system. The reason is that negative consequences of a depreciation
for the real sector may further spill over to the financial sector. Firms and households that
experience a deterioration of their balance sheets would subsequently start de-leveraging
by cutting back their consumption and investment. The financial instability effect is more
pronounced if FX debt of the non-financial private sector is financed by the domestic
banking system as depreciation will then affect banks’ balance sheets negatively through
non-performing FX loans, which could lead to insolvency of the financial institutions and
a slowdown in credit growth. Our analysis confirms this claim, as shown in Tables 2.6- 2.7.
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When we include only domestically financed FX debt, the coefficients on the interaction
term increase in absolute value for the policy rate and FX intervention regressions. At the
same time, for the external debt, the coefficients become statistically insignificant.
Appreciation vs. depreciation of exchange rates. Next, we differentiate between
exchange rate depreciation and appreciation. Central banks may be more sensitive to
depreciation pressure as a sharp currency depreciation threatens financial stability when
the non-financial private sector has FX liabilities. At the same time, central banks may
also be induced to counteract appreciations as real ER appreciations negatively affect
export performance. To account for potential asymmetries, we multiply the interaction
term of FX debt and exchange rate changes by a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if the exchange rate change is negative (appreciation). As shown in Tables 2.8- 2.9, both
FX interventions and changes in policy rate are mostly driven by a depreciation pressure.
On average, if a country has a 10% FX debt-to-GDP, a 10% depreciation is associated
with a decrease in NFA by 0.4% of GDP and an increase in policy rate by 0.15 percentage
points (Figure 2.9).
The coefficients for appreciation pressure are much smaller and not statistically sig-
nificant (the χ2-statistic for a joint significance of the coefficients is 0.76 and 1.78 for
FX interventions and policy rate equations, respectively).13 Our results differ from Levy-
Yeyati et al. (2013), which show that, in most cases (and increasingly so in the 2000s),
interventions were aimed at limiting appreciation rather than depreciation of exchange
rates. However, the authors do not account for countries’ FX indebtedness.
2.4.2 Robustness checks and extensions
The definition of FX interventions. We check if our results are robust to a number of
alternative specifications of FX interventions. Apart from using changes in NFA relative
to GDP, we use changes in NFA relative to M2 and change in reserves minus gold relative
to GDP as dependent variables in equation 2.2. These alternative specifications do not
change the results qualitatively (Table 2.10).
Our proxy for FX interventions – the change in NFA of the central bank – could change
for reasons other than FX interventions. Importantly, we implicitly assume that reserves
are denominated in USD, while in reality it is a mix of currencies. To correct for valuation
effects, we use the Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER)
database for Emerging Markets and calculate changes in NFA adjusted for valuation effects.
13The following equations are estimated: FXIi,t = αi+γ1∆ERi,t+γ2∆ERi,t×FXDi,t−1+γ3∆ERi,t×
FXDi,t−1 × Dummy(∆ERi,t < 0) + βcontrolsi,t + εi,t and ii,t = αi + θ1∆ERi,t−1 + θ2∆ERi,t−1 ×
FXDi,t−1+θ3∆ERi,t−1×FXDi,t−1×Dummy(∆ERi,t−1 < 0)+βcontrolsi,t+εi,t. We test the following
hypotheses: for FX interventions, H0: γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 0; for policy rates, H0: θ1 + θ2 + θ3 = 0.
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Additionally, we correct for movements in the net position of derivatives as central banks
may intervene in the FX currency market by engaging in forwards or futures operations,
which do not show in the NFA of the central banks. None of these adjustments changes
the overall conclusion.14
The choice of exchange rate measure. For our baseline results, we use the nominal
bilateral exchange rate with the USD. While we believe this is likely to be the variable
of concern for most of the countries in our sample, we explore different specifications for
robustness check. We use real bilateral exchange rate with the USD, nominal effective
exchange rates (NEER), and mixed series where we choose the bilateral euro exchange
rate for European countries and the USD exchange rate for the remaining countries (Ta-
bles 2.11-2.12, the latest are not reported and are available upon request). Again, our
results are robust to these alternative specifications.
Alternative instruments. For our baseline regressions, we use VIX change as the
only instrument. In addition, we estimate regressions using the EMBI change and a
combination of VIX and EMBI changes as additional instruments (Tables 2.13-2.14). The
differences in the results from using these alternative specifications are also small and the
main conclusions hold. Additionally, we report a test of overidentifying restrictions (χ2-
statistics) with the null hypothesis of a joint validity of the instruments. We cannot reject
the null that our instruments are valid.
Including the FX debt of banks and government. Throughout the paper, we
assume that FX exposures of banks and governments do not affect central bank’s policies.
While banks are likely to hedge on-balance sheet FX exposure, exchange rate volatility may
still affect banks’ balance sheets due to differences in maturities of assets and liabilities.
To account for FX exposures of banks, we use net open position of the banking system.
An important caveat is that we are only able to take into account the on-balance sheet
net open FX positions of the banks and, thus, ignore off-balance sheet hedges. These can
be large as it is the case, for example, for Turkey at the end of the sample period.15 When
we run regressions separately for government debt and net open position of banks as the
only FX exposures, the coefficients on exchange rate changes interacted with FX debt
become statistically insignificant for both NFA and policy rate equations (Tables 2.15-
14The data on currency composition of reserves is available only on an aggregated level for emerging
markets and advanced economies. Thus, by using the average composition for EMEs, we assume that the
currency composition is the same across countries in our sample. At the same time, it is highly likely that
there are large variations across countries (e.g. countries in Europe may have a larger share of euros than
Asian or Latin American countries) and the valuation adjustment may add more noise than information.
For our baseline regressions, we therefore use the unadjusted NFA series.
15Turkey is the country with the largest banking sector on-balance sheet net open FX position in the
first quarter of 2015 (about 8% of GDP). However, due to off-balance sheet hedges (for which data exists
for Turkey) of roughly the same amount, the overall FX exposures of the banking system in Turkey are
almost negligible as of the first quarter of 2015.
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2.16). Therefore, the results suggest that FX debt of the non-financial corporations and
households is indeed more important than that of the government and banks in affecting
policies that aim to stem exchange rate pressure.
Non-linearities. We analyze two types of non-linearities. The first is a non-linearity
with respect to FX debt; is it the case that the association between policy variables (FX
interventions and policy rates) and exchange rate changes not only increases with the level
of FX debt but becomes much stronger if FX debt is very high? The second is a non-
linearity with respect to the exchange rate changes. Are policy variables more sensitive to
large changes in exchange rates? We do not find support for any of these non-linearities
with the only exception of an influence of large exchange rate changes on policy rates, as
shown in Tables 2.17-2.18.
Endogeneity of FX debt. One potential bias in the estimates may arise from an
endogeneity in the level of FX debt of the non-financial private sector. As mentioned
earlier, the choice of whether to borrow in FX or not may depend on expectations of the
future policy reactions to exchange rate movements. We assume that changes in FX debt
are likely to be less affected by expectations of the central bank’s policies far into the
future. To limit potential endogeneity of FX debt, we run the regressions using a much
longer lag (three years) for FX debt. Our results are robust to this specification (the
results are not reported and are available upon request). However, we acknowledge that if
high FX exposures three years ago are driven by expectations (which can be self-fulfilling)
that today’s policy will react strongly to exchange rate movements, the use of longer lags
will not guarantee that the results are unbiased. This would require measurement of the
exogenous component of the level of FX exposure in the non-financial private sector, which
is not a part of this paper.
Another potential source of endogeneity is institutional aspects of monetary and ex-
change rate policies that may affect both monetary policy design and the choice of the
currency of debt denomination. If institutional aspects are time-invariant, then country
fixed effects in our baseline regressions capture them. One specific example of an institu-
tional change is Flexible Credit Line Agreement (FCL) with the IMF for Mexico, Poland,
and Colombia in 2009. FCL augments the access to official reserves, thus supplementing
the potential FX reserves available to dampen exchange rate volatility. To account for this
change, we run baseline regressions excluding three countries after an introduction of the
FCL from the sample (the results are not reported and are available upon request). The
baseline results still hold.
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2.5 Conclusion and outlook
Countries with floating exchange rate regimes are often reluctant to allow their currencies
to float freely. In this chapter, we show that balance sheet currency mismatches are
important for producing “fear of floating.” We find that policymakers react more strongly
to exchange rate pressure – depreciation in particular – when FX debt in the non-financial
private sector is high. They use both FX interventions and monetary policy rates. We
find that for every additional 10% FX debt-to-GDP, a 10% depreciation is associated with
a decrease in NFA by 0.2% of GDP and an increase in policy rates by 0.08 percentage
points in the next month and by about 0.2 percentage points cumulative over the following
three months. Moreover, the funding source of the FX exposures matters. FX debt of
the non-financial private sector financed from a domestic banking sector seems to be more
important in producing fear of floating than FX debt obtained directly from abroad.
Such reaction might be optimal given the negative implications for financial stability
from excessive exchange rate movements in countries with large FX exposures. However,
our findings do not allow us to corroborate optimality. Other factors, such as pressure on
central banks to protect important sectors in the economy (and possibly large financial
and non-financial firms and households) where FX indebtedness is high, could also be
at work. Thus, one should be careful about drawing policy conclusions based on the
assumption that the observed policies reflect an optimal monetary policy or optimal FX
interventions. However, theoretical literature supports that when foreign currency balance
sheet mismatches are large, some exchange rate management may be the optimal central
bank policy (while not necessarily a Pareto-efficient equilibrium).
When the FX exposure of the non-financial private sector is high, policies to reduce it
should be considered to ensure monetary policy could work effectively. The importance of
FX debt in inhibiting central banks from allowing exchange rates to move freely implies
that monetary policy could be overburdened by multiple goals. Our finding that FX debt
financed from the domestic banking system seems to be more important for producing
“fear of floating”, suggests that policies should focus first, and mainly, on limiting the
domestic FX lending. Such policies could include strengthening of supervision of FX
lending by the domestic banking sector, prohibiting banks from taking excessive currency
risks, higher reserve requirements for foreign currency funding, higher capital requirements
and risk-weights on FX lending, and potentially outright quantity restrictions on banks’
borrowing in foreign currency. More generalized capital flow management policies – while
likely effective in reducing the overall FX exposures – would be less targeted and, thus,
less effective in reducing the banking system FX lending.
As the choice of exchange rate regime and shifts between regimes may depend on the
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level of FX indebtedness of corporates and households, the analysis could be extended to
look at whether countries with high levels of balance sheet FX exposures are more likely to
choose a fixed exchange rate regime. In addition, while we treat the decision of households
and firms to borrow in FX as purely exogenous, policies to limit exchange rates movements
may provide incentives for increased FX borrowing as explained by Chang and Velasco
(2006). Emerging market economies may be diverging towards different equilibrium – with
some on a suboptimal path of high and increasing FX borrowing and more exchange rate
management, and others – on a path of low and declining FX borrowing and less exchange
rate management. Studying this dual causality empirically would also be an interesting
(yet challenging) extension.
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Appendix
2.A List of countries
Baseline sample (15 emerging market economies):
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
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2.B Data sources
Table 2.1: Definitions of variables and data sources
Variable Unit Description Source
∆Reserves/GDP % Change in reserves minus gold normalized by






∆NFA/GDP % Change in central bank’s net foreign assets
normalized by annual GDP in USD
IFS, WEO
Policy rate % Money market rate IMF statistical
database, respec-
tive central banks
∆Nominal ER % Change in nominal bilateral exchange rate to
USD (increase=depreciation)
IFS
∆Real ER % Change in real bilateral exchange rate to
USD (increase=depreciation)
IFS, Haver Analytics
∆NEER % Change in nominal effective exchange rate
(increase=depreciation)
BIS
∆VIX % Change in Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market Volatility index (VIX)
Haver Analytics
∆EMBI % Change in Emerging markets bond index
(EMBI)
Bloomberg
Inflation % Yearly inflation, computed from CPI Haver Analytics
Output gap % Deviation from hp-trend of a real seasonally-
adjusted GDP in national currency
WEO, author’s calcu-
lations
FX debt/GDP % Foreign exchange debt of non-financial sec-
tor (households, enterprises) normalized by







of the banking sys-
tem/GDP
% Banks’ FX liabilities minus assets normalized






% Government liabilities of the International





Import coverage % Central bank’s net foreign assets over yearly
seasonally-adjusted imports
IFS, DOTS
Money coverage % Central bank’s net foreign assets over M2 IFS, WEO
Current account
balance/GDP
% Four-quarter rolling current account balance




% Seasonally-adjusted imports plus exports
normalized by annual GDP in USD
DOTS, WEO
∆M2/GDP % Change in seasonally-adjusted M2 normal-
ized by annual GDP in national currency
IFS, WEO
64
Chapter 2. Floating with a Load of FX Debt?
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Statistics Obs. Mean SD Min Max
∆Reserves/GDP 2,250 0.002 0.007 -0.042 0.069
∆NFA/GDP 2,250 0.002 0.007 -0.050 0.127
Policy rate 2,244 0.068 0.051 0.004 0.471
∆Nominal ER 2,250 0.001 0.036 -0.138 0.267
∆Real ER 2,250 -0.001 0.036 -0.150 0.232
∆NEER 2,250 0.001 0.023 -0.094 0.220
∆VIX 2,250 -0.002 0.042 -0.102 0.309
∆EMBI 2,250 0.000 0.110 -0.184 0.546
Inflation 2,250 0.054 0.038 -0.043 0.333
Output gap 2,245 -0.000 0.020 -0.115 0.093
FX debt/GDP 1,965 0.209 0.122 0.027 0.587
Net open position
of the banking sys-
tem/GDP
1,965 -0.013 0.041 -0.128 0.118
Government exter-
nal debt/GDP
2,250 0.156 0.108 0.009 0.552
Import coverage 2,250 0.629 0.484 -0.214 2.702
Money coverage 2,250 0.394 0.252 -0.790 1.177
Trade open-
ness/GDP
2,250 0.052 0.027 0.011 0.147
Current account
balance/GDP
2,250 -0.020 0.051 -0.255 1.117
∆M2/GDP 2,250 0.004 0.006 -0.024 0.132
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2.C Figures
Figure 2.1: FX exposures of the non-financial private sector: schematic example
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Figure 2.2: FX debt of the non-financial private sector across time
Source: Quarterly External Debt Statistics, IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics,
WEO, authors’ calculations.
Figure 2.3: FX debt of the non-financial private sector across countries,
Q12015
Source: Quarterly External Debt Statistics, IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics,
WEO, authors’ calculations.
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(a) FX debt-to-GDP is lower than 20% (b) FX debt-to-GDP is higher than 20%
Figure 2.4: Exchange rate changes and FX interventions
(a) FX debt-to-GDP is lower than 20% (b) FX debt-to-GDP is higher than 20%
Figure 2.5: Exchange rate changes and policy rates
Figure 2.6: VIX, EMBI, and exchange rate changes
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Figure 2.7: NFA decline associated with a 10% depreciation
Figure 2.8: Policy rate increase associated with a 10% depreciation
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Figure 2.9: Appreciation vs. depreciation of exchange rates (FX debt: 10% of GDP)
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2.D Tables
Table 2.3: Comparative statistics: high vs. low FX debt
High FX debt Low FX debt
(> 20% of GDP) (< 20% of GDP)
% of cases 51 49
abs (∆ER) > 2.5% 36 35
abs (∆Policy rate) > 0.5 pp. 21 14
abs (∆NFA/GDP) > 0.5% 38 21
Intervention index > 0.5 17 14
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Table 2.4: Regression results – FX interventions
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.015 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009)
∆ Nominal ER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.186∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.042)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.014∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
∆ M2/GDP 0.128 0.124
(0.072) (0.073)
Trade openness/GDP 0.040 0.042
(0.039) (0.036)
Current acoount/GDP (lag) 0.032∗ 0.032∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Money coverage (lag) -0.006 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003)
Import coverage (lag) 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003)




N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable.
In 2SLS regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate
changes. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.5: Regression results – Policy rates
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
Policy rate (lag) Country-specific
Inflation Country-specific
Output gap Country-specific




∆ Nominal ER (lag) × Debt/GDP(lag) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)




N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Country
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.6: Regression results – FX interventions, external vs. internal borrowing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.030∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.014 -0.026
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ Nominal ER × -0.262∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗
Debt/GDP (internal, lag) (0.044) (0.065)
∆ Nominal ER × -0.333 -0.166
Debt/GDP (external, lag) (0.201) (0.172)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.017∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.013∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆ M2/GDP 0.124 0.124 0.134 0.125
(0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Trade openness/GDP 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.045
(0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.032∗ 0.033∗ 0.027 0.027∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Money coverage (lag) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Import coverage (lag) 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt/GDP (internal, lag) -0.010 -0.010
(0.007) (0.006)
∆ Debt/GDP (internal) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.013)
Debt/GDP (external, lag) -0.002 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
∆ Debt/GDP (external) 0.018 0.018
(0.014) (0.013)
N 1920 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.159 0.158 0.142 0.137
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Country
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
74
Chapter 2. Floating with a Load of FX Debt?
Table 2.7: Regression results – Policy rates, external vs. internal borrowing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER 0.020 0.023∗ 0.020 0.022∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × 0.117∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
Debt/GDP (internal, lag) (0.025) (0.025)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × 0.088 0.087
Debt/GDP (external, lag) (0.077) (0.073)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Debt/GDP (internal, lag) -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Debt/GDP (external, lag) -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
N 1914 1914 1914 1914
R2 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Inflation,
output gap and lagged policy rates are country-specific and are not reported. Country fixed effects
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∆Nominal ER -0.015 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
∆Nominal ER x Debt/GDP (lag) -0.217∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.064)
∆Nominal ER x Debt/GDP (lag) x 0.099 0.361∗∗
Dummy(∆Nominal ER <0) (0.082) (0.123)
∆Nominal ER(lag) -0.014∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)




Trade openness/GDP 0.039 0.036
(0.039) (0.038)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.031∗ 0.028∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Money coverage (lag) -0.006 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)




N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable.
In 2SLS regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate
changes. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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∆Nominal ER 0.020 0.024∗
(0.016) (0.012)
∆Nominal ER (lag) 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
∆Nominal ER (lag) x Debt/GDP (lag) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
∆Nominal ER (lag) x Debt/GDP (lag) -0.162∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
x Dummy (∆Nominal ER (lag) <0) (0.033) (0.034)




N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. In-
flation, output gap and lagged policy rates are country-specific and are not reported. Country
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust



















Table 2.10: Regression results – FX interventions, alternative definitions of FX interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆NFA/GDP ∆NFA/GDP(adj.) ∆Reserves/GDP ∆NFA/M2
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.037 -0.037
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.025) (0.025)
∆ Nominal ER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.186∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗
(0.033) (0.042) (0.040) (0.044) (0.031) (0.069) (0.093) (0.150)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.014∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.011 -0.011 -0.043∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
∆ M2/GDP 0.128 0.124 0.090 0.085 0.134 0.129 0.468 0.467
(0.072) (0.073) (0.086) (0.088) (0.065) (0.068) (0.263) (0.263)
Trade openness/GDP 0.040 0.042 0.021 0.019 -0.008 -0.007 0.186 0.186
(0.039) (0.036) (0.054) (0.051) (0.030) (0.026) (0.123) (0.115)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.034 0.035∗ 0.022 0.022 0.105∗ 0.105∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.042) (0.042)
Money coverage (lag) -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006∗ -0.017 -0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
Import coverage (lag) 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.030 -0.030
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.016)
∆ Debt/GDP 0.031∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.066 0.065 0.054∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.038) (0.037) (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.025)
N 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.157 0.157 0.139 0.136 0.201 0.200 0.113 0.113
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable. In 2SLS regressions, change in VIX is used as an
instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported.White heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.11: Regression results – FX interventions, alternative definitions of exchange rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.015 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009)
∆ Nominal ER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.186∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.042)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.014∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
∆ Real ER -0.015 -0.017
(0.009) (0.009)
∆ Real ER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.181∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.042)
∆ Real ER (lag) -0.016∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
∆ NEER 0.003 -0.015
(0.009) (0.010)
∆ NEER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.292∗∗∗ -0.276∗
(0.068) (0.108)
∆ NEER (lag) -0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.007)
∆ M2/GDP 0.128 0.124 0.129 0.127 0.099 0.105
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.069) (0.068)
Trade openness/GDP 0.040 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.047 0.046
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Money coverage (lag) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006∗ -0.006 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Import coverage (lag) 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.002 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Debt/GDP 0.031∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.025∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
N 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.157 0.157 0.154 0.153 0.083 0.080
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Country
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.12: Regression results – Policy rates, alternative definitions of exchange rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER 0.020 0.023∗
(0.016) (0.011)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
∆ Real ER 0.018 0.022∗
(0.015) (0.011)
∆ Real ER (lag) × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
∆ Real ER (lag) 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
∆ NEER 0.034 0.041∗∗
(0.018) (0.014)
∆ NEER (lag) × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.218∗ 0.217∗∗
(0.080) (0.077)
∆ NEER (lag) -0.018 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 1914 1914 1914 1914 1914 1914
R2 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Inflation,
output gap and lagged policy rates are country-specific and are not reported. Country fixed effects
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Table 2.13: Regression results – FX interventions, alternative instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.015 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
∆ Nominal ER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.186∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.123∗∗
(0.033) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.014∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆ M2/GDP 0.128 0.124 0.117 0.117
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Trade openness/GDP 0.040 0.042 0.045 0.045
(0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.032∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Money coverage (lag) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Import coverage (lag) 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Debt/GDP 0.031∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Instrument ∆VIX ∆EMBI ∆VIX, ∆EMBI
N 1920 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.157 0.157 0.152 0.152
Test of overidentifying 13.693 19.877 38.807
restrictions (χ2-stat.)
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable. Country
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. Test of overidentifying restrictions is a Wooldridge’s test statistic.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.14: Regression results – Policy rates, alternative instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER 0.020 0.023∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Instrument ∆VIX ∆EMBI ∆VIX, ∆EMBI
N 1914 1914 1914 1914
R2 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
Test of overidentifying 10.832 16.649 39.714
restrictions (χ2-stat.)
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. Inflation,
output gap and lagged policy rates are country-specific and are not reported. Country fixed effects
are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
in parentheses. Test of overidentifying restrictions is a Wooldridge’s test statistic.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.15: Regression results – FX interventions, FX debt of banks and government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.047∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.026
(0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015)
∆ Nominal ER × 0.392∗ 0.180
Debt/GDP (banks, lag) (0.171) (0.134)
∆ Nominal ER × -0.140∗ -0.100
Debt/GDP (government, lag) (0.063) (0.061)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.017∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ M2/GDP 0.131 0.123 0.136 0.127
(0.081) (0.077) (0.083) (0.078)
Trade openness/GDP 0.045 0.049 0.032 0.035
(0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.024∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Money coverage (lag) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Import coverage (lag) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt/GDP (banks, lag) -0.008 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014)
∆ Debt/GDP (banks) 0.008 0.012
(0.010) (0.012)
Debt/GDP (government, lag) -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
∆ Debt/GDP (government) 0.031 0.039
(0.020) (0.020)
N 2202 2202 2205 2205
R2 0.125 0.118 0.110 0.107
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable.
In 2SLS regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate
changes. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.16: Regression results – Policy rates, FX debt of banks and government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.021∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × 0.040 0.036
Debt/GDP (banks, lag) (0.214) (0.214)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × 0.031 0.032
Debt/GDP (government, lag) (0.038) (0.036)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Debt/GDP (banks, lag) 0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Debt/GDP (government, lag) 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007)
N 2189 2189 2192 2192
R2 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Inflation,
output gap and lagged policy rates are country-specific and are not reported. Country fixed effects
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Table 2.17: Regression results – FX interventions, non-linearities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER -0.008 0.000 -0.014 -0.019
(0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016)
∆ Nominal ER × Debt/GDP (lag) -0.264 -0.352 -0.190∗∗ -0.152∗
(0.148) (0.210) (0.052) (0.066)
∆ Nominal ER × (Debt/GDP)2 (lag) 0.146 0.373
(0.270) (0.370)
∆ Nominal ER2 × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.076 -0.027
(0.320) (0.316)
∆ Nominal ER2 -0.016 -0.017
(0.067) (0.088)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.014∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆ M2/GDP 0.128 0.123 0.128 0.125
(0.070) (0.069) (0.072) (0.077)
Trade openness/GDP 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.042
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Current account/GDP (lag) 0.033∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗ 0.032∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Money coverage (lag) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Import coverage (lag) 0.003∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt/GDP (lag) 0.006 0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Debt/GDP 0.031∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
(Debt/GDP)2 (lag) -0.016 -0.014
(0.020) (0.020)
N 1920 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.158 0.156 0.157 0.156
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for FX interventions as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Country
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. White heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. p<0.1∗; p<0.05∗∗; p<0.01∗∗∗.
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Table 2.18: Regression results – Policy rates, non-linearities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Nominal ER 0.020 0.022∗ 0.020 0.024∗
(0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.142 0.138 0.029 0.029
(0.158) (0.155) (0.024) (0.023)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) × (Debt/GDP)2 (lag) -0.116 -0.110
(0.280) (0.277)
∆ Nominal ER2 (lag) × Debt/GDP (lag) 0.765∗∗ 0.771∗∗
(0.242) (0.242)
∆ Nominal ER (lag) -0.004 -0.004 0.010 0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ Nominal ER2 (lag) -0.141 -0.142
(0.085) (0.079)
Debt/GDP (lag) -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003)
(Debt/GDP)2 (lag) 0.014 0.014
(0.022) (0.021)
N 1914 1914 1914 1914
R2 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
N ote: The Table presents estimation results for policy rates as a dependent variable. In 2SLS
regressions, change in VIX is used as an instrumental variable for exchange rate changes. Inflation,
output gap and lagged policy rates are country-specific and are not reported. Country fixed effects





Legal Harmonization, Institutional Quality,
and Countries’ External Positions:
A Sectoral Analysis1
3.1 Introduction
Regulators and policy makers are facing the challenge to promote resilient capital market
structures that support macroeconomic and financial stability. The recent financial and
sovereign debt crisis in Europe revealed a critical weakness: local stress was spreading
across countries, such that the entire financial system became unstable. One reason for
the system-wide stress is the financial market structure in Europe (Langfield and Pagano,
2016). Relative to GDP, the European Union (EU) has a large, though shrinking banking
sector, and rather underdeveloped bond and equity markets comparative to the other
big economies (Figure 3.1). Therefore, when the banking system ran into trouble, credit
got scarcer in many countries, which impaired investment activity and, hence, growth.
Consequently, policy makers and academics increasingly stress the role of alternative,
non-bank financing sources for European firms.
The EU financial system remains national and cross-border financial integration is
rather limited (European Commission, 2015). Even though international portfolio equity
holdings have significantly increased since the global financial crisis, they remain relatively
small as compared to portfolio debt holdings (Figure 3.2). The existing literature shows
that a larger equity share in external positions is related to better cross-country risk
1This chapter is part of the “European capital markets and macroeconomic stability: The role of
equity and debt” project. The chapter was previously published as: Bremus, F. and Kliatskova, T. (2018).
Legal Harmonization, Institutional Quality, and Countries’ External Positions: A Sectoral Analysis. DIW
Discussion Papers 1768. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287798.
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sharing, whereas larger external credit and debt positions matter less for consumption
smoothing and can even reduce it (Kose et al., 2009; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2011; Bremus
and Buch, 2018). Related to these considerations, the key goals laid out in the Action
Plan for the European Capital Markets Union (CMU) are the promotion of capital market
integration in Europe and a further deepening of debt and equity markets.
In this paper, we analyze legal and institutional determinants of countries’ external
debt and equity positions for different sectors for a large sample of advanced economies,
with a focus on the EU countries. Relating to the debate about the CMU, we ask how
harmonization of the regulatory environment affects countries’ external debt and equity
positions, as well as whether cross-country differences in institutional efficiency matter for
financial integration in Europe. The literature provides ample evidence that information
frictions between countries due to differences in language and legal origins, along with
deep-rooted preferences and habits, can explain a significant part of cross-border equity
and debt holdings (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Giofre, 2013a; Roque and Cortez, 2014;
Giofre, 2017). Yet, evidence on institutional and regulatory determinants of external fi-
nancial structures in the EU is scarce. This paper fills this gap and investigates which
institutional and regulatory factors that appear in the CMU-debate are relevant determi-
nants of external holdings of equity and debt.
The channels through which European policymakers plan to deepen and integrate
financial markets include standardization and harmonization of rules through supervisory
convergence, elimination of differences in financial regulations between the EU countries,
wider access to information, increased transparency (e.g. on the creditworthiness of firms),
and convergence in tax and insolvency rules (European Commission, 2015).
First, we analyze the effect of legislative harmonization in the regulation of financial
services on capital market integration. For that, we extend the legal harmonization index
by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010), using both the EU-Lex database and national information
on the transposition of the EU-Directives in the area of financial intermediation. We
collect data on the transposition of the EU laws by new member states as well as include
information about the regulations introduced in the post-crisis period. A more harmonized
legal framework reduces information and compliance costs and, therefore, should promote
cross-border portfolio investment. Second, we investigate how cross-country differences in
institutional variables, such as insolvency recovery rates, strength of investor protection,
coverage of credit registries, as well as the efficiency of tax systems and contract laws, are
related to international portfolio debt and equity investment. We expect that economic
agents prefer to invest in countries with more efficient institutions.
We use bilateral data on external asset holdings for a set of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and EU economies from the Coordinated
88
Chapter 3. Legal Harmonization, Institutional Quality, and Countries’ External
Positions: A Sectoral Analysis
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) by the IMF. As stressed by Galstyan et al. (2016), the
patterns evident in the aggregate portfolio investment data do not uniformly apply across
the various holding sectors. Therefore, in addition to total bilateral asset holdings, we use
breakdowns of these positions by institutional sector of the holder in order to achieve a
more granular picture about sectoral differences in the institutional and regulatory deter-
minants of external portfolio holdings. We focus on private investors and consider three
different institutional sectors, namely banks, other financial corporations (OFC), and the
non-finanical private sector (NF) that includes non-financial corporations and households.
Our study is most closely related to two strands of literature. It contributes to the
literature that studies the potential of legislative harmonization and convergence in in-
stitutional quality to promote international financial integration. While previous studies
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010; Houston et al., 2012) look at the effect of regulatory harmo-
nization on cross-border credit positions, our study provides evidence for portfolio debt
and equity holdings, i.e. for capital market integration. Further, the paper is related
to the gravity studies that analyze drivers of international investment positions at the
sectoral level. Most of the gravity literature in finance is based on aggregate data on
cross-border positions of debt and equity (Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012; Portes and
Rey, 2005). Since data availability has improved, a small but growing literature inves-
tigates sectoral patterns of international investment positions (Roque and Cortez, 2014;
Giofre, 2017; Galstyan et al., 2016; Boermans and Vermeulen, 2016). In contrast to the
existing studies, we provide a comprehensive overview over the determinants of investment
behavior of sophisticated (banks and other financial corporations) and less-sophisticated
investors (households and non-financial corporations) in both equity and debt markets,
with a focus on differences in institutional quality and regulatory environment.
Our empirical analysis yields three key findings. First, legislative harmonization in the
regulation of financial services across the EU helps strengthen portfolio equity investment,
while the effect is statistically insignificant for portfolio debt positions in our sample.
Second, differences in institutional quality matter, particularly for bilateral cross-border
debt positions. Economic agents prefer to invest more in countries that are transparent
and have efficient insolvency procedures, investor protection, and tax systems as compared
to the domestic ones. Third, the effects of legislative harmonization and differences in
institutional efficiency on bilateral portfolio investment positions vary significantly across
sectors. When we consider total holdings, important sectoral developments are hidden as
they may counteract each other in the aggregate. The other financial corporations sector,
which accounts for a large share of both portfolio equity and debt holdings, seems to
incorporate information on institutional and regulatory factors in its investment decisions
the most.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of
the literature. The empirical model together with hypotheses and data are presented in
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the estimation results and provides robustness tests.
Section 3.5 concludes and offers thoughts on further research.
3.2 Literature review
Several empirical studies explore the effects of differences in financial regulations and
institutional quality on cross-border portfolio investment and credit stocks and flows – with
different results depending on whether bank credit or portfolio investment are considered.
One strand of the literature shows that differences in the stringency and quality of
regulations can distort the allocation of capital between countries. On the one hand, cross-
country differences in banking regulations may encourage bank credit to flow from more
restrictive to less restrictive jurisdictions. This way, banks may improve their efficiency
by reducing the costs of compliance with regulations. At the same time, this regulatory
arbitrage can encourage excessive leveraging and risk taking (Barth et al., 2008). Houston
et al. (2012) show that banks transfer funds to markets with more lenient regulations.
However, countries with lax regulations but weak institutions are less able to attract
credit inflows. In a similar vein, Bremus and Fratzscher (2015) find that source countries
that experienced increases in capital stringency, banking supervisory power, or overall
independence of the supervisor saw larger credit outflows after the global financial crisis.
On the other hand, in the case of cross-border debt and equity investments, economic
agents have incentives to send capital to jurisdictions with more stringent rules on in-
formation sharing or investor protection, encouraging a “race to the top” in institutional
quality (Carruthers and Lamoreaux, 2016). Based on an empirical analysis, La Porta
et al. (2000) claim that the debt and equity capital markets of countries with poorer in-
vestor protections are both smaller and narrower. Mandatory disclosure and facilitation
of private enforcement are positively associated with the ratio of equity market capital-
ization to GDP, the number of listed firms per capita, and trading volume relative to
GDP (La Porta et al., 2006). Further, Gelos and Wei (2005) show that investment funds
systematically invest less in less transparent countries and have a greater propensity to
exit non-transparent countries during crises.
Another strand of the literature shows that countries with more similar regulations,
both business and financial, face lower information barriers and lower costs of compliance,
which leads to more bilateral cross-border investment (Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012).
At the same time, regulatory differences impose additional costs on economic agents by
making them learn, interpret, and understand different laws. For example, different ac-
90
Chapter 3. Legal Harmonization, Institutional Quality, and Countries’ External
Positions: A Sectoral Analysis
counting standards make it more difficult for investors to evaluate the financial soundness
and learn about the creditworthiness of firms they invest in. Empirically, Vlachos (2004)
measures regulatory differences as the absolute difference between regulatory variables in
the source and recipient countries of capital. His analysis confirms that smaller differences
in financial regulations between two countries lead to higher bilateral portfolio holdings.
He identifies the reduction in information costs rather than lower compliance costs as the
key driving force of increased financial integration.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) construct an index of legislative harmonization utilizing
differences in the transposition of the EU-Directives of the Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP) into national laws by the EU-15. The paper presents evidence that legislative con-
vergence led to growth in cross-border banking activities among the European countries.
Ozkok (2016) collects a similar index for 25 EU countries and confirms a positive link
between financial harmonization and developments in the banking and stock markets in
the EU. Additionally, Christensen et al. (2016) find a positive effect of the Market Abuse
Directive on market liquidity, with the effects being stronger in countries with stricter
implementation and traditionally more stringent securities regulations.
3.3 Empirical analysis
The goal of this paper is to investigate how legal harmonization and cross-country differ-
ences in institutional quality impact cross-border investment in debt and equity markets.
In the following, we present our hypotheses as well as describe the data and empirical
methodology.
3.3.1 Hypotheses
We concentrate on institutional aspects that are related to the current debate about the
European Capital Markets Union, namely legal harmonization and narrowing down of
differences in investor protection, insolvency procedures, contract enforcement, credit in-
formation, and efficiency of tax systems. Table 3.3 summarizes the expected effects of the
respective variables of interest on international portfolio investment. More generally, we
test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The more harmonized is the legal framework for financial services be-
tween countries i and j, the larger are their bilateral cross-border asset holdings. A more
harmonized legal framework for financial services across countries lowers the costs of invest-
ing abroad. Legal harmonization reduces both information and compliance costs. Thus,
we expect larger bilateral asset holdings for country-pairs with more harmonized markets
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for financial services.
Hypothesis 2: Investors in country i invest more in assets issued by country j, if the
quality of institutions in country j is better than in country i. In order to gauge the
potential for more transparency (e.g. on the creditworthiness of firms) to foster capital
market integration, we consider public and private coverage of credit registries. The better
the access to information about firms’ financial health is in the issuing country, the lower
the information costs are and the more attractive cross-border investments become (La
Porta et al., 2006). Hence, if the credit registry coverage in the issuer-country j is higher
than in the holder-country i, investors from country i will prefer to hold more debt and
equity from country j. Further, better investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000) and
higher insolvency recovery rates raise the probability of receiving investments back in case
of bankruptcy of the issuer. Thus, higher insolvency recovery rates in the issuer-country as
compared to the holder-country should induce higher holdings by country i of assets issued
by country j. The same reasoning applies to differences in investor protection. Finally, the
larger the gap between country i and j in the costs to enforce a contract, that is, contract
enforcement is less efficient in a source-country than in a recipient-country of capital, the
higher should be the cross-border asset positions of i in j. A similar logic applies to the
effect of differences in the time to prepare and pay taxes – a proxy for the efficiency of a
tax system.
Given that sophisticated investors, such as banks and other financial corporations,
are more exposed to cross-country differences in legal frameworks due to larger and more
internationally diversified portfolios as compared to less-sophisticated investors (the non-
financial private sector), we expect legal harmonization and institutional differences to
matter more for the former sectors (Roque and Cortez, 2014).
Regarding asset classes, differences in the strength of insolvency recovery rates should
be more important for debt than for equity investment due to the difference in liability
characteristics of these two asset categories; in case of bankruptcy, creditors are generally
paid first.2 Regarding investor protection, empirical results by Giofre (2013b) reveal that
a stronger protection of shareholders’ rights can have opposing effects on equity and debt
investments due to conflicting interests of creditors and shareholders, e.g. with respect to a
firm’s risk-taking. Overall, information asymmetries tend to matter more for shareholders
(Eichler, 2012). Therefore, legal harmonization can be expected to play a more important
role for portfolio equity than for portfolio debt investments.
2According to the WB Doing Business Indicators 2018, debt recovery rate was about 70 cents on the
dollar in high-income OECD economies.
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3.3.2 Data and summary statistics
Portfolio debt and equity holdings. We use bilateral sectoral cross-border portfolio
equity and debt holdings as dependent variables. These variables capture security holdings
by a sector s of country i that are issued by all sectors of country j. The data are available
at annual frequency from the IMF CPIS, which collects information on the stock of cross-
border portfolio equity and debt securities on a voluntary basis. We only consider holders
from those OECD and EU countries that report international equity and debt holdings
with a sectoral breakdown. For issuing countries, we include all OECD and EU countries
for which the data are available. The full list of countries and a brief description of the
key variables including the data sources can be found in Appendix 3.A-3.B. In order to
prevent outliers from affecting the estimation results, we trim the sectoral debt and equity
holdings at the 2.5%- and 97.5%-percentiles. Summary statistics for the regression sample
are presented in Table 3.2.
As illustrated by Figure 3.2, which plots the evolution of total international debt and
equity holdings for our baseline sample, investors from advanced economies hold more
debt than equity. Holdings of both equity and debt followed an upward trend with equity
and debt almost tripling over the 2001-2015 period. Equity holdings dropped significantly
in 2008, which is partially due to valuation changes. Additionally, while average annual
growth in both equity and debt holdings was negative in 2008 and 2011, portfolio equity
holdings picked up again in the post-crisis period (Figure 3.3).
As stressed by Galstyan et al. (2016), the patterns evident in the aggregate portfolio
investment data do not uniformly apply across the various holding sectors and may dis-
guise important sectoral developments. Therefore, we disaggregate portfolio investments
by sector of the holder, that is, into banks, other financial corporations (insurance cor-
porations, pension funds, money market funds, and others), and the non-financial sector
(private households and non-financial corporations). Monetary authorities and the public
sector are excluded from the analysis.
We treat banks and other financial corporations as sophisticated investors that have
greater experience in bond and equity investments and are more financially literate as
compared to the less-sophisticated investors represented by non-financial corporations and
households. As discussed by Roque and Cortez (2014), sophisticated investors face lower
transaction and information costs and are more concerned about the profitability of their
investment. Therefore, the importance of regulations in shaping investment decision might
be different for sophisticated and less-sophisticated investors. Figure 3.4 plots the com-
position of international debt and equity holdings by sector for our regression sample. It
reveals that recently OFCs account for the largest part of portfolio equity and debt hold-
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ings. While banks hold a large part of external debt, their cross-border holdings of equity
account for a minor share of total portfolio equity positions. The non-financial sector plays
a subordinated role for portfolio investment positions in our sample.
Legislative harmonization. In order to investigate the role of legislative harmo-
nization at the European market for financial services in promoting cross-border capital
investments, we construct an index of legislative harmonization following Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2010). These authors present a dataset that measures the degree of legislative har-
monization in financial services across the EU-15 between 1999 and 2007. Their index is
based on 27 EU-level Directives of the 1999 Financial Service Action Plan, which sought to
create a harmonized European market for banking, securities, and insurance. To construct
the index, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) exploit the fact that the Directives passed by the
European Commission (EC) are transposed into national law within a certain period of
time, often with delays. As shown by Koetter et al. (2017), the transposition time takes
a couple of years and the delays might occur either due to necessity of technical adapta-
tions and modifications of national laws and institutions or because of other more general
country characteristics or political considerations. As the timing of the transposition of
the EU-Directives varies across countries, the constructed index allows for capturing the
harmonization of regulations across time and country-pairs. Besides measuring bilateral
legal harmonization within the EU, this index could also be used as an instrument in
studies evaluating the effects of financial openness as in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013).
We update the index constructed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) in two dimensions.
First, we extend it to include the 13 new EU countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
and Poland), which transposed most of the existing Directives after their accession to the
EU. Second, we collect information on the transposition dates of the financial regulations
introduced post-crisis, which consist of 28 new Directives and amendments as described in
Table 3.4. We select the Directives that are listed in the section “Financial reforms” by the
European Commission.3 Only the Directives related to banking, securities, or insurance
markets that were transposed into national laws before 2015 are included. To find out the
transposition dates of each Directive we rely on information from EUR-Lex as well as on
the national legislation.4
To create the bilateral financial harmonization index, for each country-pair we define
3https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/
financial-reforms-and-their-progress/progress-financial-reforms_en
4For each Directive, we search information on transposition dates at https://eur-lex.europa.eu,
section “National transposition.” For each country, this section presents a list of national laws that contain
references to the Directive. We read the listed laws (available from the national law web-portals) and
select those laws that mention transposition of the Directive into national law. The date is recorded as of
entry of the law into force.
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55 indicator variables (LEXkijt) that are equal to one starting at the year when the
Directive k was transposed into a national law by both countries, and zero otherwise.
Further, we aggregate the values of the 55 indicator variables as follows: LegHarmijt =
log(1 +
∑K=55
k=1 LEXkijt). The resulting legal harmonization index takes higher values
when countries i and j adopted similar regulations in the areas of banking, securities, and
insurance. For example, in 2014, the non-logarithmized index is 34 for the country-pair
Italy - Croatia, whereas it takes on a value of 50 for Netherlands - Sweden. Figure 3.5
confirms that the pace of transposition of the relevant EU-Directives into national laws
varies across the EU member states. While some countries implemented the Directives
quickly, others did not transpose some of the Directives into national laws or did it with
delays. It is worth mentioning, that by construction the index is equal to zero for all
country-pairs where at least one country is outside of th EU as, in this case, countries do
not have any financial regulations in common.
Differences in institutional quality. To measure various aspects of legal barriers
preventing capital market integration, we concentrate on specific legal areas that were
identified by the Giovannini report (Giovannini Group, 2001). That is, we focus on vari-
ables gauging the quality of investor protection, insolvency recovery, contract enforcement,
coverage of credit registries, and tax systems. We use time to prepare and pay taxes to
account for the sophistication of a tax system (Lawless, 2013) and credit registry coverage
to measure transparency of a financial system. Information on all these variables is taken
from the WB Doing Business Indicators.
To measure differences in institutional quality between holder- and issuer-country, for
each of the variables discussed above we compute indicators as follows: InstDiffijt =
log(Instit/Instjt). Intuitively, economic agents are expected to transfer funds to markets
with better regulations and more efficient legal frameworks (Table 3.3).
Control variables. In addition to our main variables of interest, we include a set of
control variables in the regression equations. Following Okawa and van Wincoop (2012),
we add standard bilateral gravity controls, such as common language, common legal origin,
distance, bilateral trade, and membership in the EU and the euro area (EA). The lower
distance between countries reduces communication costs and increases human interaction,
thus, increasing cross-border investment between countries. The common language dummy
captures information barriers that arise between two countries when economic agents speak
different language and/or legal documents are in a different language. Similarly, countries
that have the same legal origin (British, French, German, Scandinavian, or Socialist)
face lower information barriers. More trade leads to closer interactions between countries
reducing information asymmetries. Moreover, countries that are members of the EA do not
face exchange rate risks, while membership in the EU removes potential capital movement
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barriers. Following Houston et al. (2012), country-specific control variables for both holder-
and issuer-economies include GDP per capita, population, and the Chinn-Ito index of
financial liberalization.
3.3.3 Methodology
Our empirical model specification is based on the gravity literature in finance that links
bilateral international capital positions to information frictions and country characteristics
(Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012; Portes and Rey, 2005).
In a first step, we estimate how legal harmonization, that is, the applicability of the
same laws across different countries, affects cross-border portfolio debt and equity holdings.
Our aim is to gauge the potential for institutional harmonization – one of the long-term
goals of the CMU – to foster cross-border integration of debt and equity markets. For this
purpose, we estimate the following panel gravity model:
log(Aisjt) = αit + θjt + γLegHarmijt + βXijt + isjt (3.1)
where Aisjt are portfolio asset positions (either equity or debt) held by investors in country
i, issued by all entities in country j.
The index t denotes years, and s reflects the sector of the holder, namely banks,
other financial corporations, and the non-financial private sector, as well as total bilateral
portfolio positions.5 LegHarmijt gauges the harmonization of laws across the EU based
on the transposition of the FSAP and post-FSAP Directives into national law as described
above. Additionally, we include both constant and time-varying bilateral control variables
from the gravity literature (Xijt), such as common language, common legal origin, distance,
bilateral trade, and dummy variables indicating whether both countries are members of
the EU or the EA. To control for all country-specific pull and push factors, we add a full
set of holder-country-and-time (αit) and issuer-country-and-time fixed effects (θjt). These
fixed effects absorb all banking sector and macroeconomic developments at the source-
and recipient-country levels. Thus, all potential confounding factors at the country-level
are controlled for in this setup.
Regarding concerns about a reverse causality between the legal harmonization index
and capital market integration, we note that decisions on the transposition of Directives
are made at the country-level and not at the bilateral level that our dependent variable is
measured at. The transposition date of the related EU-Directives is decided upon by each
5Total bilateral positions include holdings of the public sector, which only accounts for a small part of
total portfolio positions. It is not included separately in the analysis, as our focus is on the link between
institutional differences and private investment behavior. Moreover, data coverage for public portfolio
holdings is rather limited.
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individual country and affects all its EU-partner countries alike. Further, Koetter et al.
(2017) show that transposition delays are mainly related to the prevailing country-specific
legal and regulatory frameworks rather than to financial structures. Still, more financially
integrated economies may implement the Directives faster. This pattern, however, will be
controlled for by the country-and-time fixed effects for holder- and issuer-countries.
In a second step, we explore how differences in the quality of institutions between
holder- and issuer-countries affect the investment behavior of different sectors. The idea
is that economic agents prefer to invest more in countries that are transparent and that
have high quality of institutions and laws as compared to the national ones. We follow
Houston et al. (2012) and regress bilateral asset holdings on the differences between several
measures of institutional efficiency in countries i and j:
log(Aisjt) = αi + θj + ηt + γInstDiffijt + βXijt + isjt (3.2)
where InstDiffijt contains the variables of interest, which capture how qualitatively dif-
ferent institutions and laws between two countries are. We concentrate on institutional
characteristics related to the CMU-debate, such as investor protection, disclosure of infor-
mation, contract law, and insolvency and tax regimes. The vector Xijt contains the same
bilateral control variables as in equation (3.1). Additionally, we include a set of standard
country-level control variables as in Houston et al. (2012), namely log of GDP per capita,
log of population, and the Chinn-Ito index of financial liberalization for both holder- and
the issuer-countries.
Overall, our baseline sample covers 33 holder- and 35 issuer-countries over the period
of 2001-2015. For the models investigating the impact of differences in institutional effi-
ciency (equation (3.2)), the sample covers the years 2006-2014, as the main explanatory
variables measuring the quality of institutions from the WB Doing Business Indicators are
only available for this period. As we are interested in how institutional differences and
legal harmonization within the EU affect capital market integration, we follow Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2010) and only include those holder- and issuer-countries from the EU and
the OECD countries that report international equity and debt holdings with a sectoral
breakdown. For robustness checks, we expand our sample to all 94 issuer-economies for
which the data are available.
3.4 Empirical results
Tables 3.5 - 3.9 present estimation results for the linkages between bilateral portfolio
holdings, legal harmonization, and institutional efficiency, based on equations (3.1) and
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(3.2). We provide detailed evidence for total bilateral debt and equity positions together
with sectoral decompositions into banks, other financial corporations (OFC), and the non-
financial private sector (NF).
3.4.1 Determinants of international debt and equity positions
Legislative harmonization. Table 3.5 presents the results for our baseline sample of
advanced economies. It appears that harmonization of the financial market regulations
within the EU is positively related to cross-border debt and equity positions. Yet, the
positive effect of bilateral legal harmonization is only statistically significant for the cross-
border portfolio equity holdings of the other financial corporations sector (column (7)).
The result remains intact if the sample is extended to a broader set of countries (Table
3.6). Hence, legal harmonization seems to matter more for equity market integration,
which may be due to shareholders’ higher sensitivity to information frictions as compared
to creditors. The non-results for the banking sector may be partly driven by comparatively
small volumes of portfolio equity holdings by banks.
In order to investigate whether the estimation results are driven by certain domains of
financial market regulations, we run regressions for four alternative measures, namely for
bilateral harmonization in the areas of (1) banking, (2) securities, (3) insurance services,
and (4) focusing on newly issued Directives, excluding amendments to the previous Di-
rectives, as shown in Table 3.4. All regressions include the same number of observations
as well as the same control variables as in the baseline setup in Table 3.5. Based on the
results in Table 3.7, all sub-indexes (banking, securities, insurance services) are statisti-
cally significant in the regressions with portfolio equity investment of the other financial
corporations as a dependent variable, with harmonization in the insurances area being
particularly important.
Regarding economic significance, an increase in harmonization of financial regulations
between issuer- and holder-countries by one standard deviation from the mean is associated
with an increase in cross-border equity holdings of the other financial corporations by
34%.6 As we control for membership in the EA and in the EU, the coefficients on our
bilateral harmonization index show the effect of the adoption of common laws on cross-
border capital market integration on top of the membership effect. When comparing this
effect to the impact of changes in other structural variables, we find that, for example, an
increase in bilateral trade by one standard deviation from the mean corresponds to a rise in
bilateral portfolio equity holdings of the other financial corporations by about 90%. Hence,
6Taking the estimated coefficient from Table 3.5 (column (7)) and multiplying it with a one standard
deviation increase from the mean (in %) in the (non-logarithmized) index of legal harmonization yields
0.28× 100× (17.8/14.7) = 34.2%.
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pushing forward legal harmonization can strengthen equity market integration within the
EU, thereby increasing financial market depth.
For the set of standard bilateral control variables, our estimation results confirm pre-
vious evidence from the gravity literature. The less distant two countries are and the
more they trade with each other, the larger are their bilateral portfolio debt and equity
positions. Moreover, legal origins are an important determinant of capital market integra-
tion; bilateral portfolio positions are higher if two countries share a common legal system.
These findings are broadly confirmed across assets types (debt, equity) and sectors (total,
banks, OFC, NF).
For total cross-border debt assets, our results reveal that positions are higher within
the euro area as compared to the rest of the sample; i.e. if both holder- and issuer-countries
are members of the euro area. This finding is driven by the asset holdings of the euro area
financial sector, whereas debt holdings do not significantly differ inside and outside of the
euro area for the non-financial sector. Higher portfolio debt holdings within the euro area
are related to comparatively large banking systems, both on the issuer- and holder-sides.
As banks are closely interlinked with each other by holding other banks’ bonds and they
re-finance themselves through debt more than through equity, the obtained results are not
surprising.
Bilateral equity positions, in contrast, do not show a consistently different pattern
within the euro area as compared to the rest of the sample. Apart from a positive and
significant effect of euro area membership on bilateral equity positions in the banking
sector, euro area membership does not seem to matter for portfolio equity investment.
The regression results are in line with the fact that European economies differ in their
investment patterns from a broader set of countries (Langfield and Pagano, 2016).
Differences in institutional quality. Next, we investigate how differences in the
quality of institutions between holder- and issuer-countries affect bilateral debt and equity
holdings (Tables 3.8 - 3.9). As expected, capital is attracted by those countries featuring
the more efficient institutional frameworks, even when controlling for general bilateral
information frictions like common legal origins or distance.
First, the larger is the difference between two countries in strength of investor pro-
tection, insolvency recovery, and credit registry coverage, that is, the issuer-country has
less efficient institutions as compared to the holder-country, the lower are their bilateral
portfolio debt positions. Second, the less time it takes to enforce a contract and to prepare
and pay taxes in the issuer-country than in the holder-country, the more investors from
country i invest in debt instruments of country j. The coefficients are rather similar for
both the sample of advanced countries (Table 3.8) and the extended country sample (Table
3.9). Interestingly, it is again the sector of the other financial corporations that mostly
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drives the results, but this time with respect to its portfolio debt holdings.
The estimates indicate that a change in the ratio of institutional quality in the holder-
and issuer-country by one standard deviation from the mean translates into a change in
portfolio debt holdings of the other financial corporations by about 30 - 60%, depending
on the type of laws being adjusted. For example, if insolvency recovery rates become more
favorable in the holder- than in the issuer-country, such that the difference in institutional
quality rises, cross-border debt holdings of the other financial corporations fall by nearly
30% on average. At the same time, differences in institutional efficiency do not seem to
matter much for bilateral portfolio equity investments across sectors and in total. For
insolvency recovery rates, for example, this finding is in line with the pecking order of
priority creditor payments, according to which holders of securities are paid before equity
shareholders in case of the liquidation of a company.
As suggested by Tables 3.10 - 3.11 in the Appendix, both institutional pull and push
factors play an important role in determining investment decisions – yet, mostly in debt
markets in our sample. Economic agents from countries with high quality of institutions
(especially, in the areas of investors protection and insolvency laws) invest less abroad. At
the same time, investments go to the issuer-countries with better institutional quality.
3.4.2 Robustness checks
Next, we explore the sensitivity of our results to sample selection, potential outliers, and
changes in the model specification.7
First, we check how robust our regression results are to changes in the sample compo-
sition. For that goal, we test if the observed effects are driven by individual countries or
groups of countries. We exclude issuer- and holder-countries one-by-one. The coefficients
of interest retain their economic and statistical significance for all specifications. Further,
in order to account for potentially different dynamics of equity and bond markets pre-
and post-crisis, we re-run the regressions excluding years one-by-one as well as remov-
ing the global financial crisis from the sample. The results remain close to our baseline
specification.
Second, to test for the robustness of our results with respect to the choice of the
dependent variable, we use the log of the share of country j’s assets in the total external
portfolio of country i (Roque and Cortez, 2014). The results are mostly unaffected by this
alternative specification. In addition, we check sensitivity of our estimates to the model
specification with respect to the explanatory variables. We exclude each explanatory
7The corresponding regression results are not reported and are available upon request.
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variable one-by-one to account for potential multicollinearity between the regressors.8 As
expected, institutional and regulatory variables are correlated and the coefficients become
more statistically significant when we include only one explanatory variable at a time.
Third, we test the sensitivity of our coefficients of interest, namely the coefficients
on legal harmonization, with respect to the inclusion of different combinations and sets
of control variables. Given that point estimates and standard errors depend on model
specification (Athey and Imbens, 2015), in addition to the aforementioned robustness
checks, we take a more systematic approach. Namely, we perform an extreme bounds
analysis (EBA) using the Sala-i-Martin algorithm that considers the entire distribution of
the parameters (Hlavac, 2016). It estimates 2m regressions using different combinations of
m potential explanatory variables.9 This approach allows for checking whether changes in
the set of explanatory variables can fundamentally change the coefficients of interest. The
results of the EBA are presented in Figures 3.6 - 3.7. They suggest that the coefficients
on legal harmonization are mostly positive for both total debt and equity holdings across
a large range of alternative empirical models. Moreover, legal harmonization is positively
associated with debt and equity holdings of the OFCs and portfolio debt investment of
banks. Yet, the estimated coefficients on legal harmonization for the portfolio equity
positions of the non-financial corporations and banks are varying widely and can take
positive and negative values almost equally likely, depending on the set of the included
control variables.
Finally, we consider various approaches for estimating the standard errors in our panel
data regressions. Apart from clustering standard errors at a holder-country level, we
perform clustering at both issuer-country and country-pair levels. The results become
more statistically significant with alternative clustering methods.
3.5 Conclusion and outlook
Motivated by the debate about institutional harmonization in the realm of the Action Plan
for the European Capital Markets Union, this paper analyzes institutional and regulatory
driving factors of bilateral cross-border debt and equity holdings at the sectoral level.
The goal is to examine the potential for institutional harmonization to affect longer-term
structures of the financial system in Europe. To this end, based on the information from
the European Commission and national sources, we extend the legal harmonization index
8Our baseline model is specified such that variance inflation factors are below the recommended value
of 10.
9We use m = 10 potential explanatory variables: common language, common legal origin, colonial
links, common colony, common currency, contiguity, log distance, log trade, and membership in the EU
and euro area. Consequently, 1024 regressions are estimated.
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proposed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) by collecting data on the transposition of the
28 post-FSAP Directives as well as by including new EU member states in the sample.
Besides allowing to gauge de jure capital market integration in Europe, this index could
also be used as an instrument in studies evaluating the effects of capital market integration,
similarly to the approach of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) for banking sector integration.
Our empirical analysis yields three key findings. First, based on the constructed mea-
sure of legal harmonization of financial regulations for the 2001-2015 period, we present
evidence that common laws in financial services facilitate cross-border capital market in-
tegration, providing support for Hypothesis 1. The regression results reveal that the other
financial corporations sector increases its cross-border portfolio equity investment in re-
sponse to legal harmonization. In contrast, portfolio debt holdings are not significantly
affected by harmonization of the regulatory environment.
Second, we find evidence that supports Hypothesis 2, i.e. differences in institutional
quality matter for cross-border asset holdings as economic agents prefer to invest in coun-
tries with more efficient institutions as compared to the domestic ones. The more efficient
insolvency procedures, investor protection, or contract enforcement are in an issuer-country
as compared to a holder-country, the larger are the bilateral portfolio debt positions. Port-
folio equity holdings, however, seem to be less responsive to these discrepancies.
Third, the estimation results show that the relationship between institutional and reg-
ulatory differences and bilateral portfolio investment holdings vary significantly across
sectors. The other financial corporations sector reacts to a large set of the variables con-
sidered in this study as compared to banks and the non-financial private sector. Given that
the sector of the OFCs accounts for a significant part of the cross-border debt and equity
positions, the reduction of differences in institutional quality as well as legal harmonization
of the financial regulations have the potential to increase capital market integration.
Since most of the indicators on differences in institutional quality are rather broad and
reflect a large set of factors, a more detailed analysis of the most relevant regulatory and
institutional drivers of the external capital market positions is needed. Further, in order
to examine the potential for legal harmonization and more efficient institutions to promote
equity market integration, the analysis could be extended to foreign direct investment as
an important part of the equity market.
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Appendix
3.A List of countries
Holder-countries (33 EU and/or OECD countries):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and United Kingdom.
Issuer-countries (35 OECD countries):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
Full sample (59 additional issuer-countries):
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mau-
ritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines,
Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Vietnam.
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3.B Data sources
Table 3.1: Definitions of variables and data sources
Variable Unit Description Source
Equity, Debt mln. USD Cross-border holdings of equity or debt from
a country j by sectors of a country i
CPIS, IMF
Common language 0 or 1 Dummy variable that equals one if the two
countries share a common language (spoken





0 or 1 Dummy variable that equals one if the two
countries have the same legal origin (British,
French, German, Scandinavian, and Social-
ist)
La Porta et al.
(1999)
Distance km Simple distance between most populated
cities
CEPII
Trade mln. USD Sum of the values of imports and exports,
FOB
DOTS, IMF
EU, EA 0 or 1 Dummy variables that equals one if the two
countries are members of the EU and euro
area, respectively
GDP per capita const. 2010
mln. USD
GDP per capita World Develop-
ment Indicators,
WB
Population mln. people Total population that is counted as all resi-





Fin. liberalization [0,1] The Chinn-Ito index, normalized. The more
open the country is to cross-border capi-




Insolvency recovery cents on the
dollar
Amount recovered by secured creditors
through judicial reorganization, liquidation






[0,10] Strength of investor protection index. High
values indicate better protection
WB Doing Busi-
ness
Time to enforce a
contract
days Time required to enforce a contract, counted
from the moment the plaintiff decides to file
the lawsuit in court until payment
WB Doing Busi-
ness










index Legislative harmonization in financial ser-
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables
log(Debt), total 11,750 5.71 2.95 -1.84 11.06
log(Debt), banks 7,043 5.46 2.61 -1.17 10.38
log(Debt), OFC 7,868 5.37 2.82 -1.31 10.62
log(Debt), NF 6,465 3.28 2.81 -3.33 9.06
log(Equity), total 11,490 4.70 3.32 -3.92 10.41
log(Equity), banks 4,178 3.38 2.85 -3.81 8.66
log(Equity), OFC 7,992 4.77 3.03 -2.74 10.11
log(Equity), NF 6,862 2.73 3.14 -4.99 8.52
Bilateral explanatory variables
Common language 11,750 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Common legal origin 11,750 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
log(Distance) 11,750 7.78 1.13 4.09 9.88
log(Trade) 11,750 7.37 2.03 -1.61 13.36
Both countries in the EU 11,750 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Both countries in the EA 11,750 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Bilateral harmonization index, total 11,750 1.45 1.67 0.00 3.99
Country-specific explanatory variables
Strength of inv. protection, diff. 6,377 0.00 0.31 -1.08 1.06
Insolvency recovery, diff. 6,377 -0.02 0.57 -1.59 1.59
Time to enforce a contract, diff. 6,377 0.02 0.58 -1.75 1.79
Credit coverage, diff. 6,377 -0.01 1.14 -3.96 3.96
Time to pay taxes, diff. 6,377 0.08 0.71 -2.30 2.49
log(GDP per capita), issuer 6,377 11.29 2.06 7.22 17.16
log(Population), issuer 6,377 2.57 1.33 -1.19 5.77
Financial liberalization, issuer 6,377 0.90 0.21 0.16 1.00
log(GDP per capita), holder 6,377 11.21 2.10 7.22 17.16
log(Population), holder 6,377 2.42 1.23 -1.19 4.87
Financial liberalization, holder 6,377 0.91 0.17 0.16 1.00
Note: This Table presents descriptive statistics for the baseline regressions presented in Ta-
bles 3.5 and 3.8. OFC = other financial corporations (insurances, pension funds, money mar-
ket funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corporations and private
households), diff. = log of the ratio of institutional quality in the holder- and issuer-country.
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Figure 3.1: Size of the financial sector (% of GDP)
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Figure 3.2: Mean growth rates of international portfolio debt and equity holdings
Figure 3.3: Total international portfolio debt and equity holdings
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(a) Portfolio debt holdings
(b) Portfolio equity holdings
Figure 3.4: Cross-border portfolio positions, by sector
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Figure 3.5: Number of the FSAP and post-FSAP Directives transposed into the national
law, years 2007 and 2015
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Figure 3.6: Extreme bounds analysis: legal harmonization, debt holdings
Figure 3.7: Extreme bounds analysis: legal harmonization, equity holdings
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3.D Tables
Table 3.3: Hypotheses: Expected effects of legal and institutional harmoniza-
tion
Variable Effect on portfolio investment
Legal harmonization +
Strength of investor protection, difference -
Insolvency recovery, difference -
Time to enforce a contract, difference +
Credit registry coverage, difference -
Time to pay taxes, difference +
Note: This Table presents the expected effects of legal harmonization and differences in
institutional quality on portfolio investment positions. Differences are computed as the





































Table 3.4: The FSAP and post-FSAP Directives
Directive Title of the Directive Sector
1998/26/EC Implementation of the Settlement Finality Directive Securities
2000/46/EC Directive on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the businesses of elec-
tronic money institutions
Banking
2000/64/EC Directive amending the insurance directives and the Investment Services Directive (ISD)
to permit information exchange with third countries
Insurance
2001/17/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of insurance undertakings Insurance
2001/24/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of banks Banking
2001/65/EC Directive amending the 4th and 7th Company Law Directives to allow fair value account-
ing
Securities
2001/86/EC Directive supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the involve-
ment of employees
Securities
2001/97/EC Directive amending the money laundering directive Banking
2001/107/EC 1st Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securi-
ties)
Securities
2001/108/EC 2nd Directive on UCITS Securities
2002/13/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance directives Insurance
2002/47/EC Directive on financial collateral arrangements Securities
2002/65/EC Directive on the Distance of marketing of Financial Services Insurance
2002/87/EC Directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings
and investment firms in a financial conglomerate
Banking
2002/83/EC Solvency I Directive for life insurance Insurance
2002/92/EC Directive on insurance mediation Insurance
2003/6/EC Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation Securities
2003/41/EC Directive on the prudential supervision of pension funds Insurance





































2003/51/EC Directive modernizing the accounting provisions of the 4th and the 7th Company Law
Directives
Securities
2003/71/EC Directive on prospectuses Securities
2004/25/EC Directive on Take Over Bids Securities
2004/109/EC Transparency Directive Securities
2004/39/EC Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (update of ISD) - MiFID Securities
2005/56/EC 10th Company Law Directive on cross-border mergers Securities
2006/48/EC Directive on the relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions Banking
2006/49/EC Directive on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions Banking
2006/43/EC Directive on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts (amendment) Securities
2006/46/EC Directive on accounting standards (amendment) Banking, Insur-
ance, Securities
2007/14/EC Directive on the harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (amendment)
Securities
2007/36/EC Directive on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies Securities
2007/44/EC Directive on procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of
acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector (amendment)
Banking, Insur-
ance, Securities
2007/63/EC Directive on requirement of an independent expert’s report on the occasion of merger or
division of public limited liability companies (amendment)
Securities
2007/64/EC Directive on the payment services in the internal market Banking, Insur-
ance
2009/14/EC Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes (amendment) Banking
2009/44/EC Directive on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems and on
financial collateral arrangements (amendment)
Securities
2009/49/EC Directive on certain disclosure requirements for medium-sized companies and the obliga-
tion to draw up consolidated accounts (amendment)
Securities
2009/65/EC Directive on UCITS Securities







































2009/110/EC Directive on taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic
money institutions (amendment)
Banking
2009/111/EC Directive on the capital requirements (amendment) Banking
2009/138/EC Directive on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance (Sol-
vency II)
Insurance
2010/73/EC Directive on the prospectus (amendment) Securities
2010/76/EC Directive on the capital requirements (amendment) Banking
2010/78/EC Directive on the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Au-
thority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and European Secu-
rities and Markets Authority) (amendment)
Banking, Insur-
ance, Securities
2011/61/EC Directive on alternative investment fund managers (amendment) Securities, In-
surance
2011/89/EC Directive on the supplementary supervision of financial entities in a financial conglomerate
(amendment)
Banking
2012/17/EC Directive on the interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers (amend-
ment)
Securities
2013/14/EC Directive on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement




2013/34/EC Directive on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related
reports of certain types of undertakings (amendment)
Securities
2013/36/EC Directive on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and investment firms (amendment)
Banking
2013/50/EC Directive on the harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (amendment)
Securities
2014/49/EC Directive on deposit guarantee schemes Banking
2014/51/EC Directive on the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance




2014/59/EC Directive on establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions







































Table 3.5: Regression results – Legal harmonization
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Common language 0.100 -0.160 0.064 0.061 -0.047 0.367 -0.162 0.035
(0.194) (0.178) (0.247) (0.179) (0.176) (0.288) (0.209) (0.216)
Common legal origin 0.696*** 0.683*** 0.703*** 0.802*** 0.851*** 0.425* 0.843*** 0.921***
(0.123) (0.136) (0.161) (0.140) (0.145) (0.243) (0.166) (0.166)
log(Distance) -0.274*** -0.423** -0.380*** -0.439*** -0.389*** -0.401** -0.412** -0.915***
(0.090) (0.154) (0.131) (0.095) (0.110) (0.180) (0.169) (0.119)
log(Trade) 0.341*** 0.327*** 0.237*** 0.313*** 0.452*** 0.535*** 0.315** 0.406***
(0.056) (0.087) (0.082) (0.069) (0.095) (0.173) (0.146) (0.098)
Both countries in the EU 0.460 -0.183 0.224 0.454 -0.260 -0.899 -0.815* -0.457
(0.312) (0.697) (0.486) (0.574) (0.321) (0.950) (0.467) (0.508)
Both countries in the EA 0.563*** 0.528** 0.466** -0.035 0.146 0.940*** 0.087 0.270
(0.173) (0.204) (0.187) (0.171) (0.228) (0.337) (0.281) (0.285)
Bilateral harmonization index 0.109 0.119 0.128 0.064 0.101 0.002 0.282** 0.043
(0.099) (0.209) (0.134) (0.145) (0.101) (0.276) (0.133) (0.107)
R-squared 0.824 0.743 0.812 0.732 0.836 0.655 0.817 0.777
Observations 11750 7043 7868 6465 11490 4178 7992 6862
Holders countries 33 31 32 32 33 31 32 31
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and portfolio equity assets as dependent variables. OFC = other fi-
nancial corporations (insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corporations and
private households). The sample covers 2001-2015 period. Holder-year and issuer-year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not re-
ported. Standard errors are clustered at the holder-country level.





































Table 3.6: Regression results – Legal harmonization, all countries
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Common language 0.237** -0.022 0.176 0.264* 0.005 0.548** -0.136 0.321
(0.116) (0.166) (0.162) (0.139) (0.156) (0.254) (0.172) (0.239)
Common legal origin 0.515*** 0.579*** 0.564*** 0.725*** 0.837*** 0.356 0.769*** 0.876***
(0.145) (0.182) (0.202) (0.150) (0.155) (0.271) (0.154) (0.162)
log(Distance) -0.513*** -0.717*** -0.529*** -0.607*** -0.637*** -0.595*** -0.550*** -1.186***
(0.097) (0.127) (0.147) (0.086) (0.117) (0.197) (0.127) (0.111)
log(Trade) 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.121* 0.159*** 0.328*** 0.317*** 0.265*** 0.200***
(0.041) (0.070) (0.064) (0.056) (0.054) (0.097) (0.069) (0.047)
Both countries in the EU 0.432 -0.258 -0.602 0.458 0.001 0.118 -0.755 0.045
(0.453) (0.752) (0.528) (0.769) (0.408) (0.792) (0.470) (0.847)
Both countries in the EA 0.896*** 0.692** 0.816** 0.095 0.036 0.637* 0.082 0.199
(0.275) (0.279) (0.341) (0.196) (0.268) (0.359) (0.297) (0.318)
Bilateral harmonization index 0.019 0.081 0.251* 0.047 -0.035 -0.099 0.202* -0.098
(0.122) (0.220) (0.130) (0.171) (0.128) (0.311) (0.117) (0.205)
R-squared 0.777 0.707 0.770 0.689 0.785 0.556 0.782 0.719
Observations 22659 11502 14971 10888 21238 6573 14635 11698
Holder countries 33 31 32 32 33 31 32 32
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and equity assets as dependent variables. OFC = other financial corpora-
tions (insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corporations and private households).
The sample covers 2001-2015 period. Holder-year and issuer-year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. Standard errors
are clustered at the holder-country level.





































Table 3.7: Regression results – Legal harmonization in different markets
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Bilateral harmonization index, total 0.109 0.119 0.128 0.064 0.101 0.002 0.282** 0.043
(0.099) (0.209) (0.134) (0.145) (0.101) (0.276) (0.133) (0.107)
Bilateral harmonization index, banking 0.135 0.157 0.167 0.067 0.112 -0.063 0.274* 0.115
(0.114) (0.217) (0.139) (0.174) (0.114) (0.319) (0.135) (0.124)
Bilateral harmonization index, securities 0.139 0.157 0.127 0.088 0.092 -0.149 0.273* -0.013
(0.110) (0.227) (0.147) (0.171) (0.115) (0.278) (0.145) (0.127)
Bilateral harmonization index, insurance 0.129 0.167 0.117 -0.017 0.142 -0.100 0.327** 0.088
(0.122) (0.239) (0.166) (0.189) (0.115) (0.308) (0.153) (0.137)
Bilateral harmonization index, excluding amendments 0.110 0.108 0.145 0.082 0.126 0.123 0.349** 0.061
(0.105) (0.230) (0.146) (0.148) (0.108) (0.294) (0.149) (0.116)
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and equity assets as dependent variables. OFC = other financial corporations
(insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corporations and private households). The sam-
ple covers 2001-2015 period. Holder-year and issuer-year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. All regressions include the same
control variables as in Table 3.5, as well as the same number of observations. Standard errors are clustered at the holder-country level.





































Table 3.8: Regression results – Institutional differences
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Common language -0.118 -0.266 -0.261 -0.107 -0.273 0.331 -0.414* -0.215
(0.235) (0.220) (0.263) (0.173) (0.187) (0.318) (0.217) (0.214)
Common legal origin 0.804*** 0.739*** 0.841*** 0.900*** 0.845*** 0.478** 0.849*** 1.122***
(0.126) (0.141) (0.184) (0.158) (0.154) (0.233) (0.169) (0.184)
log(Distance) -0.351*** -0.445*** -0.388*** -0.487*** -0.421*** -0.509** -0.474*** -0.962***
(0.093) (0.140) (0.127) (0.114) (0.111) (0.190) (0.158) (0.136)
log(Trade) 0.344*** 0.328*** 0.287*** 0.363*** 0.503*** 0.512** 0.331** 0.398***
(0.057) (0.090) (0.066) (0.074) (0.096) (0.192) (0.146) (0.099)
Both countries in the EU 0.724*** 0.413* 0.674** 0.910*** 0.055 -1.001* 0.131 -0.220
(0.208) (0.233) (0.303) (0.254) (0.247) (0.560) (0.282) (0.341)
Both countries in the EA 0.765*** 0.629*** 0.526*** -0.013 0.152 0.883** 0.139 0.313
(0.188) (0.215) (0.181) (0.208) (0.198) (0.389) (0.243) (0.254)
log(GDP per capita), holder 1.876 0.479 1.783 0.023 3.342*** 3.718** 2.271*** 2.816*
(1.373) (1.003) (1.208) (1.356) (0.728) (1.772) (0.810) (1.381)
log(GDP per capita), issuer 2.653*** 3.533*** 5.675*** 1.591 0.620 -1.519 1.847*** -0.255
(0.805) (1.044) (0.839) (1.061) (0.691) (1.118) (0.617) (0.943)
log(Population), holder -0.583 2.789 2.853 1.932 4.390** -3.080 3.589** 0.670
(2.982) (2.020) (2.473) (2.718) (2.103) (2.953) (1.661) (1.906)
log(Population), issuer 2.117* 4.003*** 2.516*** 3.069** 0.275 1.355 0.029 0.849
(1.053) (1.253) (0.831) (1.330) (0.864) (2.208) (1.143) (1.227)
Fin. liberalization, holder 1.059 2.033 -1.096 2.307 2.394*** 6.609*** 1.928*** 1.979
(1.429) (1.648) (0.916) (1.835) (0.440) (1.672) (0.658) (2.055)
Fin. liberalization, issuer 0.514 0.219 0.731 0.543 -0.908* 1.181 -0.975 -1.003
(0.333) (0.477) (0.443) (0.432) (0.532) (1.543) (0.612) (0.923)
Strength of inv. protection, diff. -0.780 -0.403 -0.635 -1.368** 0.074 1.224 0.163 -0.365
(0.465) (0.818) (0.452) (0.558) (0.276) (0.807) (0.327) (0.578)
Insolvency recovery, diff. -0.223 -0.585*** -0.474*** -0.320 -0.111 -0.601 -0.148 0.066
(0.227) (0.178) (0.171) (0.199) (0.148) (0.377) (0.160) (0.181)
Time to enforce a contract, diff. 0.895*** 0.532* 0.587*** 0.125 0.201 -0.311 0.085 -0.022
(0.286) (0.289) (0.172) (0.299) (0.160) (0.446) (0.122) (0.315)
Credit registry coverage, diff. -0.031 -0.189*** -0.327*** -0.042 0.044 -0.080 -0.022 0.096
(0.093) (0.065) (0.051) (0.111) (0.077) (0.118) (0.091) (0.101)
Time to pay taxes, diff. 0.293** 0.106 0.359*** 0.424* -0.277* -0.161 -0.211 -0.332**
(0.133) (0.171) (0.128) (0.223) (0.140) (0.244) (0.136) (0.145)
R-squared 0.806 0.727 0.811 0.702 0.825 0.669 0.804 0.771
Observations 6377 3800 4587 3850 6313 2259 4544 4094
Holder countries 32 30 31 29 32 29 31 29
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and equity assets as dependent variables. OFC = other financial corpora-
tions (insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corporations and private households),
diff. = log of the ratio of institutional quality in the holder and in the issuer country. The sample covers 2006-2014 period. Holder-, issuer-, and year-
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the holder-country level.





































Table 3.9: Regression results – Institutional differences, all countries
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Common language 0.154 -0.177 0.050 0.153 -0.065 0.716** -0.299 0.131
(0.156) (0.190) (0.186) (0.146) (0.196) (0.272) (0.182) (0.257)
Common legal origin 0.517*** 0.605*** 0.632*** 0.733*** 0.807*** 0.408* 0.741*** 0.990***
(0.152) (0.187) (0.197) (0.160) (0.142) (0.236) (0.164) (0.181)
log(Distance) -0.424*** -0.641*** -0.461*** -0.595*** -0.568*** -0.616*** -0.550*** -1.013***
(0.097) (0.139) (0.153) (0.117) (0.132) (0.200) (0.127) (0.123)
log(Trade) 0.286*** 0.275*** 0.197*** 0.231*** 0.442*** 0.396** 0.323*** 0.303***
(0.043) (0.097) (0.062) (0.070) (0.071) (0.186) (0.090) (0.068)
Both countries in the EU 0.433* 0.353 0.346 0.881*** -0.173 -0.265 -0.015 -0.033
(0.231) (0.268) (0.346) (0.287) (0.308) (0.612) (0.333) (0.362)
Both countries in the EA 1.069*** 0.771** 0.873*** 0.185 0.183 0.682* 0.240 0.315
(0.258) (0.285) (0.259) (0.227) (0.223) (0.369) (0.254) (0.296)
log(GDP per capita), holder 1.429 0.794 1.893* 0.658 2.101*** 2.915** 0.953 1.989
(1.080) (0.827) (1.047) (1.072) (0.695) (1.404) (1.186) (1.275)
log(GDP per capita), issuer 1.401*** 1.575* 2.624*** -0.105 0.085 -0.234 1.042* 0.171
(0.432) (0.843) (0.518) (0.820) (0.503) (0.686) (0.513) (0.680)
log(Population), holder -0.297 3.212 2.291 0.928 4.861** -0.891 3.511* 1.591
(2.430) (1.934) (2.152) (2.792) (2.153) (2.771) (1.800) (1.994)
log(Population), issuer 0.318 0.277 1.017 1.897* 1.462 0.481 1.412 -0.565
(0.593) (0.864) (0.626) (1.013) (0.986) (1.325) (0.973) (0.850)
Fin. liberalization, holder 0.727 1.823 -1.170* 1.988 2.841*** 6.296*** 1.912** 2.671
(0.970) (1.277) (0.657) (1.730) (0.305) (1.655) (0.905) (1.672)
Fin. liberalization, issuer 0.557*** 0.487* 0.712*** 0.680** 0.123 1.056 0.124 -0.287
(0.160) (0.279) (0.197) (0.295) (0.245) (0.966) (0.254) (0.390)
Strength of inv. protection, diff. -0.295 0.424 -0.277 -0.564 -0.235 0.337 -0.196 -0.549
(0.324) (0.504) (0.331) (0.351) (0.338) (0.615) (0.363) (0.424)
Insolvency recovery, diff. -0.178 -0.432* -0.211 -0.003 -0.283*** -0.215 -0.175 0.125
(0.177) (0.230) (0.139) (0.149) (0.098) (0.289) (0.104) (0.165)
Time to enforce a contract, diff. 0.803*** 0.539* 0.727*** 0.099 0.214 0.021 0.272 -0.216
(0.250) (0.272) (0.216) (0.255) (0.147) (0.370) (0.166) (0.282)
Credit registry coverage, diff. -0.027 -0.076 -0.199*** 0.068 0.017 0.001 -0.066 0.127
(0.068) (0.060) (0.043) (0.104) (0.058) (0.107) (0.056) (0.095)
Time to pay taxes, diff. 0.172 -0.034 0.277** 0.331* -0.181 0.165 -0.125 -0.167
(0.105) (0.162) (0.106) (0.187) (0.142) (0.264) (0.127) (0.129)
R-squared 0.778 0.709 0.768 0.677 0.778 0.590 0.774 0.722
Observations 11209 5647 7992 5914 10544 3229 7606 6212
Holder countries 32 30 31 29 32 29 31 29
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and equity assets as dependent variables. OFC = other financial corpora-
tions (insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corporations and private households),
diff. = log of the ratio of institutional quality in the holder and in the issuer country. The sample covers 2006-2014 period. Holder-, issuer-, and year-
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the holder-country level.





































Table 3.10: Regression results – Issuer-specific characteristics
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Common language -0.075 -0.259 -0.174 -0.009 -0.232 0.260 -0.336 -0.110
(0.235) (0.213) (0.264) (0.191) (0.186) (0.333) (0.213) (0.228)
Common legal origin 0.794*** 0.764*** 0.793*** 0.902*** 0.839*** 0.470* 0.831*** 1.083***
(0.122) (0.139) (0.180) (0.150) (0.156) (0.235) (0.177) (0.183)
log(Distance) -0.336*** -0.456*** -0.386*** -0.498*** -0.394*** -0.473** -0.425*** -0.944***
(0.094) (0.146) (0.118) (0.096) (0.107) (0.181) (0.150) (0.127)
log(Trade) 0.361*** 0.334*** 0.295*** 0.344*** 0.513*** 0.579*** 0.361** 0.409***
(0.060) (0.091) (0.067) (0.074) (0.093) (0.205) (0.139) (0.096)
Both countries in the EU 0.740*** 0.236 0.504* 0.841*** -0.015 -0.942* 0.096 -0.373
(0.201) (0.248) (0.261) (0.299) (0.247) (0.472) (0.289) (0.408)
Both countries in the EA 0.675*** 0.626*** 0.609*** -0.090 0.145 0.887** 0.116 0.227
(0.160) (0.215) (0.186) (0.198) (0.202) (0.403) (0.235) (0.248)
log(GDP per capita), issuer 2.595*** 3.179*** 5.403*** 1.782 0.879 -1.401 2.345*** -0.019
(0.739) (1.006) (0.759) (1.196) (0.649) (1.045) (0.671) (0.978)
log(Population), issuer 3.153*** 3.517*** 3.468*** 4.167*** 0.907 1.747 0.234 2.636**
(1.054) (1.191) (0.877) (1.322) (0.950) (2.040) (1.231) (1.252)
Fin. liberalization, issuer 0.688* 0.545 0.717 0.562 -0.784 1.066 -0.871 -1.002
(0.353) (0.556) (0.442) (0.407) (0.522) (1.266) (0.603) (0.887)
Strength of inv. protection, issuer -0.580 -1.278 -1.198* 0.116 -0.982*** -1.225 -0.865** -0.286
(0.386) (0.809) (0.635) (0.777) (0.356) (1.369) (0.367) (0.548)
Insolvency recovery, issuer 0.109 0.225 0.540*** 0.098 -0.018 0.473 0.032 0.108
(0.162) (0.212) (0.182) (0.267) (0.182) (0.511) (0.207) (0.311)
Time to enforce a contract, issuer -0.633** -0.610** -0.397 -0.143 0.083 0.145 0.182 0.950***
(0.252) (0.270) (0.234) (0.315) (0.190) (0.498) (0.172) (0.296)
Credit registry coverage, issuer 0.234*** 0.236*** 0.418*** 0.251** 0.045 0.069 0.018 0.065
(0.053) (0.070) (0.064) (0.109) (0.092) (0.205) (0.092) (0.111)
Time to pay taxes, issuer -0.499*** -0.128 -0.537*** -0.693*** 0.626*** 0.360 0.556*** 0.650***
(0.103) (0.213) (0.119) (0.189) (0.121) (0.309) (0.130) (0.152)
R-squared 0.818 0.735 0.815 0.736 0.829 0.680 0.812 0.773
Observations 6707 4035 4892 4033 6653 2346 4863 4304
Holder countries 33 31 32 30 33 30 32 30
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and equity assets as dependent variables. The following equation is estimated:
log(Aisjt) = αit + θj + ηt + γInstitutionsit + βXijt + isjt
OFC = other financial corporations (insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corpora-
tions and private households). The sample covers 2006-2014 period. Holder-year, issuer-, and year-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are
not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the holder-country level.





































Table 3.11: Regression results – Holder-specific characteristics
Debt Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Banks OFC NF Total Banks OFC NF
Common language 0.030 -0.230 -0.045 0.042 -0.172 0.433 -0.275 -0.144
(0.220) (0.216) (0.273) (0.164) (0.186) (0.334) (0.206) (0.230)
Common legal origin 0.736*** 0.703*** 0.745*** 0.793*** 0.865*** 0.510* 0.861*** 1.066***
(0.135) (0.143) (0.175) (0.161) (0.144) (0.254) (0.163) (0.176)
log(Distance) -0.307*** -0.409*** -0.362** -0.439*** -0.405*** -0.502*** -0.441** -0.982***
(0.094) (0.137) (0.148) (0.114) (0.129) (0.177) (0.181) (0.136)
log(Trade) 0.344*** 0.333*** 0.279*** 0.351*** 0.484*** 0.406** 0.344** 0.368***
(0.053) (0.083) (0.071) (0.074) (0.101) (0.164) (0.153) (0.094)
Both countries in the EU 0.753*** 0.363 0.816** 0.791*** 0.151 -0.936* 0.216 -0.190
(0.250) (0.227) (0.302) (0.240) (0.274) (0.537) (0.305) (0.342)
Both countries in the EA 0.618*** 0.553** 0.362* -0.105 0.097 0.831** 0.097 0.281
(0.195) (0.216) (0.191) (0.214) (0.222) (0.357) (0.276) (0.283)
log(GDP per capita), holder 1.767 0.105 1.428 0.104 2.988*** 3.681* 2.225** 2.269
(1.270) (0.892) (1.248) (1.569) (0.631) (1.868) (0.936) (1.434)
log(Population), holder -0.246 3.017 1.753 1.932 4.547** -5.610* 2.797 2.172
(2.411) (2.245) (2.663) (2.933) (1.820) (2.835) (1.792) (2.016)
Fin. liberalization, holder 0.968 1.495 -0.836 2.076 2.596*** 5.706** 2.225*** 1.503
(1.353) (1.732) (1.004) (1.624) (0.316) (2.070) (0.759) (1.850)
Strength of inv. protection, holder -1.908*** -2.217*** -1.682*** -2.045* -1.076*** 0.210 -0.615 -0.638
(0.649) (0.729) (0.476) (1.004) (0.347) (0.992) (0.436) (0.727)
Insolvency recovery, holder -0.229 -0.913*** -0.417** -0.515 -0.240 -0.776 -0.221 0.212
(0.378) (0.292) (0.179) (0.375) (0.220) (0.529) (0.144) (0.221)
Time to enforce a contract, holder 0.875* 0.141 0.579** -0.247 0.458* -0.668 0.318 0.688
(0.457) (0.351) (0.240) (0.389) (0.239) (0.944) (0.193) (0.475)
Credit registry coverage, holder 0.160 -0.009 -0.065 0.343* 0.104 -0.171 -0.042 0.315
(0.123) (0.153) (0.093) (0.182) (0.096) (0.187) (0.191) (0.213)
Time to pay taxes, holder -0.020 0.028 0.096 0.095 0.089 -0.227 0.114 -0.134
(0.273) (0.259) (0.209) (0.550) (0.157) (0.469) (0.172) (0.242)
R-squared 0.806 0.732 0.812 0.700 0.827 0.647 0.810 0.778
Observations 7011 4197 5029 4250 6891 2565 4976 4498
Holder countries 32 30 31 29 32 30 31 30
Note: This Table presents estimation results for log bilateral portfolio debt and equity assets as dependent variables. The following equation is estimated:
log(Aisjt) = αi + θjt + ηt + γInstitutionsjt + βXijt + isjt
OFC = other financial corporations (insurances, pension funds, money market funds, others), NF = non-financial private sector (non-financial corpora-
tions and private households). The sample covers 2006-2014 period. Issuer-year, holder-, and year-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but are not
reported. Standard errors are clustered at the holder-country level.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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